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ABSTRACT

Bowen, Lauren Renee. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University,
2015. Free to Hate Freedom and the survival of liberalized states confronting the
emergence of political Islam; effective state solutions to the rise of Islamic political
violence in democratic societies.

The following research addresses the susceptibility of liberalized nations to encounter
Islamic political violence associated with the behaviors they direct toward Islamic
minorities. Democratic values, theoretically, weaken the ability of free regimes to defend
against the emergence of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Experiences with these
phenomena are, however, specific to multicultural or assimilationist democratic states
that esteem civil liberties and individual freedom. This study presents diverse data sets to
understand the interaction of state behaviors shaped by the adoption of multiculturalism
or assimilationist polices concerning Islamic minorities and violent outcomes. The
findings suggest that state behaviors affecting Islamic populations are correlated with
heightened or reduced prospects of Islamic political violence. Moreover, this research
demonstrates that, democracies’ unique experiences with Islamic violence and extremism
connect with multicultural integrationist or assimilationist practices and that the impact of
state behavior on Islamic populations and majorities relates to democracies’
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experiences with the emergence of Islamic radicalism and political aggression in
unexpected ways.

UPDATE: This research was defended December 2, 2014. Nearly a month later 12
Frenchmen tragically fell victim to Jihadist violence at the offices of a satirical
newspaper. While the measures in this study, compiled to operationalize Islamic Political
Violence, do not reflect these causalities their incorporation would neither skew the
results nor impact the findings. This incidence further substantiates that social science
research cannot predict the emergence of jihadist violence. In light of this development,
however, it can be determined that state behavior connects with heightened or reduced
prospects of Islamic political violence. Never should state behavior be solely attributable
to deadly violence or its alteration be entirely depended upon as a robust means through
which to strategically prevent such occurrences.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Prevalent themes dominate academic and political discourse concerning how and to what
extent democracies’ political behaviors contribute to their likelihood to experience
domestic Islamic political violence and radicalization. Professor Joycelene Cesari, senior
research fellow at the Berkley Center of Religion, perfectly summarizes these common
notions in her commentary to the New York Times suggesting that, “to end the appeal of
Islamic State to Muslims, Europe must embrace Islam” (New York Times). She asserts
that,
“The radicalization of Muslim Youth is the increase of discriminatory policies via Islamic
practices in Europe, including the use of the hijab, regulation of mosque minarets,
curriculum, and halal food. All contribute to a growing sense among Muslims that they
are not accepted as full members of European society. Anti immigration and anti Islamic
discourse translates into discriminatory practices in employment, housing, and political
activities. It can be a factor in strengthening a defensive identification within Islam and
therefore gives more leverage to any ideology that pits the West against Muslims”
(New York Times).
Like Cesari, much of the literature reviewing the role democracies assume in their fate
with violent outcomes perpetrated by native Islamic actors credit their discriminatory and
alienating behaviors with a greater probability to experience Islamic terrorism. Most
political and academic theories agree that state behavior influences free societies’
chances to confront violence founded in religious and violent prerogatives. What is
unresolved in the literature are the specific democratic behaviors that create a free state’s
predisposition to Islamic terrorism. Are they democratic behaviors that perceivably
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alienate and discriminate Muslims associated with assimilationist conduct as echoed by
Cesari? This study surveys the rather unexplored lack of violent consequences endured
by assimilationist European societies criticized by Cesari. Her popular preference for
European governments to embrace Islamic practice (as is mandated by multiculturalist
conduct), however, is often regarded as the best means through which to combat violence
and radicalization. This research will show that both are much more seemingly prevalent
and impactful in democracies closely resembling her vision of a liberalized state absent
Islamic terrorism.
The literature, in concert with the position of Cesari, often points to multicultural
integration proceedings as the most effective means through which to mitigate violence.
This model’s societal implications encourage an acceptance and tolerance for all
components of Islam so to realize the successful integration of Islamic minorities.
Multiculturalism’s embrace of Islam is, therefore considered an effective political
mechanism through which to lessen Islamic violence and radicalization.
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PURPOSE AND RATIONALE
The popular expression, “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”
attributes random, violent, and often catastrophic events against the unsuspecting to
political causes founded on intense desires for liberation and ascendency of nationalist
sentiments. Preferences for aggression, from this perspective, challenge political
oppression. Regimes that subject their populations, therefore, to repression and are not
sufficiently open to permit citizens enough outlets for political expression incite anger
and remain vulnerable to experiencing political violence (Wade/Reiter 333). If indeed,
terrorist movements only emerge from the most desperate and oppressive circumstances
then establishing the determinants of terrorism prospectively involves simple and concise
calculations. As recent history demonstrates, nationals of democratic societies, however,
violently react to the behaviors of their resident sate despite expansive opportunities for
legitimate and peaceful political change.
Assumptions concerning the relationship between state behavior and political
violence emerge from the prevalent viewpoint that an absence of political freedom
necessitates political violence. Unfortunately the success of Islamic radicals, though
citizens of free societies, demonstrates that rights and increased economic opportunity
fail to deter Jihadist acts. Yet much confidence is placed in the ability of political rights
to subdue the need for political violence. Why do democracies with significant
Islamic minorities have diverging experiences with Islamist violence?
Violent incidents recently experienced by Western democracies point to the
inability of freedom and prosperity to mitigate Jihadist violence. Naturally curiosities
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emerge about the degree to which democratic conduct justifies radicalized yet free
populations to engage in such atrocities.
Competing theories offer credible insight into free and authoritarian states’
experiences with terrorism. Some attribute political violence to oppression,
discrimination, and alienation. Others posit that foreign policy correlates with an onset of
political violence. Yet others conclude that democracies remain not even a little
vulnerable to domestic terrorism because of democratic institutions promising peaceful
change.
All attribute, however, domestic and international violent movements to state
behavior. None explain divergences in experiences in terrorism across the exact same
regime types. Moreover, none can detail why democracies also remain vulnerable to
domestic terrorism despite democratic traditions permitting outlets for peaceful political
change. If repression inspires domestic political violence so and advances liberation
movements though entire populations of democracies are already considered liberated,
then why would domestic terrorism emerge in democracies and in protest of what?
Because state behavior has been identified as a primary cause for political
violence, Western democracies subject to Islamic violence instinctively seek to
understand their contributions to violent outcomes. If democratic conduct must be tied to
the liberated West’s “fateful” experiences with Islamic terrorism then, careful
consideration must be directed toward the behaviors of a democracy with heightened
experiences of Islamic terrorism over that of another with less Islamic violence. The
objective of this study remains less about establishing causation between a democracy’s
treatment of its Islamic citizens and prevalence of violence and more about the aspects of
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democratic governance that increases a free state’s vulnerabilities to experience Islamic
political violence.
This study recognizes that democracies indeed experience domestic terrorism and
that these experiences with terrorism vary between liberal regimes. How does state
behavior connect with domestic terrorism in democracies? Why do
experiences with Islamic political violence diverge across democratic
systems?
Scholarly assessments adequately explain the emergence of Islamic political
violence in regimes ruled by oppressive elites but little substantive explanation exists as
to why democracies experience domestic Islamic political violence in conjunction with
transnational Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately, as Jogman protests, “ the majority of
available data concentrate on international or transnational terrorism while several
democracies have more to fear from domestic terrorism” (Jogman). Furthermore,
Indridrason, when accounting for the academic theories relating to terrorism and regime
type admits that, “ studies of the consequences of democratic governance have largely
been absent” (224). Fox also stresses that most studies involving ethno-religious groups
focus on behaviors of minorities. According to Fox, “ the question of what motivates the
behavior of the majority has received, at best, secondary attention” (424).
Prevailing terrorism and regime type theories credit democracy as very capable in
eliminating Islamic political violence, especially those movements sustained by their own
citizens. One such theory forwarded by Schmid acknowledges that the strengths of
effective democracies can minimize the emergence of domestic terrorist groups (17).
Consistent with this assessment, healthy democracies remain capable of reducing the
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need of resorting to violence for achievement of political change. The political systems
permitting political change achieved through peaceful means, however, potentially
extend violently motivated non-state actors’ opportunities for radical and aggressive
responses to “undesirable” state and societal behaviors.
This inquiry suggests not that there remains something about democracies that
inspires violence but that instinctive political and societal behaviors of liberal systems
compel aggressive responses and protest of political as well as societal conduct
disconcerting to Islamic minorities. According to Eubank, “democracy provides a setting
within which it is relatively easy for terrorists to commit violent acts is not identical to
asserting that democratic politics promotes terrorist violence” (419). Democratic systems,
therefore, potentially promote environments in which Islamic minorities aspiring for
political change may conduct violent operations with reasonable chances for success.
After careful review of literature explaining the correlation between democracy
and occurrences of political violence, I shall attend to the interactions of: (1) democratic
vitality, (2) societal and political responses either demonstrating preferential treatment
toward Islamic minorities through adoption of multiculturalism policies or neglecting the
social and economic status of native Islamic minorities as a consequence of assimilation
policies, (3) foreign policies involving majority Islamic states, and (4) perceptions among
resident Islamic minorities of inclusiveness, oppression, and occupation resulting from
state /societal domestic behaviors and foreign policies involving Islamic lands. Assessing
the relationship between democratic practice and the prevalence of political violence
among citizens with alternatives to such means illuminates the vulnerabilities of
democratic polities to experience violence for political ends. Democracies vulnerabilities
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are then exploited by their own citizens who are frustrated by societal and state conduct
that they perceive as alienating to minorities, occupying majority Muslim states, or
contradictory to Islam.
A survey of the literature concerning the relationship between terrorism and
democracy reveals that democracies remain vulnerable to experiencing transnational
terrorism but fail to experience domestic political violence perpetrated by minority
Islamic populations native to democracies. According to these analyses, democratic
societies allow for expression of interests and preferences through peaceful participation
in political processes. Therefore little incentive remains for participation in violence for
political ends. Additionally, free and frequent elections require elected officials to
respond to the immediate needs of their citizens leading to a reduction of grievances
against the state. The representation required for healthy democratic function adequately
addresses the concerns of potentially discontent populations (Suvan 883).
Some scholarly contributions fail to link inherent characteristics of democratic
regimes including wide political participation, civil liberties, and free press to the
likelihood of free states experiencing domestic political violence perpetrated by native
Islamic non- state actors. These works associate such upheaval with the perception
among its proponents about the degree to which the targeted state behaves like an
occupying force. The views forwarded in these assessments suggest that terrorism
remains a preferred mechanism through which to protest occupation and oppression
(Pape). In accordance with these arguments, liberal societies remain vulnerable to
political violence because its participants aspire to terminate the occupation of their
perceived homelands and liberate oppressed Islamic minorities (Suvan 889).
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The literature assumes that the relationship between state behavior and terrorist
incidents facilitate beliefs among policy makers that modifying the political functions of
non-democracies remains the best approach to combat global terrorism. While nobility
and righteousness surround the efforts of the free world in their democracy promotion
efforts, it remains inconclusive as to whether such aspirations effectively guard against
the success global jihadist movements because there exists a lack of consensus in the
literature concerning the determinants of terrorism. Therefore developing a clear
understanding of the link between democracy and political violence remains crucial,
especially considering the aggressive democratization policies among leaders of the Free
world with intentions to neutralize threats of Islamic terrorism to global security.
If indeed, one person’s terrorist is always another person’s freedom fighter, then
one’s version of liberty fails to align with that of another. Jihadists’ variety of justice
equates not with liberty and equality, but with the implementation and fierce practice of
laws indicative of their religious convictions. Success of Jihadist movements then,
compromise guarantees of civil liberties and freedoms extended to democratic residents.
This study potentially illuminates the hallmark of Jihadist movements to realize political
influence, if not domination, especially when their activities are prevalent in democratic
societies that extend means for democratic change, guarantee liberties, permit economic
and social mobilization, and promise equality of justice.
Assessing motives and opportunities for violence in democratic societies also
challenges arguments attributing violence to discrimination and an absence of liberty.
This research potentially demonstrates violent reactions are prompted by both aspirations
for the advancement of political influence where Islamic minorities enjoy preferential
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treatment, and opposition to dominance resulting from democratic states’ contradicting
institutions meant to preserve civil liberties.
The literature acknowledges that democratic function reduces levels of
dissatisfaction among citizens residing in liberal societies concerning government
conduct. These same contributions, however, fail to explain the emergence of domestic
political violence perpetrated by native Islamic adherents in democratic settings, which
presumably, maintain an immense capacity to attend to discontent among these minority
populations often known to advance aggression. Because the sources of terrorism are
many, however, any society and polity permits occurrences of terrorism in all of its forms
(Crenshaw 396). Eubank recognizes that, “democracy makes it possible for
dissidents…to wage campaigns of terrorist violence on behalf of whatever goals they
seek to achieve. After all liberty is to faction (even violent faction) as oxygen is to fire”
(161). Huntington presumes that Islamic civilizations challenge Western societies,
defined by democratic traditions, international interests and sovereignty (Fox/Sandler
472:2003). Perhaps democratic state and societal behaviors exhibited toward resident
Islamic minorities influence possibilities of Islamic political violence. What
conditions and/or processes in a democratic state correlate with
occurrences of political violence by native non-state actors?
Empirical inquiry allows for exploration of the prevalence of Islamic political
violence in politically liberated societies. A democratic state’s vitality, societal and
political behaviors directed toward Islamic minorities, and foreign policies concerning
majority Islamic states prospectively motivate and justify violent preferences among
Islamic minorities. Islamic minority populations, therefore, opportunely and violently
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respond to policies and societal behaviors that revere their religious identity, prohibit
public religious expression, alienate, or occupy lands considered exclusive of Islamic
influence.
Exploring the emergence of domestic political violence among Islamic
populations in free societies, despite scholarly neglect of such occurrences, requires
attention to the processes and conditions within democracies that permit, motivate, and
enhance the numbers of willing participants in Islamic aggression for political change,
though these Jihadist actors possess peaceful alternatives promising the same end.
Inconsistencies in the literature concerning the relationship between state behavior and
occurrences of political violence create an empirical puzzle: how do state behaviors
exhibited by democratic regimes relate to their diverging experiences with domestic
Islamic political violence?
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent Western experiences with Islamic political violence focuses on the social,
economic, and political turmoil prevalent in Islamic states. Scholars, along with media
outlets, tend to attribute most occurrences of Islamic political violence in free societies to
the frustrations of discontented actors from distant, disturbed lands. Democracies tend,
however to fiercely preserve and operate to extend, to the globally oppressed, republican
values including freedom of association, speech, movement, and religion. Because of
these processes and conditions, free societies remain susceptible to experiencing Islamic
political violence. This is a consequence of societal attitudes and policy approaches
directed at religious minorities while simultaneously maintaining cherished components
of democratic practice and efforts to promote human rights. Eubank and Weinberg warn
that, “terrorist attacks occur most often in stable democracies and that both the
perpetrators and victims of those attacks are from the same democratic state” (Li 279).
Despite democracies’ reputations for neutralizing frustrations among the public
toward government operations that otherwise potentially spawn violent movements,
various democratic processes and conditions attract occurrences of political violence.
Moreover, healthy democracies’ high regard for rule of law and civil liberties restricts
prevention and adequate response to political violence. Li claims that, “enacting
repression and effective deterrence is more costly to the government in a competitive
political system because it may harm political support and cause the government to lose
power” (283). States acting to prevent political violence require some degree of reduction
in civil liberties, moderating of public speech and movement, and establishment of rules
that allow for specialized prosecution of participants in violent behavior. Crenshaw
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concludes that, “situations where regimes repression is inefficient, revolutionary
terrorism is doubly likely” (384). Cuenca also admits that, “in the domestic setting the
state has to react to the violence of terrorist groups. It has to find the optimal mix of
repressions and concession that minimizes violence” (Cuenca). Societies and
governments acting to maintain the religious identities of their minorities and preserve
civil liberties prospectively experience violence because of the political resolve among
violent actors to advance and undermine policies or behaviors either contradictory of
their agenda and religious practices.
Literature discussing the relationship between state behavior and political
violence identifies several themes detailing the emergence of Islamic aggression among
those populations native to democratic polities. These trends reported by scholars
include: democratic vitality extending opportunity for violence; societal and political
conduct toward Islamic minorities potentially prompting violence; and perceptions
(whether real or ill conceived) of violent Islamic participants that their resident
democracy oppresses domestic and international Muslim populations. Some studies of
Jihadist preferences emphasize state behavior in proliferating violence, as Martin
highlights, “ a group’s progression toward revolution involves: the perception within a
particular group that the government or social order is inherently brutal or unfair toward
the group; recognition that the system does not allow for meaningful social dissent by the
group; after analyzing the contemporary political environment the group perceives that
the government’s system possess inherent weakness or contradictions” (66). Gurr
likewise stresses that collective disadvantages perpetrated by the majority facilitate
grievances within afflicted subgroups. Combine these grievances with opportunities for

12

mobilization and violence results (Piazza 341). For Crenshaw, “Terrorism requires the
perception of an unjustly harsh government and profound disillusionment with the
existing order” (410). Terrorism/ regime type literature reviews the conditions and/or
processes that provoke Islamic violent behavior in liberal political systems designed to
challenge inequality, alleviate disadvantages experienced by minority groups, and
promote justice.

Democratic Vitality: opportunities for political violence
Several scholarly discussions emphasize the policies administered in democracies as the
means of reducing political aggression. Democratic policies, as assumed in the literature,
warrant justice and equality, reduce potential frustrations among constituents, and
provide legitimate means through which to express grievance. Burgoon suggests that
social policies directed in democratic societies, “diminish preferences for terrorism by
reducing economic insecurity, inequality, poverty, and religious-political extremism”
(177). These arguments purport that authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, and military
police states are vulnerable to violent uprisings because of their concern for elite power
preservation rather than forging political, economic and social conditions conducive to
extensive prosperity and freedom. Crenshaw states that conditions that create motivations
for terrorism involve, “the lack of opportunity for political participation…regimes that
deny access to power and persecute dissenters create disaffection” (384). Crenshaw
further notes that, “given some source of disaffection and in highly centralized modern
states with a lack of responsiveness terrorism is an attractive strategy” (396).
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Some analyses conclude that those individuals living in free societies with the ability to
influence policy possess minimal incentive for engaging in terrorist activities because of
the availability of legal avenues through which to address disaffection. Some regard
democracy, as Weinburg reflects, “ as a weapon in the fight against terrorism…only
freedom and democracy can ultimately defeat terrorism and through no other system can
political grievances be addressed more effectively” (599).
Schmid, Rummel, Li, Wade, Reiter, and Gurr theorize that healthy democratic
function inversely correlates with terrorism. Schmid’s discussions relating to terrorism
and state behavior identify the conflict reducing mechanisms available in democratic
polities. Specifically that: free and fair elections; free speech; and an independent
judiciary limit the need for resort to political violence (17). Gurr, when assessing the
reasons people engage in rebellious behavior against the state, stresses that, “public
order…can only be maintained when the means are provided within it for men to work
towards the attainment of their aspirations” (intro). Rummel’s discussion accentuates the
qualities necessary for healthy democratic function including negotiation, compromise,
and mediation as limiting the emergence of violent situations. Additionally, as Rummel
explains, restraints on decision makers, competitive elections, cross pressures resulting
from democracies’ natural pluralism, and the development of a democratic culture and
norms that emphasize rational debate and toleration facilitate the democratic constructs
capable of minimizing violent expression (4).
Li’s analyses of the correlation between democracy and political violence regard
democratic participation as the primary means through which to eliminate political
violence. Li asserts that, “democracies permit dissenters to express their policy
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preferences and seek redress. Different social groups are able to participate in the
political process to further their interests through peaceful means such as voting and
forming political parties…since democracy lowers the cost of achieving political goals
through legal means …groups find costly illegal terrorist activities less attractive” (280).
Aggrieved populations in free societies, according to Li, maintain the ability to exert
more influence on their own government through political participation and achieve
favorable policy changes or compensation (281). Wade and Reiter agree that democracy
significantly curtails the benefits of engaging in violence for political ends by
proclaiming that, “the availability of greater political representation in democracies
provides alternative means of political action to terrorism “(intro).
Other arguments including those advanced by Zariski, Eubank, Gurr, and Khan
focus less on democratic policies that reduce political violence and more on the attributes
of autocracy and authoritarianism that promote terrorism. For Khan, when the ruling class
deprives their populations of the right to political liberty, their grievances multiply
exponentially to systematic brutality. Therefore, according to Khan, the aggrieved
population spawns an army of militants committed to aggressive pursuits (17). Gurr
agrees and contends that, “while civil violence can occur in the context of any kind of
political community…it is most likely to occur in societies that rely on coercion to
maintain order in lieu of providing adequate patterns of value satisfying actions” (317).
Eubank recognizes that because autocracies quench alternative means of political
expression, they remain very vulnerable to experiencing political violence (intro).
Zariski’s discussion of ethnoterritorial factions within a state considers those
central governments that demonstrate minimal sensitivity to the demands of an ethnic
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minority prompts violence against insensitivity and disaffection (364). Gurr analyzes that,
“exclusive reliance on force eventually rises up the forces that destroy it” (intro).
Though the arguments cited above focus on the attributes of democracies that
minimize violence and those of autocracy that encourage violent behavior, Pape,
Crenshaw, Cuenca, and Schlagheck contest their theoretical conclusions and suggest that
democratic functions weigh very little on the likelihood of free states expelling violent
behavior among native frustrated minorities. Schlagheck explains that, “Authoritarian
regimes including right wing militarianist governments and left wing (totalitarian) states
are well equipped to handle terrorism because there are few limits on the governments
prerogatives” (91). Cuenca asserts that in highly democratic regimes violence is unlikely
to emerge, but also admits that such phenomena remain even more unlikely in highly
repressive regimes. According to Cuenca, violence results in far too high a cost in
authoritarian regimes compared to the potential for benefits experienced by non state
actors for engaging in aggressive behavior. Crenshaw agrees and admits that, “in
situations where the paths to the legal expression of opposition are blocked but where
regime repression is inefficient, revolutionary behavior is doubly likely” (384). Pape
concludes that democracies remain especially exposed to coercive punishment because
adversaries view such polities as “soft” usually on the grounds that their populations
maintain an extensive ability to affect policy (349).
Several arguments identify aspects of democracy including: civil liberties,
constraints on executive powers, and press freedom as obstructing effective opposition to
terrorism. Though the literature correlates these attributes with the presence of political
violence in free societies, empirical insight into the relationship reveals not that these
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aspects prompt violence, but that they permit the success of aggressive strategy
developed for political ends.
Scholarly conclusions including those forwarded by Li, Schlagheck, Eubank,
Weinburg, and Schmid assert that democracies’ regard for civil liberties limit the
capacity of their leaders to implement effective counter terrorism measures and provided
violent actors extensive freedom to operate with minimal potential for detection. As Li
discusses, democracy encourages terrorism on the premise that their systems guarantee
civil liberties allowing terrorists to organize and maneuver with minimal potential for
consequence, thus reducing the costs of engaging terrorist campaigns (282). Additionally,
as Li’s asserts, expansive and secure civil liberties create significant legal barriers in
monitoring, mounting evidence against, and convicting terrorists (282). Schlagheck
insists that, “recognized civil rights in democratic states’ constitutions limit the scope of
actions a state can pursue in countering terrorism” (92).
Crenshaw, Schmid, Eubank and Weinburg conclude that revered civil rights
especially those of freedom of movement, association, and speech significantly limit the
effectiveness of counter terrorism in free societies. These discussions recognize that
guaranteed extension of civil liberties create liabilities in democracies. Political rights
offer those using aggressive means reasonable chances of success because of the ease
with which they can mobilize to pursue a violent political cause. Crenshaw expects that,
“the desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures” (Li 282).
Another element of democratic conduct considered necessary for its maintenance,
but complicates counter terrorism efforts, includes the constraints mandated on executive
powers through balance of power and other established democratic institutions. Cuenca
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and Li maintain that constraints on executive powers positively correlate with
occurrences of political violence (Li 282).
Li also insists that press freedom provides opportunities for terrorists to voice
their agenda to large audiences and gain public support or generate fear but a free press is
also an attribute of democratic practice considered essential for healthy democratic
function. However, the excessive detail reported by unfiltered news outlets assists, as Li
further notes, in the recruitment, education, and training of new terrorists (Li 282).
Schmid also acknowledges that constitutional guarantees of a free press in liberalized
societies increase the allure of participation in violence for political ends because,
“violence both as information and entertainment- is a commercial product for the western
media…and therefore terrorists, by attacking newsworthy persons, create information
which is freely distributed by the mass media system to mass audiences” (22). These
arguments conclude that freedom of the press creates the potential to commercialize
violence, enabling its use an effective means to enact political change.
Reviewing the arguments suggesting that authoritarian regimes efficiently expel
violence because of unconstrained repressive powers, therefore, reveals that democratic
practice accompanies a reasonable risk for violent action through conditions permit
political violence. These scholarly discussions pertaining to the relationship of state
behavior and the emergence of political violence suggest not that democracy encourages
terrorism but that features exclusive to democratic systems provide the outlets for violent
expression founded in political initiatives.
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Behavior of the majorities: motivating violence
Although several scholarly advancements focus on aspects of democratic function
that extend opportunities for political change pursued through violence, few associate
those functions as well as behaviors of the majorities with motivating political
aggression. Some discuss the potential for free states to experience violence because of
behaviors of majorities to: revere constitutional mandates; provide for and accommodate
a minority presence; include minorities in the political process; and respect democratic
institutions. From the perspective of some, democracies’ demonstrating inconsistent and
weak responses to violent behaviors among minorities also effects political aggression.
Others yet elaborate on the unfair and repressive behaviors of democracies as motivating
violence because of policy determinations to: separate church and state; minimize ethnic
minority challenges to liberal ideology and state sovereignty; or assimilate religious
minorities into secular societies.
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Political/Societal behaviors motivating violence: Liberalization
1. Unwavering Reverence for constitutions
Because revered constitutions of democratic states extend opportunities for
political participation and guarantee individual liberty, political violence participants
mobilize in free societies to advance their causes, as theorized by several scholars. These
discussions contend that democratic institutions, necessary for healthy democratic
function, incentivize violence. Challenges persist for liberalized states to adequately
combat terrorism while respecting institutions provided by constitutional frameworks.
Eubank reflects the limitations of consolidated democracies to combat terrorism in
observing that, “ at no time in history have so many countries been governed under
democratic auspices. This means that, in global terms, the expansion of civil liberties and
political rights has coincided by all accounts with an increase in the level of terrorist
activity both domestic and international”. Eubank correlates democratic behaviors and
violence by asserting that, “ there exists some attributes within the dynamic of
democracies that make the use of terrorist tactics attractive to their own citizens” (161).
Ross substantiates that, “ the lion’s share of terrorism takes place in democracies due to
the strengths and limitations of this type of political system” (321).
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2.Democracies tend to provide for and accommodate a minority presence
Multiculturalism, religious tolerance, and preservation of a fair societal order,
though considered hallmarks of healthy democratic practice, remain by-products of
democracy that permit the potential success of political violence movements founded in
global jihadist ideology. Although many scholarly discussions consider democratic
polities as capable of accommodating very ethnically diverse populations, these ethnic
variations in other scholarly advancements, facilitate political autonomy and/or
domination movements among the culturally fragmented. Schlagheck recognizes the
openness of democratic societies as one of the most significant factors considered in the
likelihood of democracies to experience terrorism (92-93). Eubank agrees that, “open
societies with democratic governments are highly susceptible to violent conflict. In fact,
this vulnerability is a price democracies must pay for their very openness” (Eubank
intro).
Discussions by McDonald, Zimmerman, Kohli, Letshert, and Fox argue that
multicultural policies so extensively exaggerate minority affirmation that ideals promoted
by its own practice undermine it (Mcdonald 2007). According to Zimmerman, achieving
stability and legitimacy remains extremely difficult in multi ethnic and multi religious
societies (2005). Fox warns that, “democracy is almost impossible in states with multiple
nationalities” (Fox/Sandler 470:2003). KohLi asserts that, “periodic demands for more
control and power by a variety of ethnic groups-that is self-determination movementsought to be expected in multi-cultural democracies”…(325). Letshert concludes that too
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much diversity causes societies to become fragmented, leading minorities to question
state legitimacy (Leshert 51).
Berman and Schmid understand democracies’ tendency to accommodate the
belief systems and traditions of varying ethnic distinctions, as toxic in the defense against
political violence movements seeking autonomy or domination. Schmid warns that, “by
tolerating the intolerant, democracies allow terrorists to plan and prepare strikes. By
combating them with measured rule based force democracies are at a tactical
disadvantage in the conflict with an anonymous opponent showing no restraint” (14).
Berman suggests that the embrace of values by host societies of immigrant and
indigenous populations erodes existing democratic values in their efforts to achieve
cultural diversity (30). McDonald also concludes that, “ an emphasis on tolerance and
respect of minority groups, though well intentioned, potentially undermines ideals of
community cohesion by inhibiting traditional methods for cultural exchange and
adaptation (abstract 2007).
Fox attributes democracies’ tolerance of religious practices as a primary
vulnerability for such societies to experience political violence. Although Fox identifies
ethnic tensions as primary causes of political violence, these upheavals often involve
religious influences. From Fox’s perspective, religion can cause ethnic conflicts when the
religious laws call for conflictive action. Religion can, according to Fox therefore,
influence ethnic conflicts through the use of esteemed religious institutions in liberalized
states. (Abstract).
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3.Inclusion: minority involvement in and influence over political
processes
Democracies’ tendency to allow for political expression among a multitude of
minorities with varying religious and cultural practices further marginalizes and
radicalizes those that fail to benefit from political engagement, as emphasized in
discussions attributing political aggression to liberal regimes with many competing
interests. Zariski proclaims that, “plurality (or) two party systems raise such high barriers
against the acquisition of influence by nationalist movements representing ethno
territorial minorities that they actually provoke the emergence of extremist tendencies
and of single issue movements reflecting those tendencies” (264). Furthermore, Tilly’s
political opportunity structure promotes that political violence especially emerge in
societies where independent political expression is permitted, non-state association is
allowed, and the government does not resort to oppression to control political outcomes
when policies fail to minimize minority deprivation (Piazza 2006 161).
Piazza recognizes that severe ethnic, religious, or regional divisions facilitate
massive opposing interests in legislatures. His argument suggests that political violence
ensues when fractured representatives fail to moderate and integrate fringe political
forces into political norms and a configuration of anti-system political forces assume
positions of power (Piazza 172 2006).
The literature therefore specifies that the political involvement of religious
minorities permitted by democratic institutions support potentially favorable policy
changes by religiously radicalized individuals seeking domination. In Zartman’s view,
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secular democrats exclude religion from political processes based on democratic
principles, yet those principles afford political religionists opportunities to win
democratic elections and subdue democracy (intro). Zartman concludes that, “one of the
Achilles’ heels of democracy is its vulnerability to challengers who would use its own
rules to annul it”(intro). Israeli adds that, “to achieve their goals Islamist movements are
striving to participate in the democratic game, more specifically the part of it which
would allow them to seize power” (167). As demonstrated by these discussions, the
democratic process potentially incentivizes religious extremists to pursue political change
and/or domination by legitimate participation in political processes.
4. Preservation of Democratic Institutions
Several discussions elaborate democracies’ susceptibility to experience terrorism
based on state behaviors respectful of democratic institutions, prohibiting admittedly
effective repression in expelling violence. Zariski credits the emergence of ethnic
extremism to the reactions of central leadership because governments that, “…yield
ground to the minority group….actually leads to a stepping up of violent behavior on the
part of activist members of a minority group…” as a consequence of expression of selfdoubt among governing entities (364). Crenshaw demonstrates democracies’ limited
capacity to oppose terrorism in concluding that, “the most salient political factor in the
category of permissive terrorism is a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent
terrorism. Inefficacy of leniency can be found in a broad range of all but the most brutally
efficient dictatorships. ..for many governments the cost of disallowing terrorism is too
high” (383).
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Li, Wade, and Reiter highlight the institutional limitations of democratic
governments to advance meaningful responses to terrorism. Li explains that compared to
the autocratic ruler, a democratic government must adhere to its institutions even though
subsequent policy inaction and political deadlock heighten public frustration, assuredly
encouraging rather than discouraging resort to terrorism (283). Wade and Reiter warn
that, “Institutional constraints significantly weaken the ability of democratic governments
to fight terrorism. Institutional checks and balances hold the democratic government
accountable to a broader range of interests. It is therefore difficult for democracies to
enact anti-terrorist strategies that are as strict as those adopted by non-democratic
regimes” (331). These discussions suggest that securing societies from terrorism requires
almost complete abandonment of those institutions that ensure political freedom. In
addition these conclusions consider democracies ill-equipped to resist terrorism when
maintaining political institutions promising personal liberty in democratic politics.

Regime Weaknesses and Inconsistency
Behaviors of a political system that reflect weakness, as addressed by the
literature, motivate violence among those aggressively advancing political causes. Zariski
correlates the emergence of ethnic extremism with perceived political weakness. For the
maintenance of extremist movements, as Zariski clarifies, a central government exhibits
behaviors that facilitate insights of weakness and/or indecisiveness (264). Ross proclaims
that, a state’s inability to eradicate terrorism stems from legislatures failing to advance
policies capable of countering terrorism (324). Engagement in violent conduct occurs, in
Martins view, when oppositional forces perceive weaknesses in a state’s structures (67).
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Several discussions ascribe the presence of political vehemence in free societies
to inconsistency of repression and freedom experienced by minorities. Crenshaw cautions
that, “government reactions that are inconsistent wavering between tolerance and
repression seem most likely to encourage terrorism” (369). Cuenca reiterates that,
“violence erupts in institutionally inconsistent regimes” (41). Terrorism derives
momentum from, according to Zimmerman, “ over/under reactions of the stronger stately
opponent” (2005). Mueller and Weede identify high rates of domestic political violence
in regimes where repression is intermediate (Piazza 163 2006).
Schlagheck states that, “the vulnerabilities of liberal democracies tend to interact
in ways that result in democracies’ over-reacting or under-reacting in a terrorist crisis”
(92). To one extent democracies minimize the threat posed by terrorist movements by
reducing its occurrence to a societal nuisance similar to that of organized crime, as
particularized by the literature. To another extent, scholars accuse democracies of acting
repressively to thwart Jihadist movements while conducting counter- terrorism in ways
that conflict with democratic institutions and civil liberties. Because repression overtly
prohibits terrorist activity, Schmid considers whether healthy democracies should
sacrifice democratic values in order to be effective against terrorism or whether they
should tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the conservation of cherished political
rights (15). Schlagheck hates that although, “repressive measures are often effective in
breaking up terrorist groups…such extreme measures undermine the rule of law and civil
liberties on which democratic government is based” (93). Weinburg stresses that, “the
pursuit of security as the expense of liberty actually enhances the prospect for more
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terrorism” (259). Therefore, according to scholarly discussions extremes of both
repression and liberty expose regimes to political violence.
Behaviors of Majorities Motivating Violence: Repression
Insights into conduct of democracies that prompt terrorism in the literature reveals
that liberalized states also limit freedom. Discussions attributing political violence to
oppositional constituencies who incite discrimination and intolerance point to the
potential for oppression in Free States. These arguments therefore contend that Islamic
violence participants optimize chances for political change by compelling democratic
leaders to protest violent behavior with repression and abandon particular democratic
institutions.
Crenshaw theorizes that terrorism remains an attractive strategy among groups of
various ideological persuasions that challenge the state’s authority, especially those
seeking to demoralize the government by provoking an otherwise responsive democratic
regime to act repressively (389). Cuenca admits that because, “terrorist groups are
unable to militarily defeat their rival…they nonetheless can hurt the state by contesting
its monopoly of power and provoke it to act repressively (32). Cuenca also attests that,
“…excessive repression is something that terrorist groups eagerly seek. The intention is
that violence will trigger a disproportionate repression by the state alienating key
constituents that will side with the rebels” (35). According to Cuenca and Crenshaw,
therefore, soliciting a democratic state to contest political violence with repression
substantiates the claims of violent players that the state remains unsympathetic to the
needs of the people and bolsters support for their aggressive causes.
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1. Minority Inequality/Deprivation
Inferior status of minorities in democratic societies reflects repression even in
systems of government designed to extensively minimize such, and fuels violence among
afflicted groups, from the perspective of several scholarly advancements. Tilly’s political
opportunity structure recognizes deprivation as cause for political violence in free
societies because of opportunities provided for violent contest (Piazza 161:2006).
Smooha also prescribes a combination of democratization and deprivation of minorities
as reinforcing cultural retention and violent demands for political change (425). Krieger
and Meirriecks associate significant minority inequality with terrorist activity and imply a
link between deprivation and political violence (intro: 2010).

2. Minority Discrimination/Intolerance
Discrimination and intolerance exhibited toward ethnic minorities in
democracies remains another manifestation of repression capable of motivating minority
violence in liberalized societies weather or not political institutions prohibit such majority
practice, as identified by the literature. Some scholars fail to promote a strong
relationship between democracy and tolerance. Consistent with these views, liberalism
commits democracies to values quenching pluralism and tolerance (Fox/Sandler
471:2003). Incongruities between liberal ideologies and religious ideologies, as these
arguments propose, result in differential treatment of ethno religious minorities. Fox
discusses this differential treatment and emphasizes that, “liberal democracies, to be
faithful to their basic principles, must be willing to be tolerant of many diverse
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groups….at the same time, liberal democracies are less obliged to tolerate…values….that
contradict the liberal-democratic system. Because of this, liberal democracy constitutes a
civic religion that is not truly pluralist” (Fox/Sandler 483:2003).
Although many assumptions identify healthy democracies as incapable of
discrimination, liberal ideology, according to Fox, stifles pluralism and tolerance because
of its mandate to protect freedom from contradictory and corrosive ideologies.
Democracies, therefore, motivate violence because of their reinforcement of exclusion
among ethnic subgroups with the potential capability to compromise democratic vitality
(Piazza 2011). This conduct prompts distrust and questions of state legitimacy among
alienated and aggrieved groups susceptible to radicalization. From this perspective,
discrimination enables minority violence directed against the state and majority
population (Piazza 341:2011). Fox insightfully comments that, “models meant to predict
the emergence of ethnic conflicts establish discrimination as causation of conflicts related
to ethnicity” (Fox 425).
3.Separation of Church and State
Majority actions to minimize religious influence over political processes
radicalize ethno-religious minorities therefore motivating violence, according to several
scholarly perspectives. Fox promotes that, “ less state involvement in religion causes
people to be more religious. That is, institutional secularization leads to higher religiosity
among individuals” (540:2005). The most advanced states, from Fox’s view, maintain an
extensive institutional capacity to regulate religion. In those states where modernity most
undermines traditional practices, religious elements legislate or aggressively promote
morals (Fox 562:2005).
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Fox further questions the extent to which separation of church and state
accomplishes tolerance on behalf of majorities when determining whether such strict
divisions of religion and politics initiates violence (Fox/Sandler 470: 2003). For Fox, “the
secular makeup of democratic regimes, including the constitutional separation of church
and state allows discrimination against religious practices…”(Fox/Sandler 482:2003).
Potentially prohibiting religious influence over policy fosters minority discrimination and
minority radicalization therefore motivating violence in democracies according to Fox.
4. Assimilation of Minorities
Assimilation policies directed toward ethno religious minorities in democratic
societies remains another means by which liberal governments repress minorities, as
concluded in several discussions attending to democracies’ capacity to enact repression.
Smooha considers assimilation of resident populations as undermining ethnic diversity
through oppression (423). Kurlander recognizes assimilationist models of integration as
intolerant and repressive on basis of inclusion (49).
Letschert describes political and societal efforts to combine concepts of
integration and diversity as contradictory (49). For Letschert, democracies remain
capable of repression because, “ assimilation approaches to integrating minorities require
subnational ethnicities to share values of the dominant culture rather than co exist while
maintaining their specific identities (49). Repression occurs, according to Letschert, when
the state mandates minorities to abandon key elements of their identity including religion
and language (49).
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5. State Reactions when ethnic minorities challenge liberal ideology
and state legitimacy
State perceptions of minority threats to state legitimacy and liberal ideology
instigates majority repression in democracies from the perspective of scholars concerned
with tyranny in spite of liberalization. Fox theorizes that, “ democracies are likely to
respond to perceived challenges of nationalist movements with discrimination” (442).
Smooha identifies homogeneous democracies as discriminatory when they associate
minority rights with the erosion of state legitimacy because of minorities’ liberty to
promote transnational thinking and interests in political and societal contexts (424).
Smooha further reflects that, “ the flow of non- assimilable immigrants and the rise of
minority nationalism seriously challenges homogeneity of the nation state and facilitates
its intolerance of ethnic and cultural diversity” (425).
Fox and Sandler regard ethno-religious minorities as particularly susceptible to
oppression via democratic majorities. Democracies engage in discrimination because of
majority considerations that religious fundamentalism challenges liberal ideology, as
reflected by Fox. Attempts by religious fundamentalists, in the view of Fox, to transform
free societies into theocracies immensely contradict the liberal concepts promoting
healthy democracies (442). Sandler concludes that, “ traditional religion in many states
often competes with liberal democracy providing a challenge to its value system…this
challenge is severe when a minority religion contests both the liberal values and the
culture of the ruling majority” (Fox/Sandler 483: 2003).
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Justification for Violence: Occupation of Majority Islamic States
and Minority Perceptions
While some literature highlights contexts for violent expression provided by
democratic function and state behaviors exhibited toward minorities in detailing the
political violence experienced by free states, other discussions, explore the justifications
(both real and perceived) that “legitimize” the violent choices of Islamic minorities.
Some scholarly discussions reveal that democracies’ military involvement in majority
Islamic states validates aggressive responses to such external conduct considered to
unduly influence or control international Islamic populations. In addition from the
perspective of several scholars perceptions of minorities concerning their inferior status
also rationalize domestic political violence.
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Perception of Oppression
Perceived injustice and discrimination of minority populations potentially
facilitates violent movements in peaceful societies, as detailed in many theoretical
discussions concerning terrorism. Crenshaw considers concrete grievances among an
identifiable subgroup of a larger population as a direct cause of terrorism. Gurr
hypothesizes that perceptions of deprivation develop when people believe that a majority
hinders their ability to pursue a meaningful life, so these perceptions compel discontented
minority populations to protest such “deprivation” through violent action (38).
According to Ross, “grievances, both actual and perceived, that are commonly the result
of coercion, discrimination, oppression, and repression, often against an identifiable
subgroup, can lead to terrorism” (325). Martin reiterates that, “feelings of deprivation
and frustration underlie decisions to engage in collective action” (67). As identified by
the above research, because “struggle” is synonymous with Jihad, convictions to advance
jihadist movements may then involve a “justification” for violent resistance and terrorism
against perceived injustice administered by the state.
Though the literature largely credits democratic polities with reducing perceptions
of alienation and deprivation, other works suggest that democratic processes do not
appeal to the interests of a small, disenfranchised minority population. Davenport
suggests that, “all aspects of democracy are not, by definition, likely to reduce coercive
action” (14). Eubank attributes the appearance of terrorist organizations in democracies to
an excluded minority, “whose preferences have lost out or are no longer considered in the
normal democratic struggle over the formation of public policy” (163). These conclusions
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suggest that features inherent to democratic practice, especially those related to rule by
the majority, produce feelings of deprivation and oppression among minority populations
that experience minimal representation and benefits from legitimate democratic conduct.

External Behaviors of Democratic States resulting in Jihadist movements
Discussions pertaining to the relationship between terrorism and regime type also
emphasize external behaviors of states as contributing to occurrences of political
violence. According to these arguments, violent political actors participate in extremist
movements because of foreign occupation of territory they perceive as the rightful
domain of their ethnic influence and authority. This literature identifies aggressive
foreign policy efforts among free states as catalysts for violent political upheaval.
Munson recognizes that attraction to Islamic movements by minority Islamic
populations native to democracies results from its leaders’ meticulous exploitation of
widespread resentment of foreign domination. Munson warns that, “One must recognize
that Islamic militancy is partially fueled by the Ayatollah Khomeini, Hamas, and Bin
Laden linking what they see as the subjugation of their homelands to the subjugation of
Islam” (51). For Khomeini, as noted by Munson, “triumph will come when all forms of
foreign domination have been brought to an end” (42). Bin Laden exhibited outrage at
influential foreign powers consistently desecrating Islamic Lands. Roshandel
acknowledges that Jihadists conspire against the West because of American military
presence in Saudi Arabia, US alliances with Israel, and Sanctions against Iraq (76). Pape
attributes acts of political violence to causes for independence and eradication of foreign
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control from perceived homelands among communities with strong nationalist sentiments
(348).
Wade, Reiter, and O’Brien conclude that Islamic violence participants
strategically protest foreign influence by employing terrorist acts against the perceived
occupiers. As Wade and Reiter explain, “terrorism should be understood as a strategic
response to perceived occupation by a democracy” (332). As specified throughout these
discussions, as superpowers continue to flex their military might in lands recognized by
jihadist leaders as Islamic, those states remain subject to a wide range of violent
strategies employed to expel any and all military influence.
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METHODOLOGY: PROCESS‐TRACING ANALYSIS OF MOST SIMILAR CASES
This analysis examines the possible link between violent experiences and
state behaviors directed toward Islamic minorities intended for integration or social
cohesion. A scholarly undertaking, focusing on this relationship, involves
assessment of multicultural and assimilation conduct along with discrepancies in
violent outcomes between democratic states ascribing to one model over another.
The research framework accounts for policies meant to assimilate or integrate
Islamic minorities and violent initiatives pursued by Muslim populations subject to
the integration or social cohesion objectives aspired by liberalized states.
Failures of extant literature to examine the political actions directed toward
Islamic minorities in democracies along with the prevalence of violence generate a
void in theoretical positions attempting to identify a connection between state
behavior and Islamic terrorism. To heighten the explanatory value of approaches
aiming to relate the behaviors of free states and the emergence of Islamic terrorism
this research considers: (1) the treatment of Islamic minorities in democracies
through policies concerned with integration or assimilation and (2) violent
consequences endured by democracies. These variables raise empirical curiosities
about particular behaviors (affecting domestic Islamic populations) that facilitate
conditions under which Islamic political violence is catastrophic and severe.
Popular academic works attribute domestic Islamic minority oppression,
foreign policy ambitions involving majority Islamic states, and democratic qualities
as inspiring political violence. This study alternatively assersts that state policies,
rooted in multicultural or assimilation practices directed toward resident Islamic
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populations, affect prospects for violence. More than the phenomena popularly
identified to promote violence including: democratic attributes, external state
behaviors, minority status, and minority perceptions. This link is primarily
demonstrated in the association between multicultural and assimilation policies and
the emergence of violent results across democracies.
Causal mechanisms including: Islamic minorities’ considerations of violence
as legitimate and necessary; political objectives pursued through organized
violence; religious radicalization; national identities assumed by Islamic minorities;
and democratic vitality also connects multiculturalism and assimilation with
differences in violent experiences. Falletti, a reputable political scientist researcher
at the University of Pennsylvania, defines causal mechanisms as, portable concepts
that explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a
particular outcome (Falletti abstract). Accounting for these causal mechanisms
further reflects the influence that social cohesion and integration policies exhibit
over democracies heightened vulnerability for Islamic political violence.
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Hypothesis

State Behaviors affect prospects of Islamic political violence

State policies, however, rooted in multicultural or assimilation practices
influence violent outcomes perpetrated by Islamic adherents more than
democratic attributes, external state behaviors, minority status, and
minority perceptions

More incidents and deadly occurrences of Islamic political violence ensue in
multicultural polities over those that are assimilationist

State behaviors, meant to integrate Islamic immigrants or promote social
cohesion, impact causal mechanisms of Islamic violence (in the context of
multicultural and assimilation systems) for political ends

.
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The hypothesis is accepted or rejected based on the calculation and
assessment of the proportion of Islamic political violence to a democratic state’s
embrace of multiculturalism. Ratios of Islamic violence to minority integration,
economic inclusion, status of civil liberties, national attachments, and a democracy’s
practice of multiculturalism further establish that conditions (popularly theorized to
cause terrorism) are causal mechanisms of violence within political, economic, and
social climates promoted by assimilation and multiculturalism.
Analyzing processes of democratic states along with factors of causation such
as: minority considerations, political objectives, religious radicalization, foreign
policies, and minorities’ national priorities in Britain and France potentially
demonstrates a correlation between multiculturalism, assimilation, and political
aggression in free societies. A process tracing analysis of these most similar cases
prospectively identifies state behaviors directed toward Islamic minorities as
capable in understanding Islamic violence beyond those previously credited with
predisposing a democracy to violence including liberty, oppression, and occupation.
Challenges to counter‐terrorism remain substantial in Britain and France
because state behaviors, aspiring for minority integration or social cohesion, impact
minority choices to respond violently either to their status or foreign military
involvement in majority Islamic states. Analyzing these cases, therefore, highlights
the processes and conditions in democratic polities most likely to connect with
Jihadist violence. Inclinations for democracies prioritizing integration or social
cohesion to experience violence potentially result from the causal mechanisms of
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assimilation, multiculturalism, and violent activities specific to either Britain or
France.
Britain and France remain residence to substantial immigrant and descendent
Islamic communities, they possess membership in the European Union, participate in the
European Union Court of Human Rights, previously colonized states with majority
Muslim populations, and engage in international efforts to achieve world peace and
promote democracy. Theses similarities provide ample opportunity for empirical inquiry
into variables prevalent in free states causing or accompanying domestic Islamist
aggression.
This research explores the relationship between Jihadist violence and
democracies’ majority behavior directed toward an Islamic population, along with the
previously established theoretical parallels and causes for terrorism including secondclass minority status, foreign occupation, and democratic practice. This exploration
involves detailing a variety of media sources, statistical measures, and indices that
integrate: democratic vitality; Islamic minority class positions; foreign initiatives
concerning primarily Islamic territories; opportunities for Islamic minority political
participation; resident Muslims’ perceptions of inclusion, alienation, discrimination and
occupation; and societal and political behaviors directed toward Islamic minorities.
Measures of healthy democratic function illuminate opportunities for violence. Various
societal and political approaches concerning a significant minority presence potentially
motivate violence. Foreign influence in Islamic states, Islamic minority
societal/economic conditions, and Islamic minority perceptions concerning both illustrate
actual and perceived justification for violence. Demonstrating associations and possible
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causations of Islamic political violence in democracies requires empirical evaluation of a
composite of variables so to establish determinants of domestic aggression among native
residents in free societies.
Understanding the state behaviors that coincide with politically motivated
violence requires isolation of multiculturalism and assimilation as independent
variables. Discussing the causal mechanisms, specific to assimilation and
multicultural societies further explains the interactions of state behaviors and
emergence of Islamic political violence in either Free States to varying degrees. The
array of causal factors includes: democratic vitality; Islamic minority considerations
of violence as legitimate and necessary; political objectives pursued through
violence; and national priorities adopted by Islamic minorities. Detailing these
causal conditions contextualizes the influence that varying integration constructs,
adopted in democracies, exert over prospects for violence. Consistent with the
hypotheses, political violence links with democracies’ designs for either minority
integration or social cohesion. Islamic political aggression is the dependent variable.

41

Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent Variable

Multiculturalism

Independent Variable

Assimilation

Dependent Variable

Discrepancies in Severity of Violence

Measured in causalities, injuries, and
number of incidents tied to Islamic
terrorism
Causal Mechanism in the Context of Assimilation and Multicultural
Democracies
Causal Mechanism I

Democratic Vitality

Causal Mechanism II

Islamic Considerations of Violence as
Legitimate and Necessary

Causal Mechanism III

Prospects of Radicalization

Causal Mechanism IV

National Priorities of Islamic Minorities

Causal Mechanism V

Political Objectives pursued through
Violence
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Integration policies, or state behaviors specifically designed to address a
significant Islamic presence, vary between democracies though ambiguous
experiences of Islamic political violence occur consistently across these systems of
government. This “constant” complicates a comprehensive understanding of the
connection between state behavior and Islamic political violence. Analyzing Islamic
political violence, therefore, links specific majority approaches (concerning a
significant Islamic presence in free states) to their diverse experiences with political
aggression.
Discussion of Independent Variables
Independent Variable, Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a model adopted to accommodate the ethnic differences
that naturally occur upon an influx of immigrant populations, with diverse
backgrounds. This framework hopes to integrate immigrant minorities into a
democratic setting without the compromise of ethnic traditions, religious values, or
democratic function. Accounting for this integration approach in an analysis
concerning the emergence of political violence in democracies, therefore, potentially
associates accommodative integration policies with prospects for violent pursuits
among Islamic populations.
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Independent Variable, Assimilation
Assimilation practices, advanced by democracies, require immigrants to tailor their
ethnic traditions and religious conduct to complement the democratic processes
and values of their residence. Official policies necessitate that immigrants conform
to their democratic residence. Institution of language requirements for citizenship
and legal ramifications for display of distinct religious symbols exemplify the state
conduct meant to promote social cohesion in assimilation democracies. Including
minority assimilation efforts in the explanations of the relationship between state
behavior and Jihadist violence in Western democracies clarifies the potential for
assimilationist societies to encounter Islamic political aggression.
Dependent Variable, Casualties, Injuries, and Violent Acts attributable to
Islamic Political Violence
It is rare for free states to not have some historical rendezvous with Islamist
violence. This is often attributed to the opportunities for violence extended by
democratic function, foreign occupation of land exclusive to Islamic citizenship, and
Islamic minority status. Explaining Islamic political violence in free states,
consistent with this research design, mandates an account of the various occasions
of Islamic violence in democracies laboring to assimilate or integrate Islamic
Immigrants.
Islamic violent pursuits may be an outcome of integration or assimilation.
These majority approaches to resolve societal and political problems (posed by
immigration) affect differences in aggressive results across democracies. Though
political violence emerges in all systems of government for diverse reasons,
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behaviors of the ruling class cultivate environments in which violence is possible or
even likely. Behaviors of majorities in democracies that affect prospects of violence
are attributable to their endeavors meant to integrate or assimilate immigrants.
Discussion of Causal Mechanisms
It has been previously theorized that violent phenomena in free states
coincide with status or treatment of domestic Islamic minorities, military
involvement in lands with Islamic majorities, political oppression, or political
liberties creating opportunities for violent expression. Evaluating prospects for
violence in free societies normally involves, therefore, minority justifications for
violence originating from perceptions of oppression, discrimination, mistreatment,
and foreign occupation. This study, however, attributes these societal factors and
conditions to democracies either adopting an assimilationist or a multiculturalist
approach for immigration resolutions. Minority sentiments, then, serve as causal
mechanisms for violence in the context of assimilationist and multiculturalism.
Discrimination, oppression, occupation, and extension of civil liberties (previously
theorized to cause violence in isolation), assessed in the background of assimilation
and multicultural democracies, links integration/social cohesion practices to
political violence.
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Causal Mechanism I, Democratic Vitality
This study includes democratic vitality as a causal component of the research
model, constructed to understand the propensity for violence in free states. The
hypothesis of this model discounts the effect of democratic attributes on different
violent encounters. This variable, rather, assists in understanding that democratic
aspects alone, including maintenance of civil liberty and balance of power, fail to
heighten or reduce prospects of violence.
Freedom House is an organization whose research and analysis determines
the status of freedom throughout the world. Measures established by Freedom
House, based on state policies and conduct, assess a population’s political and civil
liberties. Employing these indices, defined by Freedom House, outlining healthy
democratic function in a state, ascertains that democratic qualities create
opportunities for engagement in political aggression. Democracies’ not respecting
civil liberties, so to undermine prospects of political violence demonstrates that
freedom creates outlets for violent expression. This is evident in states having to
compromise civil liberties in efforts to promote security and deter threats of
political violence.
Analyzing the status of civil liberties in free societies exposes democracies’
prospects for aggressive political change because of healthy democratic function but
does not adequately explain discrepancies in experiences with political violence
between liberalized states. Further exploring why one democratic state experiences
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more violence, despite a presence of political and civil liberties, permits
implementation of effective security policy without the compromise of freedom.
Measure accounting for Extent of
Democratic Vitality in Britain and France

Freedom in the World, by Freedom
House

Causal Mechanism II, Islamic Minorities Considerations of Violence as
Legitimate and Necessary
Islamic Minorities derive justifications to participate political violence from: (1)
their status in Britain or France, (2) French/British military involvement in territories
with Islamic majorities, and (3) their perceptions concerning both. Behaviors of
majorities warrant violence, according to the participants in Islamic political aggression.
Varying majority behaviors in democracies, however, incite violent upheaval for diverse
reasons. Vehement protest of alienation, discrimination, OR foreign occupation
associate with models aspiring for minority integration or strong national identification
with their democratic residence.
The economic standing of Islamic populations vary between multicultural and
assimilation democracies. This evaluation, therefore, considers Islamic minorities’
economic and societal positions as a consequence of integration or assimilation policies.
Scholarly works often proscribe foreign occupation in Islamic lands as a precursor
of Islamic political violence. These assessments can account for the threats posed to
democracies on behalf of international terrorist organization as a result of western foreign
military entanglement. These theories, however, cease to predict the reactions of
Muslims, native to democracies, also potentially outraged by such external conduct. This
examination determines that native Muslims respond to their democracies’ international
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behaviors similar to that of International jihadists, but differently than Islamic
populations across democracies subject to either assimilation or multicultural practices.
The national loyalties mandated by assimilation democracies possibly influence the
deviations in responses among Islamic residents of assimilation or multicultural
democracies despite military action in majority Islamic states commenced by both.

Measure for Real Justifications to
Participate in Violence

Minorities At Risk

Minorities At Risk databases identify minority populations susceptible to violent
actions because of political and societal climates endorsed by majorities limiting their
economic or social mobilization. Identifying these vulnerable Islamic populations in
European democracies via Minorities At Risk indices elucidates the: status of Islamic
minorities in European democracies, societal conditions fostering minority
discontentment, and genuine hardships confronting Islamic minorities. Ascertaining the
truthful positions of minorities in European democracies assists in understanding: if
perceptions of discrimination/ alienation align with actual experiences of ill treatment and
if discrimination/alienation serves as a legitimate basis for violent reaction (Minorities At
Risk).
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France: French National Identity and
Integration,
Who belongs to the National community?
Section III pgs. 9-12

Minority perceptions of Alienation and
Discrimination

Britain: Living Apart Together, Policy
Exchange report
Chapter 6
These academic reports, public opinion polls, and media headlines provide data
on the perceptions of Muslims in Britain and France concerning a sense of belonging and
the treatment to which they are subject in their democratic residence. The opinions of
Islamic minorities highlight their considerations of violence as a legitimate and necessary
mechanism through which to address their grievances.

•

Living Apart together, Policy
Exchange Report
Chapter 5

•

Government Policy Towards
Muslims is Sharpening

Perceptions of Foreign Occupation

Monday, 29 January 2007- Policy Exchange Press
Release

•

Media Reports in Appendix III

These data components allude to the objections that British and French Muslim
populations possess concerning Western militancy in territories with Islamic majorities.
The report and press release issued by policy exchange assesses feelings of Muslims in
the UK about British intervention in Islamic states. Knowing the extent to which French
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Muslims contest military action of the French government poses complications as the
French have: largely reserved the use of military force against Islamic targets, provided
little material support for Israel, and issued few polls about French Muslims’ s concern
over aggressive actions abroad. Comparing and contrasting the reactions of British and
French Muslims, as reported by media outlets, to Western foreign policy, however,
distinguishes different levels of outrage between the ethno religious populations of
assimilationist and multicultural democracies.
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Causal Mechanism III, Minority Radicalization
Britain: Islamic Radicalization in the UK
Indicators for the Prospects of Minority
Radicalization

France: Islamic Radicalization in France
Islamic Radicalization Index (IRI)
International Institute for Counter
Terrorism

Islamic radicalization thriving in democracies to varying degrees reflects
the opposing mentalities of multicultural or assimilation societies to prevent such ills.
Discussing the prevalence of Islamic radicalization provides yet another indicator of the
priorities of democracies’ integration models to obstruct foreign yet adversarial
influences with intentions to protect their sovereignty and culture. Because the Islamic
Radicalization Index and media headlines reflect different degrees of Islamic
radicalization in Britain and France, its prevalence and reasons for such connect with a
democracy either practicing multiculturalism or assimilation (Islamic Radicalization
Index).
As radical Islam continues to undermine democratic values and security efforts of
the West, its agents seek creative outlets for violent expression. Their stealthy adaptations
to democracies’ defense measures irrefutably present an existential danger to core liberal
values of Western civilization. It is in this complicated political and security landscapewith the increasing infiltration of Islamic radicalization in the West- that the International
Institute for Counter Terrorism unveiled the Islamic Radicalization index (IRI). The IRI
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culminates articles, essays, opinion pieces, and briefing notes to address the theory and
empiricism of Islamic radicalization. These reports seek to establish within the confines
of national boarders how, why, and by whom Islamic radicalization is proliferating in
Britain and France. This index assigns no quantitative value to the emergence of Islamic
radicalization in Britain and France. The qualitative perspective, however, offers expert
insight into to the levels of religious radicalization and the reasons for such, associated
with state behaviors of multicultural and assimilationist democracies.
Causal Mechanism IV, National Priorities Assumed by Islamic Minorities
Britain: Living Apart Together (Policy
Exchange)
Qualitative Measures of National Priorities
adopted by Islamic Minorities

France: Islamic Radicalization in
(Bigot, Adele)

France

Assessing the national commitments that Islamic minorities possess as residents
of Western democracies offers insight into the consequences that Multicultural or
Assimilation democracies experience due to their different integration objectives. The
national priorities that Islamic minorities assume, as determined in part by
multiculturalism or assimilation, correspond with levels of violence and reasons for
pursuit of it initiated by Islamic adherents.
Scholarly perspectives advanced by Policy Exchange in “Living Apart Together”
and Adele Bigot in “Islamic Radicalization in France” permit a possible linkage between
weak national sentiments among Islamic minorities toward multicultural practice in
Britain and heightened national loyalty with assimilation practices in France (Bigot)
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(Policy Exchange). These trends perhaps indicate that multiculturalism and assimilation
affect violent pursuits because of their diverging influences over Islamic minorities to
strongly identify with their resident democracy or not.
Conceivably, the foreign entanglements of Multicultural democracies in Islamic
states solicit violent outrage perpetuated by British Muslims. Multiculturalism’s
character, however, allows maintenance of Islamic traditions (even if radical) and
overwhelming sympathy with Islamic populations abroad subject to foreign
“occupation”. Assimilation societies contrarily impose strict requirements on their
Islamic minorities to conform the ethnic or religious identities to suit their domestic
culture. The data highlighted above indicates that these heightened patriotic feelings,
although state mandated, may limit violence to upheavals and rioting rather than
engagement catastrophic terrorism for political ends.
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Causal Mechanism V, Political Objectives Pursued Through Violence

Varying Political Objectives pursued
through Violence As demonstrated by:

European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion
Index

Extent of Minority inclusion in Britain
and France

Muslims In Europe: Economic Worries
Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural
Identity - Pew Research Center

OR
Varying Perceptions of Foreign Occupation
of
Majority Islamic States

Objectives sought through violence vary between assimilationist and multicultural
democracies. Emphasizing these diverging violent ambitions determines that majority
approaches directed toward Islamic minorities influence radical Islam’s political
aspirations in Western democracies. These political aspirations perhaps associate with
violent extremes pursued by Islamists to ensure their realization.
Accounting for different extents of Islamic minority inclusion and perceptions of
occupation, as academically assessed by the European Civic Citizenship/ Inclusion Index
and Pew research center in their empirical evaluation of Muslims in Europe, associates
multicultural or assimilation characteristics with the purposes of violent initiatives
pursued by immigrant Islamic populations residing in democracies. Multiculturalism’s
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intent to integrate minorities without the compromise of their ethnic or religious
traditions relates with Islamic minorities hopes to: A. be distinct from society in cultural
but not economic respects and B. direct religious solidarity with and, therefore,
opposition toward foreign subjugation of Islamic populations abroad. Assimilationists’
attempts to counter the “deteriorating” influence that external religious or ethnic
traditions potentially exert over domestic political/ societal attributes intertwines with
Islamic immigrants’ violent struggles to: A. achieve access to economic opportunity to an
extent that is equal with that of the indigenous population, B. be considered a part of their
host country in both civic and economic respects, and C. dispel racial discrimination.
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Demonstrating Link between Multicultural/Assimilation Policies and
Violence:
The Ratio of Violence to
Multicultural Conduct in Britain and Assimilationist Practices France
Propensities for violence vary between multicultural and assimilation polities.
This study demonstrates the heightened or reduced prospects for violence through
notating the proportions of Islamic violent activity (measured in casualties, injuries, and
number of attacks because of Islamic terrorism) to standards of multiculturalism
maintained in Britain and France. Causal mechanisms, as extensions of assimilationist
and multicultural conduct, tie integration and social cohesion political endeavors to
violence. This relationship, prospectively codified through the connection of causal
mechanisms to either assimilationist or multiculturalism, possibly establishes that:
minority status, opportunities for violence, or minority foreign policy objections
correspond with integration or social cohesion frameworks. Theoretical “predispositions”
to terrorism, in turn, affect violent prospects primarily in the context of multicultural and
assimilation democracies. Multiculturalism and assimilation serve as the background,
against which, minority status, opportunities, and minority contest over foreign policy
facilitate violent measures.
Calculating the proportion of violent activity and the extent to which a democratic
regime embraces multiculturalism ascertains a quantitative link between state behavior,
directed toward Islamic minorities, and Islamic political violence. Underscoring
multicultural practices embraced in Britain and France also satisfies the theoretical
presumptions that multiculturalism and assimilation affect prospects of violence more
than: opportunities for violence; minority status; and minority protest of foreign policies.
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As substantiated by the various causal mechanisms: improved social and
economic status; minority frustration over foreign policy because of minimal national
attachments; and adequate opportunities for violence permitted by democratic qualities
are consequences of the integration pursuits attempted by multicultural conduct.
Conditions in democracies popularly theorized to mitigate violence exist in multicultural
systems. Their intentions to accommodate and esteem religious or ethnic differences
permit one’s theology to define national identity but also (theoretically) limit violent
reactions. Quantifying violent pursuits and multicultural practice in liberalized states,
therefore, indicates the influence that state behaviors, directed toward Islamic minorities,
exert over the likelihood for severe political violence.
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Scale of Multiculturalism and Violence
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A scale of multiculturalism and violence details the proportion to which Britain
and France adopt multicultural policies and experience Islamic political violence in terms
of incidents, casualties, and injuries. This calculation will prospectively demonstrate that
a free state’s heightened embrace of multiculturalism will result in more incidents,
causalities, and injuries attributable to Islamic political violence.
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Data Sets and Discussion
Queens University Multicultural Index tracks a multicultural shift over the past
three decades. Shifts in multicultural practice are determined by examining:
constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; adoption of
multiculturalism in school curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the
mandate of public media or media licensing; exemptions from dress-codes; allowing dual
citizenship; funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; funding
bilingual educational; and affirmative actions for disadvantaged immigrant groups
(Queen’s University Multiculturalism Policy Index). There shall be a value of 1 assigned
to each policy area embraced by Britain or France, as is determined by the Index
compiled by Queen’s University. A zero indicates a failure to adopt any of the eight
policy areas specified by Queen’s Multiculturalism Index. State rankings receiving a
score of 8 shall be considered very multicultural in their approach of minority integration.
Conversely, state rankings with a zero shall be considered far removed from being
multicultural according to the standards outlined by Queen’s University Multicultural
Index.
This study operationalizes terrorist activity in terms of injuries, causalities, and
number of attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorist organizations. The Global terrorism
database, created and maintained by the University of Maryland, “contains the most
current and comprehensive unclassified information in the world on terrorist incidents”
(START Database). Statistical information included in the GTD (Global Terrorism
Database) is derived from a variety of open media sources. An advisory panel of 12
terrorism research experts supervises maintenance and updates to the database. The
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START’s quantifiable measures of global terrorist activity account for over 125,000
attacks and includes details on 45 variables including: number of total incidents in a
specified country, number of causalities, number of injuries, frequency of attacks,
number of causalities because of Islamic political violence, number of injuries because of
Islamic political violence, and number of attacks perpetrated by Islamic organizations
between 2000 and 2013. Terrorist activity, therefore, constitutes: total incidents in a
specified country between 2000 and 2013; number of casualties between 2000 and 2013
in specified country; number of injuries between 2000 and 2013 in specified country;
number of causalities because of Islamic terrorism between 2000 and 2013 in specified
country; number of injuries because of Islamic terrorism between 2000 and 2013 in
specified country; number of attacks perpetrated by Islamic organizations between 2000
and 2013 in specified country; and frequency of attacks per year.
Terrorism Activity in Britain and France between 2000 and 2013
Incidents
Causalities
Injuries
Casualties because of Islamic Political Violence
Injuries because of Islamic Political Violence
Number of Attacks perpetrated by Islamic Political Violence
Frequency of Attacks per year over the past 13 years
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Multiculturalism’s and Assimilationists’ Impact on Violent Outcomes
In proportion to
Minority Inclusion, Integration, National Attachment, and Status of Civil
Liberties
Many academic works posit that minority oppression, status, and Islamic
criticisms of democracies’ foreign objectives promote occurrences of Islamic political
violence. This study, however, examines such variables in the context of assimilation and
multicultural systems. From the perspective of this research, these conditions result from
multicultural or assimilation practice and contribute to a heightened or reduced potential
for democracies to experience Islamic violence.
The conditions usually identified as variables upon which violent activity is
dependent, are alternatively (as emphasized in the hypothesis) considered to minimally
impact prospects of violence in the framework of multicultural and assimilation
democracies. This research calculates the proportion of multiculturalism, integration,
minority inclusion, self reported degrees of national attachment among Islamic minorities
(affecting minority outrage over foreign policy), and status of civil liberties to violent
activity. This, theoretically, substantiates that state policies affiliated with
multiculturalism or assimilation intensify or minimize the likelihood for terrorism.
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Scale demonstrating proportion of Multiculturalism; Inclusion;
National Attachment; Integration; Status of Civil Liberties; and Violence
substantiating or negating hypothesis
Proportion of Islamic Political Violence, Multiculturalism, Minority Integration, Minority
Economic Inclusion, Civil Liberties, National Attachment, and eligibility to assume
national identity of resident state
Islamic Political Violence
Activity in Britain
Casualties because of Isalmic
Terrorism:

Islamic Political Violence
Activity in France
Casualties because of Isalmic
Terrorism:

Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism:

Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism:

Incidents perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations:

Incidents perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations:

(Start Terrorism Data Base,
University of Maryland)

(START Terrorism Database
University of Maryland)

Embrace of Multiculturalism

Britain’s Multicultural Score
according to Queen’s University
Multicultural Index:

France’s Multicultural Score
according to Queen’s University
Multicultural Index:

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion in Britain
according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index:

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion in France
according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index:

Extent of Minority
Integration

Integration of Minorities in
Britain according to MIPEX

Integration of Minorities in
France according to MIPEX:

Status of Civil Liberties

Score from 2002 to 2011:
1

Score from 2002 to 2011:
1
*France Received a downward
trend Arrow
(Freedom House)

Islamic Political Violence

(Freedom House)
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National Priorities influencing
the potential for violent
responses to foreign policy

Eligibility to assume National
identity

Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project:
____% of Muslims in Britain
consider themselves as British
First

Ability to assume National
identity according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index In
Britain:
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Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project:
_____% of Muslims in France
consider themselves as French
First

Ability to assume National
identity according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index In
France:

Data Sets and Discussion
Scholarly works often identify: discrimination; alienation; minorities’
frustration over foreign policy; and restrictions on civil liberties as specific
processes and conditions that predispose a democracy to Islamic political violence.
The premise of this research, however, considers such conditions endured and
feelings upheld by Islamic minorities to be shaped by multicultural and
assimilationist postures of majorities. Discrepancies in violent outcomes suggest a
relationship between violent occurrences, initiated by Islamic populations, and state
behaviors tied to multiculturalism and assimilation. These state behaviors also
impact Islamic minorities’: integration; inclusion; status of civil liberties; and
national priorities. Divergent experiences with Islamic political violence across
multicultural Britain and assimilationist France prospectively reveals that efforts
designed for minority integration, maintenance of social cohesion, and preserving
state sovereignty affect violent aftermaths. More than, as theorized in this study, the
conditions popularly considered as fostering violent reactions.
Several data sets demonstrate the proportion of violence to state integration
or social cohesion objectives, where Islamic minorities’ integration, inclusion, status
of civil liberties, and national priorities vary. The European Civic Citizenship and
Inclusion Index, “enables monitoring of the extent to which member states are
implementing principles of civic citizenship and inclusion agreed to by all of (the
European Union Member States)” (European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index).
The Migrant Integration policy index “creates a rich multi dimensional picture of
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migrants’ opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments’
commitment to integration” (MIPEX). Freedom in the world survey conducted by
Freedom House “ provides an annual evaluation of the state of global freedom as
experienced by individuals. The survey measures freedom-the opportunity to act
spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other
centers of potential domination according to two broad categories: political rights and
civil liberties” (Freedom House methodology). French Muslim and British Muslim self
reported national priorities are highlighted in Pew’s Global attitude project which, “ is a
series of world wide public opinion surveys encompassing a broad array of subjects
ranging from peoples assessment of their own lives to their current view about the world
and important issues of the day” (Pew Global Attitudes Survey). These data sets quantify
the intentions and success of integration and social cohesion models advanced in Western
democracies. The measures established in: European Civic and Citizenship Index,
Minority Integration and Inclusion Index, Freedom In the World’s indices Civil Liberties,
and Pew’s global attitude’s project, moreover, assist in determining if factors (otherwise
concluded to create inclinations for Islamic political violence among democracies in
previous scholarship on the relationship between terrorism and state) impact on
propensities for violence in assimilation and multicultural political climates.
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BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AS A FOUNDATION OF REASEARCH AND
CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS
This research explores an association between heightened national interests
possessed by minority Islamic populations, fostered by majority behaviors, and less
violence. Several assumptions, therefore, comprise the platform from which to
qualitatively assess the interaction of majority conduct, democratic vitality, and Islamic
minority justifications to endorse political aggression and occurrences of Islamic political
violence in free societies. These assumptions enable the evaluation of the relationship
between state behavior, national interests, democratic vitality, legitimization of violence,
and vehement Islamic political initiatives. The assumptions include: (1) considerations
that recent political violence in Britain and France was organized along religious lines;
(2) majorities intending assimilation of Islamic minorities facilitate Islamic minority
national identities reflecting at least some sentiments of patriotism as determined by legal
consequence and societal stigmatization when void of such; (3) minorities required to
emulate national loyalties, however, may not feel vested in national interests to the extent
desired by majorities; (4) one is rarely ( if ever) entirely void of a national identity or
national interests; (5) esteeming ethnic and religious compulsions in democracies permits
strong minority identification with ethnic or religious commitments; (6) questions of
compromise of state sovereignty in free societies among majorities because of extensive
minority influence provided by democratic function results in minority discrimination
and alienation; and (7) societal conditions to which participants in violence are subject
define the political objectives pursued through violence as demonstrated by the nature of
Islamic violence in democracies.
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Majority behaviors in the political and societal realms affect the national loyalties
assumed by Islamic minorities. National loyalties either directed to their receiving
democracy or pan Islamic movements. Because national loyalty remains difficult to
quantify this study determines levels of national attachment to exist in assimilationist
democracies where political and societal models expect an extent of such to be directed
toward the assimilationist residence of ethno – religious minorities. Although this
framework requires the adoption of national identities consistent with prevailing values
as a pre requisite for citizenship, means not that those minorities for whom the models are
intended necessarily feel or consider themselves loyal citizens of their resident state.
Majority behaviors often considered discriminatory intend the maintenance of
state sovereignty, considered compromised by extensive ethnic or religious influences of
resident immigrant minorities with ethnic or religious distinctions. This does not mean
that their behaviors remain any less alienating or discriminatory. Understanding this
reality explains, however, the construction of models determined to require the conduct
of ethno- religious minorities to conform to that of the dominant political and societal
trend.
Minority integration frameworks that permit, if not encourage, the maintenance of
religious identities, even if inconsistent with prevailing values, promote national
obligations to the personal significances maintained by ethno-religious minorities over
that of their resident democracy. Although national sentiments remain impossible to
accurately quantify, it is reasonable to calculate that majorities who not only emphasize
religious and ethnic distinctions but consider the esteem of such as vital to the health of
their democracy also permit their Islamic residents to identify with and direct loyalty to
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the religious or national cause of their choosing. Such minority devotion may even
contradict the very democratic ideals allowing for their fierce national or religious
subscriptions.
This study, therefore, assumes not that the citizens of democracies always remain
loyal to the state of which they are a part. It rather assumes that many variables influence
formulation of national interests. Potential disloyalty remains most challenging to
democracies whose values require the state to allow citizens to be dedicated to whatever
political cause or national ambition they consider significant or necessary.
As assumed in the premise of this research, citizens of authoritarian regimes
consume themselves in demonstrating affection for their oppressive state but probably
internally desire not to do so. Because residents of such states cannot, without fear of
serious reprisals, be honest about their national desires one must only assume that the
oppression to which they are subject eventually arises as an organized violent movement
seeking the destruction of oppressive leadership. Similarly democracies, out of concern
for state sovereignty, devise policies legally mandating citizen conduct favorable to their
interests. This means not that citizens actually revere their state institutions and societal
processes but that their conduct demonstrates such reverence out of fear of legal
repercussions and societal excommunication. The potential for Islamist violence in
democratic societies (organized along ethnic or religious lines), under these conditions,
persists as a consequence of the false commitment ethno-religious minorities direct
toward state interests.
Media analysts, public officials, and scholars often theorize that societal
conditions in democracies predicate an “absence” of national identity among ethnic
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youths and such a void is considered an indicator of vulnerability to religious
radicalization. On the contrary, this analysis assumes that one, even a “disenfranchised”
youth, is rarely (if ever) void of a national identity or national sentiments. Operating
under this assumption, multiculturalist democracies, however noble their intentions,
remain disadvantaged in the challenge of national loyalties that conflict with and
therefore potentially deteriorate democratic function.

Limitations of the Data and Findings of Analysis
Establishing the conditions favorable to Islamic political violence in free
societies, as is determined in this study, is vastly different than considering political
elements and societal phenomena specific to liberalized states as causing violence.
Definitively identifying the pre requisites for Islamic political violence in democracies
associated with democratic processes and environments challenges rigorously tested
theories that conclude oppression to be a determinant of political violence. If oppression
is theorized to cause political violence can its opposite political condition, liberty, also
cause violence?
This study cannot confirm that in the absence of democratic freedoms, democratic
political function, and societal processes violence would not occur. This analysis renders
that majorities’ behaviors of democratic systems and societal consequences manifested
from those behaviors (out of which minority rationalizations to participate in violence are
derived), categorically affect democracies’ potential to experience violence. Rather than
solely cause violent outcomes. This study determines (1) severity of violence defined by
mass causalities, (2) frequency and likelihood of minority radicalization, (3) type of
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violence pursued, (4) objectives pursued through violence, (5) the justifications (real or
perceived) to participate in violence, and (6) the role of jihadist actors in political
aspirations to vary with majority approaches either seeking immigrant minority
integration or concerned with minorities’ national identity and loyalties. Guaranteed
fluctuations of Islamic political violence cannot be yielded upon shifts in majority
behaviors, policies, and/or societal functions addressing a significant Islamic minority
presence. These approaches, therefore, absolutely create conditions under which violence
is possible rather than establish the causes associated with violent occurrences in
democratic societies.
Unexpected, yet Important, Revelation
Most measures exclusively specify the assimilation of Islamic minorities
in European democracies as immigrants’ and minorities’ equal access to economic and
social processes. They exclude the national identities assumed by Europe’s Muslim
populations in determining the extent to which minorities are assimilated. Minority
identification with the state, however, remains a primary and obvious objective of
assimilationist democracies. This research includes not only those numerical indices
reflecting states’ advance of multiculturalism or assimilationist constructs, but also those
measures that demonstrate the relationship of policy and societal objectives for either
minority integration or national identity facilitation to assimilation or multiculturalist
approaches.
National identity formulation among immigrant minorities foremost concerns the
political actors in assimilation democracies. The secure economic status and equality of
ethnic groups receives minimal and secondary legislative attention. Adequate
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assimilation of minorities in policy terms means then that minorities remain
indistinguishable from majorities in civic and cultural aspects exclusively. Minorities’
economic security in assimilationist systems is considered achievable only through their
abandonment of religious or ethnic traditions that distinguish them as separate or
different from the predominant culture. Equal economic status of immigrant minorities to
that of majorities only reflects the most advanced stages of minority assimilation.
Considering assimilated immigrant communities as indistinguishable from
majorities in cultural facets dismisses any need for the theoretical assessment of
immigrant economic equality in the measure of adequate assimilation. Political and social
objectives, pursued by assimilationist democracies, constitute minority assimilation for
the purpose of this research. Combining minorities’ economic positions with other
cultural and civic attributes that differentiate ethno- religious communities, from this
research perspective, corrupts the theoretical understanding of assimilation models.
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II .

CASE STUDIES ANALYSES OF INTEGRATION POLICIES
Assimilation and Multiculturalism

European democracies, because of mass Islamic immigration, design various
political frameworks intending the peaceful co-existence of their Islamic inhabitants.
Policies and societal approaches directed toward Islamic minorities either allow for the
maintenance of ethnic/ religious practices though sometimes contradictory to dominant
values or require minorities to adopt a hybrid national identity that conforms religious
tendencies to the values and mores of their residence. Both expect the peaceful co
habitation of immigrants, their descendants, and majorities but realize such cultural
compatibility from very different approaches.
Assimilation and Multicultural models predominately adopted by democratic
societies, however, affect levels of political violence, likelihood for ethno religious
minorities to become radicalized, objectives pursued through minority participation in
violence, type of violence utilized to realize desired political changes, and the national
identities assumed by immigrants. While democracies with significant Islamic
populations adopt aspects from both competing integration approaches, they ascribe
primarily to the model most indicative of historical predispositions as well as their
political calculations to sustain power and succeed economically. Observance of a
specific model direct majorities’ political and societal conduct toward resident ethno
religious minorities. Violence in free societies links with behaviors of democracies
committed to either minority integration or minorities’ possessing strong national
sentiments.
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ASSIMILATION APPROACH FOR SOCIAL COHESION
Assimilation Characteristics
Models based on assimilation principles intend for immigrants to assume national
identities consistent with the values and customs of their receiving state. Rather than
allow immigrant minorities’ to assume identities consistent with religious or ethnic
constructs that presumably contradict prevailing societal and political functions. One
almost always possess national loyalties, ideally, to their resident state but also to other
abstract concepts or ambitions such as control of a territory of historical or religious
significance, political systems dominated by particular economic or religious paradigms,
or transnational religious movements seeking a new world order. Primordial cohesions
such as language, religion, or ethnic traditions among groups commence nationalist
ambitions or patriotic sentiments. If these factors should unify groups to pursue
nationalist ambitions contradictory to state functions, assimilation models adequately
challenge these instincts. Assimilationist practices facilitate minority loyalties to state
interests over that of other religious or nationalist movements. Additionally,
assimilationist approaches combat hindrances to state sovereignty arising from severe
cultural or religious differences among immigrant minorities, especially those differences
with the potential to radicalize minority populations, or promote their participation in
violence.
Various societal and historical qualities compel state adoption of assimilationist
models capable of addressing complications to state functions because of ethno religious
minorities “contradictory” values. Suspicions of extensive immigrant minority influence,
eroding sovereignty, encourages majority embrace of assimilationist practices.
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Assimilationist models, therefore, involve highly centralized policy efforts to achieve a
cohesive society. These majority behaviors imply a process of becoming the same and
impel immigrant communities to realize cohesion on their own accord.
Majorities perceive threats to state sovereignty resulting from mass immigration
of populations, because of beliefs and practices embraced by immigrants contradictory to
dominant values and traditions. Advancing “successful” assimilation frameworks,
therefore, remains less about achieving, for ethno religious minorities, equality and
economic security, than forging strong national ties. Through embrace of assimilationist
policies immigrant minorities are limited in seeking the compromise of pre existing
practices and state influence through organized violence.
Assimilation conduct focuses on social cohesion. Realization of minority
assimilation, attributable to majority practices, then depends upon minority immigrants
and their descendants considering themselves of the national origin of their resident state.
Assimilationist models do not prioritize minorities’ equal participation in social, political,
and economic processes. Emerson states “ the assimilated person no longer has any wish
to relate to his origins except as a matter of family history. In policy terms assimilation
means a refusal to admit or recognize distinct communities” (3). Democracies ascribing
to assimilationist models then consider integration of minority immigrants as adequate if
they and their descendants remain indistinguishable from the majority population.
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Emergence of Assimilationist practices in France
Decline of Catholicism in France occurred after the reformation and
enlightenment. Because the French monarchs became deeply intertwined with the affairs
of the Catholic establishment the French republican elite fiercely embraced anticlericalism. Anticlericalism and republicanism joined forces to contest the relationship
between clergy and monarchs. This relationship meaningfully dissolved no ties between
French royalty and the Catholic hierarchy, however, until its dominance in the late 19th
century. With the establishment of the third republic in 1870, republicans challenged the
dominance of Catholicism. They enlisted notions of secularism as a foundation of their
anticlerical agenda (Kuru 5-6).
A war of two Frances emerged. One France, as the inheritor of the values
perpetuated by the 1789 revolution, contested clericalism from a republican and secularist
perspective. Another France, steadfast and stringent in their position concerning religious
influence over the monarchy, remained committed to making inseparable the Catholic
Church and French royalty. Principles of secularism strongly influencing political
decisions resulted from this severe conflict. Under these circumstances combative
secularism, aspiring for the exclusion of religion from the public sphere, dominated the
political landscape of France (Kuru 6).
The rising Muslim population in France during the 1980s refreshed majority
allegiances to exclude religion from the public sphere. Political debates ensued about
relations between the state and religion in France (Kuru 8). Until very recently French
society toiled not with issues of immigration and citizenship since migrant workers were
considered temporary residents. The indefinite residence of foreign postcolonial
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populations went unanticipated by authorities managing the flow of labor between France
and states formerly controlled by its late empire unduly. With the long-term residence of
Islamic minorities, however, the French public, perceiving threats to national identity,
then determined immigration to be no longer an issue of temporary migration but of
ethnicity. Republicanism, (under which abstract concepts of citizenship tied to national
identity) challenged the potential compromise of the separation of public and private
spheres and to national identity from the now permanent abode of immigrant Muslims
(Centre on migration policy 23). Regarding the Muslim question, then, societal
commitments to republican values and secularism forged political alliances that sought
the implementation of assimilation policies ultimately excluding religious traditions from
the public sphere (Kuru 8).

Majority Assimilation Practices in France
Paris expects abandonment of Muslim traditions that compete with the prevailing
values so that Muslims may enjoy full participation in French life (Gallis 25). According
to Yanasmayan, “ To date the historical archetypes of assimilationist policies are
considered to be the homogenizing practices of Jacobin republicanism in France” (28).
Traditionally, France domesticates religion to accept republican ideals.
In recent years France adopted new measures to assimilate and control its
significant Muslim community. These measures prioritize the preservation of
republicanism and encompass an institutional as well as the political will, based on
traditions of enlisting highly centralized government apparatuses, to ensure public order.
As of 2005 France continued to reject policy accommodations and responses, otherwise
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extending Muslims preferential treatment, as a means of assimilation promotion in
political and societal domains. (Gallis 27).
Various state actions, during the presidency of Sarkozy, express intents to
advance the French model in an assimilationist direction. Politically charged and intense
debates, including vocal contributions from the extreme right, resulted in a societal
situation characterized as laitice opposite the emergence of Islam. This political theatre
intended to reiterate, in the view of Sarkozy, concepts of assimilation. It necessarily
involved the protection France’s Christian heritage through strict adoption of policies
designed to combat state “deterioration” from potentially corrosive minority political
influences (Emerson 12).
French citizenry finds its Islamic presence substantial enough to undermine its
ideal for public life. Consequently Frenchmen reconsider established notions of pluralism
and secularism. Pluralism from these considerations no longer intends “equal opportunity
advancement” among deprived sub groups. It must refer, instead, to the delicate political
act of balancing recognition of ethnic and cultural differences at the institutional level
and the maintenance of political and cultural homogeneity at the national level. Though
debates persist about how to avoid falling off this political balance, Frenchmen still
consider national unity as loyalty to the state elevated above all others (Cesari 13:
Shaping of a religious minority).
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Synthesizing the Data
Several policies recently adopted in France provide the indicators necessary to
establish France s an assimilationist democracy. They include A. the veil ban, B. free
speech restrictions imposed on those openly ascribing to radical Islam, C. government
apparatuses mandating that minority immigrants assimilate, and D. in the requirements
imposed on immigrants seeking citizenship. The prevalence of assimilationist practices in
France is also demonstrated through: the prohibition of Muslim women to wear
headscarves to school; limited access to mosques proportionate to the Muslim population;
Islamic instruction available in public schools; and number of Islamic schools funded by
the state compared to similar institutions in Britain.
The CRS report to Congress describes the social cohesion efforts relentlessly
pursued in France. According to the report, after much deliberation the French central
government, “ presented a bill to parliament to ban conspicuous religious symbols in
public schools through the secondary level. The law prohibits the wearing of head
scarves” (Gallis). Debate surrounding the legislation included then Prime Minister
Raffarin claiming that, “ the purpose of the legislation is to set limits in the face of
growing religious militancy” (Gallis 71). France’s parliamentary movement to ban the
face veil and burka uniquely identifies France as an assimilationist democracy.
Second to restricting extreme religious dress, the French government’s official
response to vocal radical Islamists defines the objectives of France’s assimilationist
model including that of social cohesion. The CRS report discusses that “ French law
allows the deportation without trail of anyone seen as a security threat”. The law targets
hateful rhetoric spewed by Islamic extremist leadership. The rationale surrounding the
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deportation of self-professed adherents of radical Islam is described in former Prime
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy proclaiming that, “ this republic is not a weak regime and does
not have to accept speeches that, under the guise of being protected, might call for hatred
and murder. Such imams will by systematically expelled…those who make excessive and
violent remarks foreign to the values of our Republic will be expelled…we will survey
every place of worship…as well as prisons and keep an eye on social sporting or cultural
organizations that serve as a screen for radical and terrorist ideologies and activities”
(Gallis 72).
In France criminal consequences befall any who deny the holocaust and voice anti
Semitic speech. Perpetuating hate and endorsing murder results in deportation. These
practices guard France against deterioration because of the competing values some
Islamic immigrants may possess and potential violent Jihadist uprisings targeting the
most important cornerstone of the French Republic; Freedom.
France demonstrates their commitment to assimilation through the positions of
integration and social cohesion assumed by former Prime Minister Nicholas Sarkozy.
His candid remarks reflect an embrace of assimilation conduct. One such statement
includes:
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“If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is the
national community, and if you do not want to accept that, you cannot be
welcome in France....We have been too concerned about the identity of the person
who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the country that was
receiving him” (Court, New Americanism)
Former Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy expresses a relentless dedication to the
preservation of the French Republic. His fierce statements concern the legal requirements
imposed on immigrants to assimilate in order to be residents of France.
Obligations, imposed on immigrants seeking naturalization, also distinguish
France as assimilationist. The Center for European Policy Studies in Interculturalism
explains that in France, “ no one can be naturalized if he or she does not justify
assimilation to the French community, notable by a sufficient knowledge, according to
his condition, of the French language and the rights and duties conferred by French
nationality (Interculturalism 10-11). Justifying ones ability to assimilate into the French
Republic remains a precondition to acquiring French citizenship. This burden carries less
significance in democracies with alternative integration polices.
Muslims in Britain and France have markedly different experiences attributable to
the social cohesion or integration policies. Compared to those Muslims in Britain, French
Muslims cannot wear headscarves to school, possess limited access to mosques by a
significant ratio, receive no Islamic instruction in public schools, and have no access to
public Islamic institutions.
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Differences of State Policies in France and Britain Directed toward
Muslim Minorities: Reflects France’s embrace of Assimilation policies
based on republicanism and secularism more than Multicultural Britain
Freedom to
Mosques
Islamic
Students’
proportionate Instruction
headscarves
to Muslim
in Schools
Population

Islamic
Schools
(funded
by state)

France

NO

1,685 to 4.5
million
1 per 2,670

No

3 (0)

Britain

Yes

1,439 to 1.6
million
1 per 1,071

Yes

140 (7)

( Gallis)
These differences between two European democracies, both with significant Islamic
populations, reveal the social cohesion or integration priorities assumed by France.
Measures Linking Intense Societal/Political aspirations for social
cohesion with the state’s to advancement of assimilation behaviors
France prioritizes social cohesion over minority integration reflected through their
practice of assimilation and dedication to preserve the French Republic. Assimilation
behaviors, therefore, link France’s societal and political aspirations for social cohesion to
obligations imposed on minorities to assume a French national identity. Immigrants
considering themselves French and accepting the French Republican ideal remains the
primary objective of assimilation conduct in France.
Several public opinion polls tie French assimilation to Islamic immigrant
minorities’ assuming a French national identity. These public opinion studies, surveying
the attitudes of French Muslims, illuminate the success of assimilation endeavors in
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France. This success is especially evident when comparing the attitudes of French
Muslims to their co religionists in Britain.
Pew Research Center’s study of the French Muslim connection, “At Home in
France” finds that, “ Most Muslims in France feel very French”. This survey suggests that
Muslims are more conservative on issues related to marriage and sexual orientation. The
proportion of Muslims, however, actively practicing their religion in France is only 10
percent. This statistic closely aligns with those Frenchman who claim to practice
Catholicism (Dewenden). Another poll conducted by pew research center in their review
of the French Muslim Connection also finds that, “ few Muslims living in France see a
natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in modern society. Seven in
ten, or 72% of, French Muslims perceive no such conflict, a view shared by a virtually
identical 74% of the French general public” (Allen).
This particular study also finds that French Muslims, when asked whether they
consider themselves a national citizen or Muslim first, split relatively evenly on the issue
42% to 46%. According to the report this, “is remarkably different from Muslims
elsewhere in Europe. Fully 81% of British Muslims self identify with their religion rather
than their nationality” (Allen). Consistent with the analyses advanced by Pew Research
Center Muslims living in France are perhaps, “ascribing to the secular ways of their
countrymen, among whom fully 83% self identify with their nationality rather than their
religion” (Allen).
Most importantly the survey results suggest that, “nearly 78% of French Muslims
want to adopt French customs. Those under the age of 35 are equally as likely to say this,
as are their elders” (Allen). France’s success maintaining social cohesion through
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adoption of assimilation policies is further evident in Muslims resident to Multicultural
aspiring to adopt British customs at a rate of 4%.
A Gallup poll released in 2009 concludes that, “ French Muslims are nearly twice
as loyal to France as the French public believe them to be”. The Gallup coexist index,
reviewing the state of inter faith relations in countries around the world found that, “ 80%
of French Muslims say Muslims in France are loyal to their country” (Gallup). The study
also finds that, “French Muslims identify with France as much as the French do (52% to
55%)” (Gallup).
Conversely Muslim’s in Britain possess minimal attachments to their resident
democracy. Public opinion data published in the Guardian concludes that, “Muslims in
Britain are the most anti Western in Europe” (Guardian). The poll finds that, “across the
board, Muslim attitudes in Britain more resembled public opinion in Islamic countries in
the Middle East and Asia than elsewhere in Europe. And on the whole, British Muslims
were more pessimistic than those in France about the feasibility of living in modern
society while reaming devout” (Guardian).
A publication by Pew Global Attitudes project, assessing British Muslim’s
concern about extremism, describes that, “Muslims in Britain consider themselves
Muslim First” (Pew Research Center). The survey found that, “ British Muslims have a
stronger Islamic identity than do Muslims elsewhere in Europe” (Pew Research Center) .
The research suggests that 8 in 10 Muslims, or 81%, consider themselves as
primarily Muslim rather than British. This contrasts significantly with Muslims in France,
only 46% that regard themselves as Muslim rather than French. Public opinion data,
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detailing the commitment French Muslims devote to France determines the influence
assimilation policies exert over French Muslims self associating with France.
Findings
Recently the French government pursued various measures to facilitate the
assimilation of the Muslim community in France. These official pursuits also provide
indicators that undoubtedly establish France as an assimilation democracy. Banning the
burqa, deporting openly hateful and radical Islamic adherents, and levying those seeking
citizenship to demonstrate loyalty to French customs include those actions that permit the
designation of France as an assimilation democracy.
Behaviors of the French government pointing to their assimilationist tendencies
include; banning the burqa and face veil in public spheres; deporting openly hateful and
radical Islamic adherents to their country of origin; the limited availability of Islamic
instruction available in French public schools compared to that of Britain; and limited
amount of public funding committed to Islamic educational institutions in France
compared to that of Britain. The formal speeches of former Nicolas Sarkozy,
emphasizing the need for Muslims to assimilate, also provides overwhelming indication
of France as an assimilationist democracy. Integrating these policy objectives, positions
of the French government, and experiences of Muslims residing in France in analysis
ascertains the assimilationist tendencies embraced in France.
Several indicators designate France as an assimilationist society. Public opinion
data, however, demonstrate the intentions and success of assimilationist conduct pursued
in France. The commitment of French Muslims, as is revealed in various surveys,
associates the aspirations for social cohesion aspired by majorities in France and also
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reflects the positive outcomes related to social cohesion achieved through the adoption of
assimilation. The consequences of Muslims in France assuming a French identity and
possessing loyalty to the Republic as inherently related to the pursuit of assimilation
policies in France, is especially evident when comparing the starkly opposite mindsets of
Muslims in Britain. The opposing sentiments of Muslims in Britain and France, regarding
the loyalty directed toward their residence and the national priorities they possess
connects social cohesion objectives, and the success of such, with assimilationist pursuits.
Upon reviewing the media headlines, included in Appendix II section II C,
discussing the assimilationist tendencies of Britain and France, concludes that France
practices and applies aspects of assimilation to an extent greater than Britain. Elements of
assimilation, as portrayed in expansive media outlets, also reveal the practical application
of assimilation policies adopted in France. Realistic attributes of assimilationist
approaches detailed in the Media reflect the motivations and reasoning of assimilation
objectives. These attributes of assimilation intend for social cohesion amidst the influx of
Islamic populations possessing the political rights and will to morph France into a
European state whose government transactions are more consistent with that of a
theocracy rather than a democracy.
Assessment
Empirical evidence correlates France with ascribing to assimilation models
aspiring for national identity formulation among immigrant minorities permanently
abiding in France. Britain, conversely, adopts multicultural practices, which intends
immigrant minority integration through policies promoting their equality. These measures
do not reflect the success of either model. This is reality demonstrated by French-
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Muslims possessing disingenuous affections toward France and British-Muslims being
equal to that of British majorities. Rather, including indices signifying British-Muslims’
equal access to societal and economic processes and French-Muslims’ genuine
attachment to their resident state connects these objectives with either of the models
aspiring to achieve such.
Integrated minorities are not synonymous with minorities considered as
assimilated. This actuality, as evidenced by the data, reveals that these models affect the
objectives of violent movements pursued by Islamic minority participants, type of
violence utilized to accomplish their goals, and their justifications to enlist violent tactics.
Assimilation, in policy terms, aims for a societal landscape where immigrant minorities
remain indistinguishable from majorities. Theoretical assessments often equate an
absence of disparity between economic and social conditions of immigrant minorities and
majorities with minorities being undifferentiated. This analysis, however, considers
adequate assimilation of minorities as being similar, in cultural to the point of no
distinction, to that of majorities, in cultural and civic aspects. Assimilation models
prioritize social cohesion because of concerns for state sovereignty and security may be
compromised by competing values possessed by immigrant Islamic minorities.
Achieving, for minorities, economic security and equality receives, consequently,
secondary attention. Including economic indices as a measure for assimilation, then,
undermines the explanatory capabilities of this research to relate violent objectives of
Islamic minorities, type of violence utilized, and various justifications that minorities
perceive to use to perpetrate violence with the different democratic approaches
addressing a significant Islamic minority presence.
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MULTICULTURAL APPROACH TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
Multicultural Characteristics
Multicultural models hope for the integration of immigrant minorities in terms of
secure economic status and equality. Integration of minorities in a multicultural society
means that differences between immigrants and majorities are reflected and esteemed in
every aspect of life other than in the social or economic inferiority of minority
populations. Multicultural frameworks desire to combat prospective minority
subservience so much that majorities accommodate societal or political changes desired
by immigrant populations. This occurs despite the status quo obstructing or contradicting
the cultural and religious practices of ethno religious minorities. In some instances
multicultural processes involve preferential treatment of Islamic minorities even if it
violates the constitutional rights of their majority counterparts.
Multicultural societies value the presence of immigrant minorities and esteem
them to such an extent that they tolerate and consider ethnic and religious behaviors,
potentially corrosive to state sovereignty, as an unfortunate but necessary by product of
multicultural practice. While meaningful threats to state sovereignty and security arise
from ethno religious minority opposition and contest of state functions, nobility and
righteousness guide majority practices to prioritize immigrant minorities’ equality and
prosperity in multicultural integration models.
Achieving a favorable status for immigrant minorities, as intended by
multicultural frameworks, involves local authorities and representatives from religious or
ethnic communities. This approach to minority integration implies through substantive
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and exhaustive political action that differences are not only to be tolerated but also
valued. These practices distinguish immigrant communities as separate but equal.
Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, considers Multiculturalism, “ as a strategy
which has encouraged different cultures to live separate lives apart from the mainstream”
(Multiculturalism, What Does it Mean? BBC).
Cultural relativism predicates multicultural ideals. Behaviors of multicultural
democracies concerning their immigrant minorities and their descendants reflect an equal
value of cultures. Multiculturalism, therefore, aims to combat exclusion, discrimination,
and minority feelings of such, otherwise known to generate minority rebellion.
Emergence of Multicultural Practices in Britain
Britain’s approach to integration rejects assimilation in favor of
multiculturalism, or promoting tolerance and integration while permitting immigrants and
ethnic groups to maintain their cultural identities. Multicultural practice represents
Britain’s dealings with growing diversity as a result of immigration outside of Europe
since the 1960s. This approach closely associates with Britain’s historical experiences
assembling various national populations including English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish
into a single nation state (Muslims in Europe: integration in select countries 12).
Post World War II immigration policy operated under laizzez-faire practices of
assimilation (Emerson 10-11). Consistent with this policy approach, government only
concerned themselves with issues of immigration and immigrant integration to promote
tolerance and discourage discrimination (Gallis). The British nationality act of 1948
granted citizenship to immigrant communities upon their arrival in Britain. Including
immigrants into political discourse concerning their integration into British society,
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naturally facilitated assimilation and, therefore, the ethnic, cultural, and religious
diversity exclusive to modern Britain (Centre on Migration Policy 18).
In the 1980s assimilation models, however, succumbed to political pressures to
adopt soft multiculturalism and equal rights so to adequately integrate immigrant
minorities. Then home secretary Roy Jenkins defined this as, “cultural diversity coupled
to equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance with a strong emphasis on nondiscrimination” (Emerson 10-11). Depoliticizing national discourse concerning “race”
and “immigration” occurred at the onslaught of popular political embrace of liberalism.
Decentralized management of integration of ethnic minorities to local authorities and
grass roots organizations ensued. This initiated a political process to include religious and
ethnic representatives in the political socialization of ethno religious minorities (Centere
on Migration policy 22). Policy shifts away from laizzez-faire attitudes alternatively
emphasized the embrace of individual or community and forfeited a British society
bonded by a common identity and set of values (Gallis 12).
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Multicultural Practices in Britain
Britain embraces multiculturalism, or integration while maintaining national
identity, to manage their significant immigrant populations. This practice in Britain
involves toleration and acceptance of group distinctions while allowing immigrants and
ethnic groups to maintain separate cultural identities and customs ( Gallis 12).
The political context for minority integration through Britain’s embrace of
multicultural tendencies during the last decade, defined by Islamic terrorism with the
London bombings and perceptions of insecurity generated by 9/11, experienced complex
recalibration. To one extent the rules for acquiring citizenship shifted in an assimilationist
direction from being based on duration of legal residence to including mandates on
immigrants to exhibit shared values and senses of duty toward the state. To another
extent threats of terrorism and consequential security concerns compelled authorities to
work in a multicultural mode with representative organizations of Muslim communities
to further minority integration (Emerson 10-11). This policy confusion and imbalance
reflect the sate’s consideration of multicultural tendencies as adequately integrating but
failing to assimilate their Islamic minority population. A political drama reflected in
Prime Minister David Cameron’s infamous speech at a Munich security conference
elaborating on the failure of Multiculturalism.
Lord sacks chief Rabbi of Hebrew congregation of the commonwealth observes
of multiculturalism in Britain to mean the creation of a more tolerant society, one in
which everyone feels at home. For him multiculturalism’s message also infers a, “
dissolution of national identity, shared values, and collective identity making it
impossible for groups to integrate because there is nothing to integrate into”
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(multiculturalism what does it mean? BBC). Another observer of multiculturalist
practices in Britain explains that, “multiculturalism as a lived experience enriches our
lives. But multiculturalism as a political ideology has helped to create a tribal Britain
with no political or moral center…where groups assert their identity through a sense of
victimhood and grievance” (Gallis 13). Multiculturalism in practice, entrenched in
Britain, discrete Muslim communities functioning apart from mainstream British society
(Gallis 12).
Synthesizing the Data
The Queen’s University Multicultural index provides substantive explanation of
the heightened multicultural tendencies of Britain compared to that of France. The index
includes eight indicators of multiculturalism to establish a European democracy as
multicultural. A through review of state policies allows the assignment of each indicator a
value signifying them as multicultural. The indices, ultimately combined to designate a
state as multicultural include: A. constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation
of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional level; the adoption of multiculturalism
in school curriculum; the inclusion of ethnic representation / sensitivity in the mandate of
public media; Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases); allowing
dual citizenship; funding of ethnic group organizations or activities; funding of bilingual
education or mother-tongue instruction; affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant
groups.
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Multicultural Differences in Britain VS France
Constitutional, legislative,
or parliamentary affirmation
of multiculturalism

Britain: NO
France: NO

Adoption of
multiculturalism in school
curriculum

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Inclusion of ethnic
representation/sensitivity in
the mandate of public media
or media licensing

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Exemptions from dresscode or Sunday closing
legislation

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Allowing dual citizenship

Britain: Yes
France: Yes

Funding of ethnic group
organizations to support
cultural activities

Britain: Yes
France: Yes

Funding of bilingual
education or mother tongue
instruction

Britain: NO
France: NO

Affirmative action for
disadvantaged immigrant
groups

Britain: Yes
France: NO
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The indicators in which Britain can be differentiated from France in terms of practicing
multiculturalism include: adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; inclusion of
ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
exemptions from dress-code or Sunday closing legislation; and affirmative action for
disadvantaged immigrant groups. The only multicultural measures shared by Britain and
France are those policies that permit dual citizenship and lack of an official multicultural
designation by the legislative body presiding over Britain and France. Of all the other
indicators, France maintains a position opposite to that of multicultural Britain.
According to the Queen’s university index, Britain is primarily a multicultural democracy
because the British government: adopted multiculturalism in school curriculum; requires
ethnic representation and sensitivity in public media; permits exemptions from dress
codes based on religious preferences; extends funding of ethnic group organizations or
activities; and advances affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.
Queen’s University considers Britain to practice multiculturalism to an extent
greater than France. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), however,
establishes minority integration as a primary objective of multiculturalism and signifies
the success of minority integration as aspired by multicultural practices. MIPEX
measures integration policies in all European member states and assigns a value based on
the degree to which European democracies adopt integration policies and their minority
populations are integrated into their respective European society of residence.
The report issued by MIPEX finds that Britain practices some of the strongest anti
discrimination laws and equality practices while possessing a strong commitment to
implement intercultural education. After thoroughly assessing seven policy areas and
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averaging the scores assigned to Britain based on their performance in each of the policy
areas. MIPEX assigns Britain a 57 on a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and policy areas
where 100 is the top score.
France, as is concluded by the Migrant Policy Index, contrasts from that of Britain
regarding immigrant integration because France: imposes job, language, and integration
requirements for family reunion; fails to grant local voting rights for foreigners prior to
naturalization; and overlooks major problems of access in new targeted labor market
measures. MIPEX assigns France with a score of 51 (6 points below that of Britain)
based on their calculation of France’s performance in 7 major policy areas related to the
integration of immigrant minorities on a scale of 0,50,100 with 100 being the highest
attainable score.
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Explanation of the Data
Indices included in the Queen’s multicultural index, measuring the adoption of
multiculturalism in European democracies, ascertain that Britain practices
multiculturalism to an extent greater than France. The Migrant Integration Policy Index
concludes that equality and successful integration of immigrants remains a more
significant priority to legislators in Britain compared to those in France. The performance
of Britain, in terms of immigrant minority integration, based on British policies evaluated
and consequential raking assigned by MIPEX links concepts of minority integration with
multicultural tendencies.
Findings
According to the highlighted data, Britain primarily practices multiculturalism
and hopes for minority integration through adoption of policies promoting their equality
and accommodating ethnic and religious subscriptions. Adequate integration of
immigrant minorities, in Britain, then encompasses economic and social mobilization of
minorities to an extent that is comparable to majorities. Minorities’ equal economic
standing and socialization, therefore, primarily define the intentions of multicultural
constructs in Britain.
.
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III CASUAL MECHANISMS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE,
MULTICULTURAL INTEGRATION, AND ASSIMILIATION SOCIAL COHESION
POLICIES
ISLAMIC MINORITIES’ CONSIDERATIONS OF VIOLENCE AS
LEGITIMATE
Perpetrators of Islamic political Violence emerge from a variety of backgrounds
and circumstances. The characteristics of activists differ in levels of education,
socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and age. Despite the many variations among participants
in violent movements experienced by democracies, however, strict practice of Islam or
intense desires for social change unifies them to achieve deeply desired objectives.
The data below indicate that justifications for use of violence and desirable
political outcomes achieved through its use arise from conditions fostered by democratic
integration or social cohesion policies. These policies potentially factor into the
prevalence of Islamic radicalization and fierce commitment to objectives pursued through
violence on behalf of Islamic minorities. Careful attention to these conditions promoting
Islamic minorities participation in violence and their political purposes for violent
engagement: (1) identify violently motivated populations; (2) illuminate real/perceived
reasons to pursue violence other than those linked with outlets for violence created by
democratic practice and predominant political/societal processes motivating its use; (3)
establish the necessity for an integrated framework to explain violence in free states; (4)
determines levels and frequency of violence associated with inequality, poverty,
alienation, and discrimination; and (5) vaguely measures national loyalties. Participants
in violent pursuits for political change perceive justifications for use of violence to realize
particular policy objectives.
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Alienation as well as discrimination of Islamic inhabitants and Democracies’
influence over Islamic populations abroad is a common theoretical framework through
which to explain violent ambitions among Islamic adherents. Assessing the differences in
levels of violence between democracies, despite consistently alienating and
discriminatory societal/political conduct or colonizing foreign policies, reveals the
theoretical shortcomings of research. The research that attributes violence to any state
behavior other than that concerned with minority integration or social cohesion in the
midst of religious or ethnic diversity. Understanding motives and objectives behind
political violence, connected with state policies directed toward Islamic minorities,
demonstrates majorities’ influence over their fate to experience domestic Islamic
aggression.
Why Perceptions Mainly Matter
While actual incidents of alienation, discrimination, and occupation subjugate
national/international Islamic adherents via democratic majorities, evaluating minorities’
perceptions concerning majority behavior more accurately establishes reasons for willing
participation in violence among politically motivated Islamic residents of democratic
states to hoping achieve “favorable” change. Identifying real and perceived justifications
to violently act on motivations/demands for organized political change, however,
determines the discrepancies between the realities and beliefs that justify violence as well
as mechanisms for religious radicalization. Genuine societal injustices toward Islamic
minorities and/or religious elites’ exploitation of Muslims’ perception of such (so to
compel aggression) potentially heighten supplies of violence participants to meet real or
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religiously fabricated demands for violent political change among an population desiring
violent change or elite clergy. Aside from evaluating sources that fuel participation in
violence and means of religious radicalization specific to democracies, gauging minority
perceptions regarding state behavior suffices in measuring justifications to violently act
on motivations for political control.
Varying Real and Perceived Justifications for Participation in
Violence
Understanding Islamic minorities’ differing considerations of violent pursuits as
legitimate and necessary involves assessment of data illuminating the: A. status of native
Islamic minorities; B. foreign occupation of majority Islamic states and C. perceptions
held by Islamic minorities concerning both. The legitimacy behind violent movements
relates with the extent to which Islamic minorities either consider themselves
economically immobile or regard of foreign policies as oppressive to Islamic populations
abroad.
Portraying accurate experiences of domestic and international Islamic populations
demonstrates to the potential for radical Islamic leadership to exploit less than optimal
circumstances and urge Islamic populations to sustain the global Jihadist cause. This
prospective manipulation, on behalf of religious elites, potentially minimizes the role
Western democracies assume in the real justifications Islamic minorities perceive for
engagement in violence.
The theoretical capability of this study relies on the acknowledgement of
diverging legitimizations Islamic inhabitants possess to violently react to state policies of
multicultural and assimilation democracies. Differing justification to participate in
violence, based on minority perceptions, link with state policies. Altering state behavior
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so to minimize justifications to pursue violence may not achieve a desirable reduction in
violence if their motivations for violence align not with reality but rather a religious
demand to react to a manipulated truth vocalized by a religious radical hierarchy.

Synthesizing the Data
Real Justifications for Participation in Violence:
Minority Status
Minority status factors into the calculations for ethno religious groups to violently
contest state or majority treatment, to which, they are consistently subject. The economic
security and social positions of minorities vary in multicultural and assimilation
democracies. Although Islamic political violence is a commonality shared by each, the
status of ethno religious minorities determines the legitimacy of violent Islamic
movements. “Minorities at Risk” database convey the justifications behind violent
pursuits by considering the status and political contributions of Islamic minorities in
Western democracies.
“ Minorities at Risk” recognizes the vulnerabilities leading to minority rebellion,
especially those facilitated by an ethno political group’s status and scope of political
influence. Minority groups’ level of political influence is measured in terms of the,
“group collectively suffering, or benefitting from, systematic discriminatory treatment
and/or a group serving as the basis for political mobilization and collective action in
defense or promotions of its self-defined interests” (Mar methodology). Likelihood of
collective action, initiated by a minority group determined to be at risk, hinges on beliefs
that common traits distinguish them as: separate from the majority, targets of possible
discrimination, and/or targets of possible alienation.
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“Minorities at Risk” considers Muslims in France at risk of employing militant
strategies in response to government policies that are considered discriminatory and
marginalizing. As MAR assesses, “ specific factors, which may contribute to the
likelihood of rebellion among French Muslims, include repression and recent rioting
(MAR Assessment of French Muslims). MAR further recognizes that Muslims do face
many of the risk factors that heighten the possibly of protests including repression and
political restrictions. The lack of cohesion among French Muslims, however,
substantially limits the impact of their attempts to improve their situation through rioting
and rebellion (MAR Assessment of French Muslims).
By contrast, MAR considers the risk of rebellion among ethno religious
populations in Britain to be low but not non-existent. Violence that does ensue, according
to their evaluation, “is more likely in reaction to the central government’s foreign policies
as was seen in the 2005 subway bombings in London” (Mar assessment of British
Asians). Britain, as is determined by MAR, lacks the, “usual risk factors associated with
protest such as repression and political restrictions” (Mar assessment of British Asians).
Protest of Rebellion is, therefore, “not likely to be large scale or sustained”.

Findings
The potential for Islamic minority aggression or rebellion in Britain and France is
prevalent, as discussed in MAR’s assessment of religious minority populations, but to
different extents and for purportedly different reasons. Conditions known to spur violent
protest including repression create vulnerabilities for France to experience collective
rebellion among minority population to leverage favorable change. Muslim minorities in
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France existing on the fringe of society likely engage in violent protest so to solicit policy
actions addressing their marginalization.
Muslims in Britain, however, possess greater access to mainstream society. Their
discontent, expressed through violence, is attributable to Britain’s foreign policy
ambitions. The conditions known to cause random acts of violence are largely absent in
Britain’s political and societal discourse concerning minority populations including
repression, discrimination, and alienation. The most deadly and gruesome terrorist
incidence experienced in Britain or France, however, contested the foreign activity of the
British government via violent expression of British Muslim citizens in the July 2005
London bombings. This asymmetry of violence perpetrated as a response to British
foreign occupation suggests that multicultural Britain permits more anger and hostility to
“undesirable” behaviors, as defined by British Muslims, than does the repression that
French Muslims view as an obstacle to a favorable status. These barriers to a respected
social position, nonetheless, incite their rebellious and disruptive protest in assimilationist
France.
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Synthesizing the Data
Perceptions of Justifications for Participation in Violence:
Minority considerations on their prospective Alienation, discrimination,
and inferior Social Status
Living Apart Together, a report published by Policy Exchange, explores the
attitudes of British Muslims. The portion of the inquiry dedicated to understanding
British Muslims’ perceptions of their sense of belonging and status found that 84% of
respondents agreed they had, “been treated fairly regardless of their religious beliefs”
(Living Apart Together 64). When surveyed about the mistreatment the participants
believed they were subject: 6% claimed to have been subject to physical violence
because of their religion; 9% believed they were stopped by the police because they were
Muslim; 25% believed they were at the receiving end of verbal abuse because of their
religious subscriptions; 30% felt that at some point non Muslims directed toward them
hostility because of their religious affiliations; and 52% reported no negative experiences
as a Muslim resident . As concluded by the interviews of British Muslims in Living
Apart Together, “ a majority of the respondents had not experienced Islamophobia in the
past year and those that had; experienced relatively low level incidents (Living Apart
Together 65).
French National Identity and Integration: who belongs to the national
community, published by the migration policy institute, analyzes a unique dataset of the
largest survey ever conducted in France on ethnic minorities. The census under
examination by the institute contains data on citizenship and place of birth. These details
permit an assessment of French Muslim attitudes about their senses of belonging. This
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report focuses on French national identity possessed by immigrants and their
descendants.
The data included in the census reveals that immigrants and their descendants feel
rejected and labeled as a nationality other than French by the indigenous population.
Those immigrants with likely Muslim affiliations including Africans, Arabs, Asians, and
Turks feel considerably more rejection of their “Frenchness” than do the other white
European immigrant participants. Out of the interview participants with likely Muslim
affiliations Asians claim to experience the most widespread rejection of their
“Frenchness” at 44% and African immigrants claiming the least amount of rejection at
41%. Moreover, ethnicities with probable Islamic attachments report heightened
experiences of racism that other immigrants who are white and European. African
participants reported the most incidence of racism at 49% and Turkish participants
reported the least at 33% (Simon 14).
Feelings of French Minorities

Europeans/Whites
Africans and
Dom/Blacks
Maghrebians/Arabs
Asians
Turks
Others

Experience of
Racism

Experience of
Discrimination

Rejection of
Frenchness*

23

12

10

49

39

41

42

34

43

33

22

44

29

26

43

33

26

24

Note: Population aged 18-50.
* This indicator is calculated only for French citizens. (Simon 14).
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A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center’s global attitudes project
compares Muslim attitudes across European countries and permits a direct contrast of
feelings between British Muslims and French Muslims. The study reveals that French
Muslims believed that Europeans are less hostile to Muslims than do British Muslims.
Only 39% of French Muslim respondents felt that Europeans directed hostility toward
Muslims compared to 42% of British Muslim respondents who agreed that Europeans are
hostile to Muslims. Despite these small differences in the views of British and French
Muslims concerning the hostility among Europeans to which they are subject, French
Muslims reported a much higher frequency of bad personal experiences than did British
Muslims. British Muslims, however, claimed that Europeans were hostile toward
Muslims by 12% more than the French Muslims who claimed to have bad personal
experiences because of their religious beliefs at a significantly higher rate (Pew Global
Attitudes Project).
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Findings
Based on the surveys of Policy Exchange, Migrant Policy Institute, and Pew
Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project French Muslims had more bad personal
experiences than British Muslims 10% and feel a rejection of their French nationality
(Living Apart Together 65). Regardless of these sentiments, French Muslims believe
Europeans are less hostile to Muslims than do Muslims in Britain. Although these
findings are not robust, they point to the fact that French Muslims experience more
racism, rejection, and discrimination while holding more favorable view of their
European hosts than do their British counterparts.
British Muslims reported to have been treated fairly, despite their Islamic
attachments, by an overwhelming majority. In the same study conducted by policy
exchange 30% felt subject to at least some non-Muslim hostility because of their religion
(Living Apart Together). This is relatively consistent with the results of the Pew Research
survey results stating that 28% of British Muslims have claimed to have a bad personal
experience (Pew Global Attitudes Project). Although they have had fewer bad personal
experiences than French Muslims, as is concluded in the Pew Survey, they possess less
favorable views toward Europeans concerning the amount of hostility directed toward
Muslims.
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Synthesizing the Data:
Real Justifications for Participation in ViolenceForeign Occupation
Understanding Britain and France’s experiences with Islamic political violence
involves attention to their military commitments on international fronts where Muslims
are a majority. Evaluating the offensive military actions of Britain and France assists in
illuminating their vulnerabilities to be victims of domestic political violence initiated by
Jihadists or non-state actors violently advancing Islamic values and principles. Several
international upheavals affecting global Islamic populations in the past decade epitomize
the West’s struggle to undermine radical Islam. The fronts include but are not limited to:
the Palestinian territories, Israel, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. This research attends to
the official roles Britain and France maintain in these conflicts, as are portrayed by the
Diplomate and Foreign and Commonwealth office, so to demonstrate that such
aggressive involvement may potentially prompt violent retaliation among domestic
Islamic adherents against British and French citizens.
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France’s Foreign Entanglements concerning Global Islamic populations
Israel:
According to the Diplomate, which outlines official French foreign policy, France
was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on May 11,
1949. Bilateral relations in the cultural, scientific, and economic realms continue to
evolve as political relations strengthen. Israel and France currently engage in very close
dialogue on international matters of equal concern (Diplomate).
Iraq:
France’s refusal to support the coalition force’s regime change in Iraq, through
military power, has tarnished their reputation with the current Iraqi government. This
failure to participate or back the US led international confrontation of Sadaam Hussein’s
dictatorship has been perceived as supporting his regime, according to Diplomate.
Despite the potential for negative perceptions held by current Iraqi leadership, France
provided no military reinforcement for the efforts to eradicate Sadaam or challenge the
presence of Al Qaeda during Iraq’s reconstruction after a successful mission to oust
Hussein from power (Diplomate).
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Lybia:
In March of 2011 Sarkozy vowed protection of civilians in Libya amid fierce
combat between leader Mommar Ghadafi and rebel fighters (News Desk PBS.org).
Sarkozy committed the French forces to aid in the protection of civilians in the absence
of a full cease-fire agreement. Sarkozy promised, “ our air force will oppose any
aggression our determination is total” (News Desk PBS.org).
Palestine:
France seeks full resolution of matters concerning the Palestinian territories
including those related to borders, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Since the Oslo
agreement was signed, according to Diplomate, France has worked toward the creation of
a peaceful Palestinian state alongside Israel. France has also backed the Seville Council’s
July 2002 adoption of a declaration recognizing the Palestinian’s right to establish a state
based on the boarders previous to that of 1967 (Diplomate).

UK’s Foreign Entanglements concerning Global Islamic populations
Israel and Palestinian Territories:
Britain recognizes Jerusalem as crucial to the Middle East Peace Process.
According to the Foreign and Commonwealth office, Britain supports a, “peace
settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians, which fulfills the aspirations of both
parties for Jerusalem”. Britain officially accepts and agrees with Israeli control of West
Jerusalem but condemns Israeli rule of East Jerusalem and considers this a form of illegal
occupation. The Foreign and Commonwealth office proclaims that, “ attempts by Israel to
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alter the character or demography of East Jerusalem are unacceptable and extremely
provocative. Settlements as well as evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes in
East Jerusalem are illegal and deeply unhelpful to efforts to bring a lasting peace to the
Middle East”. It is the official position of the British government that Jerusalem be
partitioned so that it is the shared capital of the both the Israeli and Palestinian states
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office).
Iraq:
Britain militarily aided in the successful dissolution of Sadaam Hussein’s
dictatorship. UK remains proud of their contributions to end the modern evil empire.
Secretary of State for Defense Dr. Liam Fox boasted that, “ thanks to the sacrifice,
commitment, and professionalism of thousands of British Service men and women,
Southern Iraq is an area transformed from the dangerous and oppressed place it was
under Saadam Hussein and in the aftermath of his removal” (Foreign and Commonwealth
office). Brigadier Max Marriner, commander of the British Forces in Iraq, also reflected,
“ the UK’s Armed Forces can look back with pride at what they have achieved in Iraq
since 2003. Security has fundamentally improved and as a consequence the social and
economic development has dramatically improved for the better as too have peoples
lives” (Foreign and Commonwealth office).
Afghanistan:
The UK has militarily intervened in Afghanistan because, according to the official
position of the British government, “ the country has become a base of operations for
Islamic terrorists that pose grave threats for Britain and the world at large. The Taliban
harbored Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan which permitted terrorists to plan and
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execute the catastrophic attacks of September 11 2001” (Foreign and Commonwealth
Office). The British government has pledged their commitment to build up the Afghan
Security forces and assist in eradicating the presence of Islamic extremists in Afghan
territory.
Findings
Britain and France have militarily intervened in states with Islamic majorities.
The global Islamic populations, under the influence of British and French forces, differ
between Iraqis and Afghans, affected by a British military presence. Libya as well as
West Africa, territories in which France has interceded, remain subject to French
influence via military force. The military commitment of Britain in Iraq and Afghanistan
has endured for nearly a decade. France, however, has also strategically responded to
conflict involving radical adherents, in the predominately Islamic regions of Africa.
Libya and West Africa are the fronts on which France has offered their military
capabilities’ in efforts to mitigate human rights abuses and confront radical Islam.
It is popularly theorized in terrorism literature (according to the arguments
advanced in the “Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” by Robert Pape) that a military
presence in majority Islamic states compels suicide terrorism against domestic civilian
targets or military installments abroad. The strategy of suicide terrorism involves
pressuring policy makers to terminate their state’s military presence in territories
exclusive to Islamic citizenship.
This assessment challenges such academic perspectives able to predict targets of
domestic suicide terrorism. British civilians have succumbed to suicide terrorism
reportedly because of their state’s military contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan as
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claimed by the perpetrators of the July 2005 bombing. France has yet to experience the
same fate though troops have maintained a presence in Islamic states even if it was
considerably less extensive than that of Britain in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps
divergences in experiences of domestic political violence can be solely attributed to the
endurance and prominence of a democracies military involvement. Military engagement
has nonetheless been pursed by both Western European democracies.
These finding posit the possibility that domestic policies, concerning
democracies’ Islamic minorities, influence the amount loyalty they directed toward their
co religionists aboard. The amount of solidarity that domestic Islamic adherents possess
concerning their global Islamic counterparts, permitted by multiculturalist or
assimilationist policies, also leave democracies exposed to retaliatory violence. A
military presence in Islamic states combined with a domestic Islamic population that
possess overwhelming sympathies to the plight of international Islamic populations,
subject to the military actions of Western democracies, affects the likelihood for a
multiculturalist or assimilationist democracy to experience the most extreme and
catastrophic forms Islamic political violence. Integration or social cohesion policies,
therefore, may influence the probability that domestic Islamic devotees violently respond,
especially through suicide terrorism, to foreign policies involving Islamic states.
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Synthesizing the Data and Perceptions of Justifications for Participation
in Violence:
Perceptions of Foreign Occupation among Islamic populations
Perceptions of Muslims in Britain
According to the survey findings in Living Apart Together, the issue of most
significance for British Muslims remains UK’s foreign policies. As stated in this report,
“Many Muslims are angry about foreign policy because they believe it is targeted at
Muslim states and involves double standards” (57). British Muslim’s anger regarding
their state’s foreign policy has been confirmed in numerous surveys and the think tank
Policy exchange in their considerations of Muslim’s feelings of UK foreign policy admits
that, “many Muslims in Britain have been radicalized by their anger over foreign policy”
(60).
The findings of “Living Apart Together” are substantiated by a poll released by
Ispos gauging the attitudes of British Muslims. The poll reveals that 53% of Muslims in
London, over the age of 16, believe that UK’s involvement in Iraq was the primary
reason London was bombed in July 2005 (ISPOS MORI poll). Moreover, according to a
poll by ICM research published in the Guardian, 80% of British Muslims fail to believe
that the “War on Terror” is NOT a “War on Islam”. These sentiments resonate with
British Muslims despite President George W. Bush and Tony Blair promising and
explicitly stating in 2002 that, “the war on terrorism in not a war on Islam” (Scotsman).
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Perceptions of Muslims in France
There are significantly fewer noteworthy examples of French Muslims resisting
French efforts abroad. Few instances of French Muslims fighting coalition forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan have been recorded. International occurrences involving French
Muslims waging Jihad against Western coalition militaries in Islamic states is not likely a
direct protest of French foreign policy. While France committed military assistance to the
US led “War on Terrorism”, its role was less clearly defined and prominent.
The discontent French- Muslim’s have with international events involving Islamic
populations concerns “Israeli occupation”. This discontent is primarily expressed
through massive protests about the behaviors Israelis direct toward the Palestinians.
These organized movements contesting what is believed to be Israeli “oppression” of
Palestinian people include no direct outrage over the official French position on this
sensitive Middle East issue. The French position closely aligns, however, with the
viewpoints of the French Muslim protestors desiring termination of an Israeli presence in
Palestinian territories.
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Discussion of Measures, as cited above, for Real and Perceived
Justification for Participation in Violence
“Minorities at Risk” as well as an official report reveals that various societal
conditions or political processes affect minorities’ calculations and rationalizations for
political aggression. Justifications to participate in violence (whether real or perceived)
vary between multicultural and assimilation models either aspiring for social cohesion or
integration. Assimilation models prioritizing the deep national attachments of minorities
above their equal status results in economic inferiority and discrimination (either out of
fear that their influence will deteriorate state sovereignty or to ensure the success of
assimilation approaches). Minorities consider that, therefore, a legitimate cause for
violence. Multicultural models encouraging the maintenance of religious and ethnic
practices, although sometimes contrary to prevailing values, permit ethno religious
minorities to devote sympathies and loyalties toward the plight of their international
religious and ethnic cohorts. These sympathies and deep loyalties, however, drive violent
reactions to state policies designed for conservation of security and sovereignty when
they involve the “subjugation” of their esteemed fellow Muslims or ethnic extensions.
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Findings
The most puzzling aspect of the perceptions held by British and French Muslim
populations on the foreign policies of their residence is that they tremendously oppose the
US led war on terrorism by nearly the same proportion. According to a poll conducted by
Pew research center for a project that assess global attitudes, 78% of British Muslims
oppose the US approach to undermine global terrorism while 77% of French Muslims
possess the same opinion (Pew Global Attitudes Project). Despite Muslim populations in
Britain and France contesting the US methodology to combat radical Islam by nearly the
same percentage, Britain has experienced severe violent reactions attributed to their
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan while France has yet to experience a similar fate.
Perhaps discrepancies in violent reactions to the “US styled” confrontation of
terrorism in Islamic states correlates to the the length and extent of military commitment
of Britain and France, though either have militarily intervened in majority Islamic states
since 200, and in accordance with the objectives pursued by the US “War on Terror”. As
is hypothesized in this study, perhaps domestic policies aimed at integration or social
cohesion of Islamic minorities residing in Britain or France impact their choices to
violently react to the treatment of Islamic populations abroad.
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DIVERGENT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES PURSUED THROUGH VIOLENCE
The varying political objectives of violent movements, initiated by minorities, are
related to multicultural or assimilation practices. Indicators of minority inclusion,
citizenship, and minority considerations of their resident democracy as an occupying
force points to differences in desired outcomes of violent pursuits in multicultural or
assimilation democracies.
Multicultural democracies aspiring for integration or assimilation democracies
intending social cohesion foster different social, economic, and political experiences
endured by Islamic minority residence. One of the desired outcomes of violent
engagements in assimilation democracies is that economic and social status of Islamic
minorities be respected. Violent objectives in multicultural democracies contrarily focus
on the “liberation” of Islamic populations abroad subject to military intervention of
Western states.
Violent aims for economic inclusion, citizenship, or termination of a military
presence in lands with a majority Islamic citizenship receive theoretical attention in this
evaluation, because previous academic work emphasizes alienation, discrimination, and
foreign occupation as causing violent reactions. This research, however, does not argue
that citizenship, secure economic status, or non interventionist foreign policies eliminates
violence but that varying democratic approaches to integrate minorities or promote social
cohesion affect the goals defined by violent Islamic movements.
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Synthesizing the Data
Political Objectives Pursued through Violence
The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index as well as official accounts
of the 2005 July 7th bombings in Britain point to the varying political objectives Islamic
minorities pursue through violence. The status of Islamic minorities in Britain and
France, as calculated by the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, convey the
rationalizations Islamic minorities posit for engagement in organized violence based on
their comparatively inferior societal positions. Official accounts of the July 7th 2005
bombings overtly state the motivations of the perpetrators who executed attacks on
Britain’s mass transient system (European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index).
Political Objectives pursued through Violence as determined by the
European Citizenship and Inclusion index
The European Citizenship and Inclusion index determines the extent to which
ethno religious minorities are: included in the labor market; eligible for long-term
residence; extended rights for family reunion; considered national residents; and
protected against discrimination. The index, therefore, measures: level of inclusion in the
labor market and likelihood for citizenship, so to determine how conducive a democratic
state’s policies are to integrating ethno religious minorities. After accounting for the
behaviors of European democracies that promote or fail to promote minorities’ inclusion
and citizenship, a detailed summary discusses a democracies’ overall performance on
economic inclusion and access to citizenship granted to ethno religious immigrant
populations. The European Citizenship and Inclusion Index associates state policies with
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the status and wellbeing of immigrant populations belonging to European democracies
(European Civic and Citizenship Index).
France’s Overall performance for Ethno Religious Minority Citizenship
and Inclusion
According to the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, France
performs above the European average in areas of eligibility for long-term residence,
security of status, and rights associated with family reunion. France performs strongly in
all areas for nationality especially those rights related to dual citizenship. In this area, as
determined by the Civic Citizenship and Inclusion index, France maintains a very
favorable ranking.
France performs less favorable policy areas related to discrimination and labor
market inclusion defined by the indices. France is unfavorably situated on the scale that
determines a European democracies’ equitable status granted to minorities. Regrettably,
according to the findings of the index, France, “is most obviously below the European
average in terms of access and eligibility (ensured to minorities for their inclusion in the
labor market)” (European Civic and Citizenship and Inclusion Index).
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Britain’s Overall performance for Ethno Religious Minority Citizenship
and Inclusion
The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index conclude that Britain ranks,
“ higher than average in labor market inclusion”. Britain performs above the European
average with regard to the access to labor markets and eligibility extended to ethno
religious minorities. This measure of integration, according to the findings of the
European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, almost solely permits the upward
mobility desired by minority residents. Conversely, Britain performs below the European
average in regard to immigrant’s eligibility for nationality, a significant contrast from the
favorable rakings assigned to France on the same measure by the Civic Citizenship and
Inclusion Index ( The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index).

119

Rioting in France Related to the Discrimination and Exclusion
experienced by Islamic Minorities
In Early November 2005 the Social Science Research Council enlisted the
expertise of distinguished social scientists from France and the US to engage in academic
and political discourse about the Parisian riots. Most of the commentary was assembled at
the onslaught of the rioting, and address France’s systemic issue with minorities being
excluded on social and economic fronts. The perspectives highlighted in the academic
works included in the SSRC forum designed to assess the French riots coincide with the
findings of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index that economic stagnation
defines the experiences of Muslims residing in the poor neighborhoods of Paris.
The status of minorities in France continues to challenge French policies targeted
at assimilating minorities. Domestic complications accompany the immigration of
Muslim minorities who are legally required to adopt a French nationality but experience
economic inferiority and social exclusion. This segregation is possibly attributable to
French economic dysfunction as a microcosm of failed socialist policies rather than
assimilation approaches aspiring for social cohesion and preservation of the French
Republic. The assessments of the social scientists contributing to the SSRC forum
discussing the French riots and European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion index are
compatible and emphasize the economic disparity experienced by ethno religious
populations in France.
Portions of the essays highlighted in this research offer context to the societal
trends of limited labor market inclusion and discrimination that confront France’s
immigrant minorities. These excerpts substantiate the findings of the study assigning a
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poor ranking to France in terms of their minority populations being excluded from the
labor market but who conversely possess heightened accessibility to citizenship and a
French nationality. The analysis, included in the SSRC’s forum discussing the French
riots, reinforces the conclusions reached by the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion
Index by illuminating the objectives French Islamic minorities pursue through their
engagement in extreme civil unrest (Social Science Research Council).
Riva Kastoryono, in Territories of Identities in France, points to the objectives of
the rioting perpetuated by youthful participants in 2005 which aligns with the poor
rankings assigned to France by the European Citizenship and Inclusion Index in areas of
discrimination and labor market inclusion. According to Kastoryono’s analysis the urban
settings in France have, “become spaces where tension and violence prevail as modes of
collective expression” (Kastoryono). These environments in the view of Kastoryono,
marked with extreme poverty and high unemployment, developed into platforms optimal
for expressing political grievances through conflict. Rage occupies the urban spaces of
France.
This smoldering rage manifested itself through the violent activity pursued
during the urban riots of 2005 by young descendants of Muslim immigrants. The ensuing
chaos was meant to contest the economic plight withstood by descendants of immigrants.
Kastoryono believes that, “ violence gives (these urban settings) an ethnic collective
expression and a means of ruling by provocation” (Kastoryono). The historical ethnic
grouping of minorities in the Banlieues associates with the economic disparity and social
immobility these impoverished populations are resigned to endure because of failed
economic policy. Unemployment and poverty plague the residents of French ghettos,
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who depend on the government for limited means of survival. These excluded
underclasses dwell at the fringes of society where prosperity and security always remain
just beyond reach. Kastoryono describes the Banilues as, “settlements that have become
the mainstays of non integration” (Kastoryono).
Alec Hargreaves, contributor to SSRC, attributes the outbreak of urban rioting to
social disadvantage in an “Emperor with No Clothes”. Hargreaves notes that political
actors blame botched integration on the unwillingness of minority ethnic groups to tailor
their ethnic mores to dominant culture. Islam, from this perspective, complicates the
processes of integration pursued by immigrant communities. French Muslims remain
allegedly incapable of integrating because of divided loyalties between their religion and
commitment to France. According to Hargreaves, however, extensive research
demonstrates that second and third generations of minority ethnic groups, from whose
ranks the rioters have emerged, successfully assimilated to political and cultural norms in
France. Hargreaves discusses that with respect to national identity,” the French model of
integration has been highly successful. Its failures have been in social and economic
policy” (Hargreaves).
Descendants of Islamic immigrants, while respectful towards their religious
heritage, share the same aspirations as their majority peers for prosperity and economic
security. Futile socialist economic policies, however, perhaps contribute to lack of
opportunities extended to their indigenous elitist counterparts. Hargreaves explains that, “
it is this exclusion which has generated the resentment and anger seen at work in the
Banlieues” (Hargreaves).
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Political Objectives pursued through Violence as determined by
Official accounts of July 2005 bombings against patrons of London Mass
Transient System
An official account of the July 7, 2005 bombings, Britain’s most notorious
rendezvous with Islamic political violence, offers insight into the desired outcomes of the
Jihadist perpetrators. According to this account, “the best indications of the groups’
motivations are set out in Khan’s (one of the plot’s executioner) video statement first
aired on the Arabic television channel Al Jazeera on September 1st, 2005 and in his last
will and testament discovered by the police after the bombings”. The sadistic dialogue of
Khan centers on the perceived injustices Western civilization exacts against Muslims.
According to Khan, aggression advanced by the West against Muslims justifies violent
Jihadist acts. The Key passages of his statement reflect his “liberating strife” and read:
“Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities
that this world has to offer.
Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and
following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger
Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated.
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of
them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and
sisters.
Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop
the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will
not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a solider. Now you too will
taste the reality of this situation....
I myself, I make du’a4 to Allah....to raise me amongst those whom
I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s
heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman alZawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and
sisters that are fighting in the...of this cause.”

(Official July 7 report).
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Findings
Political objectives sought through violence vary across violent movements
specific to assimilation or multicultural democracies. Disaffected young Islamic
populations, residing in assimilationist France, protest their economic position through
engagement in extreme societal upheaval. The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion
Index discusses the dismal performance of France related to minority inclusion in
economic processes. Essays apart of the Social Science Research Council’s academic
discourse on the rioting in France testify that alienation, discrimination, and exclusion
characterize the experiences of a vast amount of France’s Islamic population. These
negative experiences perhaps remain partly attributable to unsuccessful economic stances
rooted in socialism. Perpetrators of violent contest seek to revolutionize the
institutionalized discrimination and alienation omitting them from the economic
opportunities that permit prosperity. Young populations, many of whom subscribe to
Islam, organize along socio economic lines to fiercely oppose the economic disparity
regrettably a part of their newfound French identity and largely attributable to anemic
economic productivity and growth.
Conversely the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index finds that Britain
advances policies that provide Islamic minorities social and economic platforms from
which they achieve meaningful opportunities for prosperity. Violent pursuits in Britain,
rather, seek change of Britain’s interventionist foreign policy and challenge perceived
injustice enacted by Britain against Muslims. As depicted in the statements of one of the
7/7 suicide bombers, British Jihadist activists aspire to solicit domination and control
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through violent coercion of foreign policy change that complement the agenda of radical
Islamists.
Political Objectives pursued through Disruptive Behavior and Rebellion
against Resident State: France’s Islamic minorities’ justification for
Violence
Perceived justifications for violence, in France, among Islamic residents arises
from societal alienation and discrimination of Islamic minorities. France’s assimilationist
policies and societal attitudes first and foremost concern minority adoption of French
republican and secular values to preserve state sovereignty. Mass influxes of Islamic
minorities largely unfamiliar to these values potentially deteriorate, as thought by
Frenchmen, dominant political and societal functions. Migration considerably threatens
sovereignty, from the perspective of the French as evidenced by their assimilationist
practices, when immigrants’ traditions conflict with democratic and secular values.
Perceived threats of compromised sovereignty because of extensive Islamic minority
influence, achieved through force or not, contributes to societal discrimination/alienation
against French Islamic minorities. CRS report for Congress discussing Muslim
Integration in Select Countries emphasizes that although France professes to adhere to an
integrationist policy toward immigrants, “many French Muslims live in impoverished
almost exclusively Muslim neighborhoods and are more likely to be unemployed or face
discrimination. The recent riots that erupted in France in October 2005 highlight the
alienation and anger that many young French Muslim’s feel” (Gallis 7).
Consequential societal trends in France consist of Islamic minorities required to
be French but unlikely to feel at all French and are isolated into their own economically
inferior communities. Sentiments of alienation or discrimination persist among members
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of these insulated Islamic populations. Organized movements emerge to contest their
inferior status and involve chaos, violent disruption, and societal unrest. Majority
attitudes or behaviors associated with assimilationist practices in France determine
justifications perceived among Islamic minorities for rebellious and disruptive behavior
to achieve a more favorable status.

Measures of National Loyalties and Political aspirations: Britain’s
Islamic Minorities’ Justification for Participation in Violence
Islamic minorities in Britain perceive justification for participation in
violence primarily because of British-Muslims’ objections to British military
involvement in lands considered exclusive to Islamic domination. CRS report for
Congresses attending to Muslim integration in select European countries discusses that,
“Some experts including moderate Muslim leaders in the UK believe that the recent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq have helped radicalize more British Muslims and strengthened
terrorist recruitment efforts. Those attracted to extremist ideology appear to identify with
suffering brethren” ( Gallis 12). Islamic minorities native to Britain violently protesting
or reacting to Britain’s military presence in territories with Islamic majorities
demonstrate their loyalties to their religious affiliations over that of their resident
democracy. The multiculturalist tendencies of Britain affect these priorities among
minority Islamic residents. These majority concepts do not necessarily justify
participation in violence but rather permit aggressive responses to “intrusive” or
“exploitative” foreign policies.
While attitudes of inferiority factor some into minority decisions to become
radicalized and participate in organized violence, much evidence attributes justifications
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for aggression against Britain to their extensive influence over Islamic societies abroad.
Minority participation in violence in Britain remains less about an unfavorable societal
status as evidenced by Muslims’ attitudes, involvement of economically well-situated
Islamic minorities in organized violence, and adequate policy/societal responses to
grievances of Islamic minorities expressed through legitimate recourse. Perceptions of
legitimacy for violent actions among British Muslims, rather, largely result from state
behaviors that permit if not encourage ethno religious minorities to prioritize their
concerns toward their ethnic/religious counterparts over that of national interests.
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PROSPECTS OF RADICALIZATION AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES OF
ISLAMIC MINORITIES
State policies affecting Islamic minorities influence prospects of religious
radicalization and the national priorities of Islamic residents. Prevalence of Islamic
extremism varies among Multicultural and Assimilation societies. Commitments directed
toward a resident state by Islamic minorities are influenced by state requirements for
assimilation imposed on ethno-religious minorities or by majorities’ embrace and respect
for religious and ethnic persuasions foreign to their society.
These dimensions of Islamic political violence associate with state behavior.
Islamic minorities, subject to assimilationist practices, remain less vulnerable to religious
radicalization and possess national loyalties to extents that relate with assimilation
approaches intending for minority populations to strongly identify with the state.
Multicultural societies, permitting maintenance of ethnic and cultural values, also
significantly influence choices of ethno religious minorities to become radicalized and
possess national commitments that conflict with democratic processes.
According to the Islamic radicalization index, “ the fundamental factor in the
radicalization process is ideology” (Wojtowicz 52). Islamic terrorist organizations
successfully mobilize with extensive recruitment of disenfranchised Islamic populations
exposed to their ideology. The radicalization process involves organizations or
movements exploiting individual perspectives so to indoctrinate vulnerable populations
with beliefs that violence is a legitimate recourse through which to address grievances
and arrive at meaningful solutions. Militant Non Governmental Organization’s garner
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mass international support through merging their radical beliefs with mainstream society
and attracting participants in movements promoting their vehement political agendas.
Religiously motivated leaders strengthen their capacities to succeed politically with
promotion of religious ideology that adequately radicalizes Islamic populations. The
extent to which radical or religious ideology is prevalent in assimilationist and
multicultural democracies, therefore, corresponds with chances for minority
radicalization.
Islamic minorities imperatively act on the basis of their Muslim identity. The
centrality that Islamic practice assumes in the definition of multiple identities, possessed
by Islamic minorities, depends on the integration themes of their resident democracy. In
assimilation democracies the fundamental issue concerning minority integration is not
diversity but loyalty. The character of Multicultural democracies potentially complicates
national identity formulation by encouraging ambiguity of commitment (Webster).
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Synthesis of Data
Islamic Minority Radicalization in Britain
The radicalization of Muslims residing in Britain has a vital overseas component.
The radicalization process involves residents returning to Muslim dominated countries
affected by conflict and instability (Wojtowioz 54). In this environment young British
Muslims receive an Islamic education and train to fulfill obligations of jihad in the UK.
On the home front, however, one of the most fertile grounds for UK extremism
reported in 2011 were students attending universities as noted by the UK Radicalization
index. According to officials, 40 universities were considered at high risk for their
students to radicalize or experience recruitment attempts on campus. Research
demonstrates that over 30% of individuals in the UK convicted of Al Qaeda inspired
aggression between 1999 and 2000 enrolled in a university (Wojowioz 54).
In a 2011 Prevent Strategy Report (an official strategy aimed at targeting
domestic terrorism in the UK) the British government admitted that looming threats of
terrorism, very serious in nature and affiliated with Al Qaeda, posed grave security
concerns in the UK. Latest reports issued by the House of Commons estimate that 48
proscribed terrorists reside in Britain (Wojtowioz 59-60). Domestic and International
terrorist organizations such as Egyptian Islamic jihad and Hamas collaboratively raise
funds, forge links, and market Islamic propaganda within the British homeland
(Wojtowioz 60).
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The British security service, MI 5, has reported that 2,000 residents pose a direct
threat to national security. Another 2,000 are suspected to actively conspire in plots of
aggression although unknown to authorities (Briggs 5). It is believed that the UK
confronts 30 recognized conspiracies of Islamic terrorism at any given time. Security
services, additionally, survey 200 networks. The imminent dangers remain, as described
by MI 5 chief Jonathon Evans, “the most immediate and acute peacetime threats in the 98
year history of the service”. He also describes that, “ recruits are getting younger and
international influences are much more diverse” (Briggs 5).
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Islamic Minority Radicalization in France
France remains vulnerable to radical Islam because of failed integration.
According to Adele, because immigrants and their children experience a lack of social
and economic mobilization in France, a process of religious radicalization potentially
ensures (34). The assimilation practices revered in French society, as determined by
Adele, “ resulted in the economic, cultural, political, and religious exclusion of Muslim
communities (34). These alienated populations, therefore, “likely take refuge in their faith
even to the point of radicalization” (Adele 34).
The emergence of Islam in France necessitated extensive adaptations among
Islamic populations so to enable strong identification with France. Yet, conflicts between
Islam and French tradition prevail and social as well as economic obstacles confront
French Muslim communities. Immigrants and their descendants, therefore, have fewer
expectations of social promotion. Access to education and qualified employment are
more unattainable to these disenfranchised members of French society compared to the
mainstream population (Adele 17). These discrepancies facilitate discontentment among
descendants of immigrants. Disappointments, minimized trust in state institutions, and
anger potentially override any loyalties or commitments directed toward France by
Muslim immigrants otherwise prospectively achieved through assimilation polices.
Additionally, the assimilationist social policies maintained by French authorities
increases segregation of Islamic minorities by involuntarily relegating them to
geographical enclaves, or the Banlieues, where their social and economic distinctions are
undeniable (Adele 17). The Banlieues are locations of spatial and social marginalization
(Adele 18). To one end the Banlieues are plagued with destitution and poverty. To
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another degree the ethnic origins of its inhabitants address the defining societal
shortcomings of assimilation practices because of the prevalence of religious and racial
discrimination (Adele 18). The current conditions and characteristics of the Banielues
represent the repressive assimilationist policies responsible for the gaps between the
Banielues and the rest of France. Failures of the assimilationist ideals of the French
Republic, as experienced by the children of immigrants in the Banlieues, creates potential
feelings of rejection and therefore susceptibility to radicalization when exposed to
Islamist ideology.
Oliver Roy emphasizes that Banieules and Islam are closely tied. He asserts,
however, “ these ties are over estimated as they are always considered an indivisible
issue, which leads to wrong assimilation and confusion” (Adele 18). The example of the
2005 riots demonstrates this miscalculation. Many analysts concluded that young
Muslims of the Banlieues instigated these riots due to their deep religious commitments
to disrupt peace and stability in democracies. According Adele however, “if it is true that
many young Muslims participated in these riots they did not constitute the entire group
and nor were they led as an expression of Islam” (18). The 2005 riots, often considered
France’s most extensive confrontation with radical Islam, rather epitomize the
willingness of disenfranchised youth to contest strong spatial segregation, discrimination,
and racism to which they are consistently subject via state assimilationist conduct (Adele
18).
The emergence of Islamism in France is foremost observed in the position and
influence of radical organizations that claim to represent Islamic interests. These
organizations, however, only exemplify a minority of the Muslim community in France
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and are under the influence of foreign countries (Webster 22). These trends perhaps
speak to the intermittence of radicalization of French Muslims.
Muslim Identity in Britain
Muslim identity in Britain is undeniably strong and reflects historical memory.
Until the 1970s, ethnicity, not religion, marked Muslim’s perception of their sole
differences as British residents. Arguably the solidarity and commitment British
Muslim’s possess for the transnational Ummah, or the resurgence of a Global Islamic
Caliphate, is relatively new (Abi 21). The 1992 to 1995 Bosnian war and the Kosovo
conflict of 1999, although involving international Islamic populations and British
entanglement, incited less noticeable anger among British Islamic minorities than the
more recent conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Foreign policy, very recently, seemed to
influence the radicalization process for British Muslims, which affected their national
priorities.
Munira Mirza, contributing author of Living Apart Together concludes that, “The
emergence of a strong Muslim identity in Britain is, in part, a result of multicultural
policies implemented since the 1980s which have emphasized difference at the expense
of shared national identity and divided people along ethnic, religious and cultural lines.”
(Policy Exchange Press Release). The research concludes that there is an alarming
religiosity among younger Muslims and that they believe that they have less in common
with non-Muslims than do their parents. They exhibit a much stronger preference for
Islamic schools and sharia law (or Islamic religious law). They have a greater tendency to
display their Muslim identity publicly, for example, by wearing the hijab (Very modest
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female Islamic dress) . According to a survey of British Muslims conducted by Policy
Exchange:
•
•

86% of Muslims feel that “my religion is the most important thing in my
life”.
62% of 16-24 year olds feel they have as much in common with nonMuslims as Muslims, compared to 71% of 55+ year olds.

•

60% of Muslims would prefer to send their children to a mixed state
school, compared to 35% who would prefer to send their child to an
Islamic school. There is a clear age difference. 37% of 16-24 year olds
preferred to send their children to Islamic state schools, compared to 25%
of 45-54 year olds and 19% of 55+ year olds.

•

59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared to 28%
who would prefer to live under sharia law. 37% of 16-24 year olds prefer
sharia compared to 17% of 55+ year olds

•

31% of 16-24 year olds believe if a Muslim converts to another religion
they should be punished by death, compared to 19% of 55+ year olds

•

7% “admire organizations like Al-Qaeda that are prepared to fight the
West’. 13% of 16-24 year olds agreed with this statement compared to 3%
of 55+ year olds

•
•

74% of 16-24 year olds would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear
the veil or hijab compared to only 28% of 55+ year olds.

(Government Policy Towards Muslims is Sharpening- Policy Exchange Press Release)
These statistics reveal a growing religiosity and tendency for younger generations of
Muslims to prioritize their Islamic identity over that of their British national identity
irrespective of successful integration or citizenship.
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Muslim identity in France
French national identity is considered threatened by the existence of minority
groups. This societal and political apprehension stems from beliefs that dual identity
undermines one’s commitment to French identity. France disregards notions of plural
allegiances maintained by immigrant minorities contrary to multiculturalist democracies
(Adele 21).
French identity is determined to be integral to the survival of France as a nation
state. It is imperative in French society, as demonstrated by assimilation policy, that
immigrants residing in France adopt a French identity. The culture of assimilation
demands that immigrants and their descendants transform and adapt to the French
traditions (Adele 21).
The cohesion of French society, regardless of a significant Islamic presence, has
prevailed in the midst of the 2004 hijab ban and backlash of the 2005 riots in the poor
suburbs around Paris (Bowen 5). A pew global attitudes poll, as highlighted by Bowen,
found that “ the French are far more willing to get on with the task of building a multi
religious society than are the British” (Bowen 5). Moreover the Pew research indicated a
striking French exception in regards to identity because, “ French Muslims are far more
likely than other European Muslims to emphasize their French identity. When asked to
choose between their religion and nationality as their primary identity 42% said French
first and only 7% (of British Muslims) put nationality first” (Bowen 5). Pew
contextualizes the French Muslim commitment to France and reports that “ American
Christians choose between religious and national identities in almost exactly the same
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proportion as do French Muslims. In other words, French Muslims balance their identities
in about the same way as do American Christians” (Bowen 5). This survey demonstrates
an unexpected compatibility between Muslim and French identity though assimilation
practices dictate an “abandonment” of strict Islamic practice upon immigrants’ arrival in
France.

Discussion of the Data
The UK Radicalization index identifies young (often 3rd generation Islamic
immigrant descendants) to be significantly more susceptible to engage in a process of
radicalization and direct national priorities toward Islamic populations abroad than 1st and
2nd generations of Muslim immigrants. A report issued by policy exchange, “Living
Apart Together”, also acknowledges young British Muslim citizens to possess fewer
commitments to their British nationality than their immigrant parents and grandparents.
These discussions identify multiculturalism as a variable affecting young British
Muslims’ choices to become radicalized and identify with global movements to advance
Islam more than their British residence.
Not only does Multiculturalism affect likelihood for radicalization and
inappropriate national priorities among young British Muslims, but it also influences
decisions to embrace radical Islam and possess minimal national commitments to extents
and reasons different than French Muslims subject to assimilationist policies. One of the
most significant discrepancies between British Muslims that are resident to a
multicultural democracy and French Muslims a part of an assimilations democracy is the
social status and economic well being of “radicalized” young Muslims with a confused
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national identity. Consistent with the above analyses, mainly the UK and French
radicalization indices, UK’s radical Muslims (although comprising mostly young
Muslims in Both Britain and France) are wealthier, better educated, and more socially
mobile than a similar demographic of Islamic extremists in France. Unexpectedly,
radicalization and reduced national attachment is more likely in multicultural states,
where ethno religious minorities are subject to less discrimination and alienation.
Moreover poverty, given that data presented, exerts little to no influence over violent
outcomes.
The data also suggests that multiculturalism associates with shifts in national
priorities possessed by younger generations of British Muslims away from commitments
to Britain and increasingly more toward pan- Islam movements advancing global
religious sentiments. Assimilation practices, rather, strengthen national loyalties and
facilitate investment in the success of French society and culture among French Muslims
to an extent very similar to Christian Americans rallying behind America’s republic. This
trend remains a political manifestation of French assimilation policies requiring, at
minimum, an adoption of mixed French and ethnic identities. Multicultural Britain
alternatively permits ethnicity or religion to exclusively define national preferences.
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DEMOCRATIC VITALITY AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR VIOLENCE
Democratic systems experience political violence despite meaningful and
legitimate occasions for change pursued through peaceful organization. Although many
aspects of democratic practice reduce need for violent expression, especially among their
own citizens, effectively preventing or minimizing violence challenges democracies that
revere civil liberties. Inherent features of democratic practice minimize prospects of
violence including: citizen agency; responsive and transparent governments; ability for
civil society action; and protection of minority rights. These democratic features
minimize violence but not more than features inherent to authoritarian governments
maximize relevant actors’ abilities to prevent violence through oppressive measures.
Democracies, when functioning at their healthiest with no compromise to civil liberties,
remain extremely incapacitated in preventing violence or yielding a response appropriate
for reducing chances of future terrorist incidents.
Civil liberties’ hinder democracies’ ability to obstruct political violence.
Democracies’ maintenance of civil liberties connects with their likelihood to endure
violent outcomes and is influenced by a liberalized state’s integration or social cohesion
efforts. Civil liberties perhaps create opportunities for populations to pursue violent
agendas. Surveying opportunities for violence associated with civil liberties, however,
ascertains the influence that political systems and their distinctive behaviors exert over
chances to experience Islamic aggression. Democratic attributes that vary slightly
between multicultural or assimilation regimes also influence severity of violence,
likelihood for Muslim populations to become radicalized, radicalized population’s goals
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pursued through violence, type of violence utilized, and justifications to participate in
violence.
When democracies are functioning at their healthiest, they will also be
disadvantaged in preventing and responding to terrorism. Vulnerability to experience
terrorism is not synonymous with aspects of a political system, facilitating those
vulnerabilities, causing violence. Moreover, violent reactions sustained by Islamic
minorities are rarely tantamount to minority contest of freedom. Liberalized political
systems correlate with organized political violence to the extent their healthy function
provides outlets for aggression.
Democracies minimize need for violent expression because their nature provides
legitimate means through which to affect political change. They propagate, however,
platforms from which violent actors can engage in violent pursuits with relative ease and
chances at success. The protection of civil liberties, executive constraints, and welcomed
presence of immigrants with values and ideals potentially contradictory to that of their
democratic frameworks weakens the defenses of states to defend against violent activity
perpetrated by their own citizens.
Cases evaluated in this analysis including that of Britain and France perfectly
exemplify this theoretical observation. Both experience political violence and both revere
democratic attributes in decision-making processes and political functions. Though both
engage in relatively same levels of healthy democratic practice each experience Islamic
political violence to different degrees, in different forms, and for explicitly different
reasons (as expressed by the ethno religious participants in violence). Opportunities for
violent expression resulting from attributes of democratic practice permit violence.
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Societal and political behaviors, however, intending peaceful communities of Islamic
immigrants, facilitate minority justification for participation in violence and affects
political aggression in almost every aspect other than its relation to democratic attributes.
Integrating opportunities for violence within an explanatory framework
determines whether conditions specific to democracies, absent the models exclusive to
democracies expecting minority assimilation or integration, accounts for violent
behaviors. Establishing a correlation between liberty and violence as well as considering
majority behaviors exhibited toward Islamic minorities designed for their assimilation or
integration in analysis, potentially illuminates not only the platforms available for
initiation of political violence but also demonstrates significant variations in Islamic
political vehemence across democracies. An integrated research process clarifies reasons
for violence associated with opportunities for violence. Moreover it prospectively
determines how differences in majorities’ approach to integrate or assimilate Islamic
minorities correspond with the distinctive experiences of Islamic political aggression
weathered by democratic states.
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Synthesizing the Data
The democratic health of a European state reflected thorough its embrace of
democratic attributes, as determined by the measures advanced in Freedom House,
potentially corresponds with heightened prospects to experience Islamic political
violence. The “Freedom in the World” survey conducted by Freedom House provides an
annual assessment of the status of freedom as experienced by individual across the globe.
These assessments establish a potential link between freedom and violent activities
perpetuated by Jihadists.
The connection of freedom to Islamic political violence in democracies is also
demonstrated in official abandonment of civil liberties with intentions to mitigate threats
of Islamic terrorism. Freedom House’s 2011 report of Freedom in the world portrays the
activities of liberalized governments that seek to neutralize threats of radical Islam but
compromise guarantees of civil liberties in the process. Democracies’ undermining civil
liberties in order to deter Jihadist violence validates the capability of liberty to incentivize
violence.
Ascertaining the status of freedom in European democracies enables
demonstration of democracies’ vulnerability to experience violence because of civil and
political liberties. The standing of civil liberties, as proscribed by Freedom House,
illuminates opportunities for violence associated with democratic practice. The survey
advanced by Freedom House, “includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings for
194 countries and 14 select territories. Each country and territory is assigned a numerical
rating on a scale of 1 to 7 for political rights and analogous rating for civil liberties; a
rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom” (Freedom in the World). From 2001
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to 2011 both Britain and France received the ranking indicating the highest possible
grade of freedom assigned by Freedom House, that of 1. The most notable variation
between Britain and France in Freedom House’s assessment of degree of freedom in each
entails France embarking on, “a downward trend due to a continued pattern of political
and societal discrimination against ethnic minorities, manifested in policies including a
government sponsored debate about national identity, the passage of a ban on facial
coverings in public places, and the systematic deportation of 8,000 Roma” (Freedom in
the World). This trend in France, observed by Freedom House, denotes an important
variation in the treatment to which Islamic minorities are subject in Britain compared to
those residing in France.

Status of civil liberties in France and Britain as prescribed by Freedom
House:
Opportunities for violence associated with democratic practice
Britain’s Score from 2002 to 2011: 1
Status of Civil Liberties in the United Kingdom
Frances Score 2002-2011: 1
Status of Civil Liberties in France
TREND ARROW:
France received a downward trend arrow due to a continued pattern of political and societal discrimination
against ethnic minorities, manifested in policies including a government-sponsored debate about national
identity, the passage of a ban on facial coverings in public places, and the systematic deportation of some
8,000 Roma.

Certain behaviors in Britain and France that negatively impact the status
of civil liberties but reduce prospects of political violence are emphasized in
Freedom House’s qualitative indicators. These indicators reflect a deliberate
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compromise of the population’s civil liberties as a direct response to threats posed
to security by radical Islamic adherents. One of the most recent occurrences of
this phenomenon in Britain includes a government report issued in 2009
discussing that:
“Many people arrested under the antiterrorism laws had been subsequently
charged with different crimes, indicating that the laws may have been misused. It
also showed that people of Asian descent have been arrested on flimsier grounds
than others. In June the Law Lords ruled that the evidence used against a
defendant may not be kept secret under so-called control orders—restrictive
conditions placed on terrorism suspects—as was previously the case” (Freedom in
the World).
Compromises to civil liberties remains even more significant in France because,
as Freedom House discusses:
“France's stiff antiterrorism campaign has included surveillance of mosques, and
raids for unrelated reasons (such as tax inspections) sometimes target places
where Muslims in particular are found (such as halal butchers). Terrorist suspects
can be detained for up to four days without being charged. France is more willing
than other European countries to deport radical Muslim clerics for speech
considered incitement to extremism or terrorism. The police are frequently
criticized for aggressiveness in random personal checks, which often target youths
of North African and African descent. Such police checks have deepened
resentment between minorities and the authorities” (Freedom in the World).
Relinquishing civil liberties are means through which democratic governments
respond to threats of Islamic political violence. These targeted measures,
however, demonstrate that expansive and uncompromised civil liberties fail to
effectively mitigate the violent ambitions of radical Islamists.
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Explanation of Data

The restrictions on civil liberties, detailed by Freedom House, in France but
France having experienced political violence in less severe forms and to less an extent
than Britain (although France encountered political violence nonetheless) establishes a
correlation between political esteem of civil liberties with the most severe and
catastrophic incidents of political violence. Though France restricts civil liberties more
than Britain, even if just slightly more, as described by Freedom House, incidents of
Islamic political violence yet occur. France scores as high as Britain in measurements
accounting for civil liberties yet experiences violence to a different extent, in different
forms, and for purportedly different reasons. This divergence suggests that discussing
democratic vitality, providing opportunity for violence, in research cannot explain the
discrepancies in Islamic political violence across democratic regimes. This trend also
demonstrates that opportunities for violence associated with civil liberties relate with
democracies’ behaviors integration or social cohesion ambitions.
British and French responses to insecurity from threats of domestic violence by
undermining civil liberties, as detailed by Freedom House, reveals the challenges of
democratic states to preserve security and civil liberties simultaneously. These state
behaviors indicate a correlation between democratic vitality and risks to security because
of their conscious impingement on civil liberties so to heighten defenses against threats
of domestic terrorism. Although these behaviors lessened democratic vitality and
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therefore opportunities for violence this phenomenon reveals that democracies are unable
to concurrently maintain the greatest extent of civil liberties and security.
Findings
To what extent is freedom compatible with violence? The measures extended by
Freedom House suggest that liberty is connected to democracies’ likelihood to experience
violence and that healthy democratic function promotes the success of violent movements
rooted in radical Islamic ideology.
Civil liberties, although a central mechanism of democratic function, complicate a
liberalized state’s ability to combat Islamic political violence. Civil liberties allow free
people to despise their rights and seek their demise through violent activity. To this end
the freedom to hate freedom risks freedom.
The relationship between democratic vitality and increased prospects of Islamist
violence, however, does not explain the divergences in experiences of violence across
democratic regimes. Some democracies more effectively guard against the threats to
security posed by Islamists. Why do democracies embracing democratic attributes to
similar degrees experience Jihadist domestic violence to different extents, in different
forms, and for professedly different reasons?
An empirical puzzle emerges from the link established between the prevalence of
freedom and intensified prospects to experience Islamic aggression in democracies.
Prevailing theories credit democracy with the capability to subdue violence because
guarantees of civil liberties, extended to their populations, provide legitimate outlets for
peaceful change. From this perspective, then, reduced civil liberties equates with greater
potential to experience violence. This research into the connection between democratic
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vitality and violence, however, finds that the democratic society less considerate of the
civil liberties guaranteed to their citizens are known to have experienced less Islamic
political violence to an extent that has caused fewer casualties. Inquiry into the treatment
and approach democracies direct toward their Islamic minorities prospectively satisfies
questions surrounding the discrepancies in violence experienced across democratic
regimes.
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IV

DISCREPANCIES IN SEVERITY OF JIHADIST VIOLENCE ACROSS
ASSIMILATION AND MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACIES
Emergence of Islamic Political Violence in Britain and France
Domestic Islamic political violence in Western democracies, at minimum,

severely disrupts societal functions. At its height or most gruesome violent political
contest claims the lives of the innocent and unsuspecting in spectacular and random
events. Islamic political violence varies in severity and type utilized across Western
democracies. Because of these variations, societal conditions and political processes
influencing choices among minorities to engage in aggression founded in political yet
violent initiatives relate with majority activities directed toward resident Islamic
minorities. Britain and France reflect divergences in severity of Islamic political violence
experienced, types of violence perpetrated, likelihood of minority radicalization, and the
objectives realized through use of violence.
The emergence of radical Islam, among a small minority of European Muslim
communities, intensifies security concerns among majority populations. According to
Emerson, “ The attacks by radical home grown terrorists have added a major security
dimension to the Muslim communities within Europe” (11). Scholarly analysis seeks to
determine if Islamic violent behaviors predicate societal and political behaviors or if
Islamic violence participants react to societal and political conduct considered
discriminatory/alienating to domestic Islamic minorities and believed to subjugate
international Islamic populations. Establishing a relationship between Islamic minority
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political violence and majority societal and political conduct concerning ethno religious
minorities contextualizes democracies’ different experiences with Islamic political
violence.
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DICRAPANCIES IN ISLAMIST VIOLENCE
Assimilation and multicultural democracies experience discrepancies in severity
of violence perpetrated by religious adherents. Each approach, intending either minority
integration or social cohesion, correlates with catastrophic or disruptive violence.
Two events popularly mark the diverging experiences of multicultural Britain and
assimilationist France with domestic Islamic political violence.
Britain: July 7, 2005 Transient system bombing Perpetrated by the Secret Organization of
Al Qaeda in Europe
France: Multiple occasions of Suburban Riots Perpetrated by discontent Muslim Youth in
Banuelies

The devastation related to these infamous incidents of Islamic terrorism demonstrates
democracies’ confrontations with domestic Islamic political violence that are severe and
deadly to varying degrees. Datasets including the quantitative measures provided by the
START database, maintained by the University of Maryland, reveal that multicultural
Britain and assimilationist France have, historically, experienced domestic Islamic
political violence to very different extremes.
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Islamic Political Violence Activities in Britain from 2000-2013
Total Incidents

80

Casualties

57

Injuries

816

Casualties resulting from Islamic Terrorism

57

Injuries resulting from Islamic Terrorism

786

Attacks Perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations

10

Frequency of Attacks per Year

2000-2001:
2001-2002:
2002-2003:
2003-2004:
2004-2005:
2005-2006:
2006-2007:
2007-2008:
2008-2009:
2009-2010:
2010-2011:
2011-2012:
2012-2013:
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26
19
3
1
10
12
14
21
12
4
4
6
21

Islamic Political Violence Activities in France from 2000-2013
Total Incidents

90

Casualties

14

Injuries

62

Casualties resulting from Islamic Terrorism

8

Injuries resulting from Islamic Terrorism

11

Attacks Perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations

6

Frequency of Attacks per Year

2000-2001:
2001-2002:
2002-2003:
2003-2004:
2004-2005:
2005-2006:
2006-2007:
2007-2008:
2008-2009:
2009-2010:
2010-2011:
2011-2012:
2012-2013:
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26
19
17
10
4
9
12
13
12
5
5
11
14

Synthesizing the Data; Quantitative Measures of Catastrophic Islamic
Political Violence in Britain and France
In the last decade, as determined by the archives of over 140,000 global incidents
of global terrorism maintained by the University of Maryland, Britain has experienced 80
incidents of terrorism 10 of which were most certainly perpetrated by Islamic extremist
organizations including the: Al Hafsal Morsi Birgades, Secret Organization of Al Qaeda
in Europe, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Those attacks
successfully executed by these affiliates of global Jihadist movements resulted in 57
causalities and 786 injuries on the British home front. These catastrophic terrorist events
targeted non-combatants whom were most unfortunately patrons of public modes of
transportations at the wrong second in Britain’s metropolitan districts. Although jihadist
inspired incidents are a small proportion of the all the attacks perpetrated in the last
decade on British soil they remain the most devastating and deadly of the 80 occurrences.
Furthermore, of the small proportion of incidents credited to Jihadist causes the most
deadly and destabilizing incident, the bombing of the mass transient system in July 2005,
was successfully executed by Islamic British citizens.
Contrarily France has experienced 90 incidents of terrorism in the last decade and
groups ascribing to radical Islam conducted six of those occurrences including: Al Qaeda,
Jund al-Khilafa, and the French Armed Islamic Front. Those acts successfully perpetrated
by Jihadist operatives claimed 8 lives and resulted in the injury of 11 individuals on
French soil. These proponents of Islamic political violence targeted government entities,
an airport, and educational institution, and military installments.
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Proportion of Islamic Political Violence in Multicultural and Assimilation
Democracies
Queen’s University Multicultural Index provides sufficient measures to identify a
European democracy as multicultural in their approach to integrate Islamic minorities.
The adoption of eight policies constitutes a democracy as multicultural including:
constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; adoption of
multiculturalism in school curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the
mandate of public media or media licensing; exemptions from dress-code or Sunday
closing legislation; allowing dual citizenship; funding of ethnic group organizations to
support cultural activities; funding of bilingual education or mother tongue instruction;
and affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. Quantitative values are
established by assigning a value of one where a state has adopted the specified policy. A
zero indicates that a democracy has failed to embrace the policy area, as determined by
the Queen’s University Multicultural Index. A value of eight signifies a strong
commitment to multiculturalism among a European democracy. Zero signals a complete
lack of multicultural tendencies upon summation of all of the multicultural scores in the
eight policy areas evaluated by Queen’s University Multicultural Index. Measuring the
extent to which a democracy embraces multiculturalism and extent of Islamic violence
reflected in number of attacks, casualties, and injuries signifies the influence of state
policies over the potential for Islamic political violence in free states.
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Multiculturalism in Britain and France according to the Queen’s
University Multicultural Index
Constitutional, legislative,
or parliamentary affirmation
of multiculturalism

Britain: NO
France: NO

Britain:0
France:0

Adoption of
multiculturalism in school
curriculum

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Britain: 1
France: 0

Inclusion of ethnic
representation/sensitivity in
the mandate of public media
or media licensing

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Britain: 1
France: 0

Exemptions from dresscode or Sunday closing
legislation

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Britain: 1
France: 0

Allowing dual citizenship

Britain: Yes
France: Yes

Britain: 1
France: 1

Funding of ethnic group
organizations to support
cultural activities

Britain: Yes
France: Yes

Britain: 1
France: 1

Funding of bilingual
education or mother tongue
instruction

Britain: NO
France: NO

Britain: 0
France: 0

Affirmative action for
disadvantaged immigrant
groups

Britain: Yes
France: NO

Britain: 1
France: 0

Britain’s Multicultural Score: 6

France’s Multicultural Score: 2
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Proportion of Multiculturalism to Violence

Islamic Political
Violence Activity
Britain

Multicultural Score: 6

Casualties because of
Isalmic Terrorism: 57
Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism: 786
Incidents perpetrated by
Islamic Organizations: 10

Islamic Political
Violence Activity
France

Multicultural Score: 2
Casualties because of
Isalmic Terrorism: 8
Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism: 11
Incidents perpetrated by
Islamic Organizations: 6
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Scale of Multiculturalism and Violence
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Synthesizing the Data: Quantitative Measures of the relationship between
Jihadist Violence and Multiculturalism
Quantitative indicators illuminate that levels of Islamic political violence and
subscriptions to multiculturalism vary and reflect a positive correlation. Islamic political
violence is more prevalent and deadly in states that are more multicultural in their
approach to integrate Muslim minorities. According to Queen’s University Multicultural
Index, Britain practices multiculturalism to an extent that is 3 times greater than that of
France. Britain has also experienced more Islamic terrorist activity in term of causalities,
injuries, and number of incidents by large margins. This discrepancy suggests that
democracies who implement multicultural policies experience more violence.
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Proportion of Islamic Political Violence, Multiculturalism, Minority
Integration, Minority Economic Inclusion, Civil Liberties, National
Attachment, and eligibility to assume national identity of resident state
Islamic Political Violence
Activity in Britain
Casualties because of Isalmic
Terrorism: 57

Islamic Political Violence
Activity in France
Casualties because of Isalmic
Terrorism: 8

Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism: 786

Injuries because of Islamic
Terrorism: 11

Incidents perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations: 10

Incidents perpetrated by Islamic
Organizations: 6

(Start Terrorism Data Base,
University of Maryland)

(START Terrorism Database
University of Maryland)

Embrace of Multiculturalism

Britain’s Multicultural Score
according to Queen’s University
Multicultural Index:
6

France’s Multicultural Score
according to Queen’s University
Multicultural Index:
2

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion in Britain
according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index:
102.04

Extent of Minority Labor
Market Inclusion in France
according to EU Civic,
Citizenship, Inclusion Index:
96.4

Extent of Minority
Integration

Integration of Minorities in
Britain according to MIPEX: 57

Integration of Minorities in
France according to MIPEX: 51

Status of Civil Liberties

Score from 2002 to 2011:
1

Score from 2002 to 2011:
1
*France Received a downward
trend Arrow
(Freedom House)

Islamic Political Violence

(Freedom House)
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National Priorities influencing
the potential for violent
responses to foreign policy

Eligibility to assume National
identity

Military Intervention
In
Majority Islamic States

Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project:
Seven percent of Muslims in
Britain consider themselves as
British First

Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project:
Forty-two percent of Muslims in
France consider themselves as
French First

Ability to assume British
National identity according to
EU Civic, Citizenship, Inclusion
Index In Britain:
107.77

Ability to assume French
National identity according to
EU Civic, Citizenship, Inclusion
Index In France:
113.59

British Military Intervention:
Afghanistan
And
Iraq

French Military
Intervention:
Lybia

This study explores opportunities for violence, minority status, and minority
feelings in the parameters of multicultural integrationist endeavors and assimilation social
cohesion aspirations. The above quantitative measures provide ratios of violence to
multiculturalism, favorable minority status, and minority sentiments, and occasions for
violence afforded by democratic conduct. State behaviors, founded in multicultural and
assimilationist conduct, determine minority status and feelings. These statistics, therefore,
reveals that the relationship of state behavior and violence corresponds to minority status
and sentiments because of the priorities of multicultural or assimilationist democracies to
integrate minorities or promote social cohesion.

160

Methodology and Measures:
European Union Inclusion, Civic, and Citizenship Index
The index designed by the European civic citizenship and inclusion assessment,
“illustrates to what extent member states are living up to their…promises of equality”
(14). An analytical framework, comprising the index, establishes policy conditions that
are most favorable to immigrant inclusion (15). The normative framework accounts for:
labor market inclusion; long term residence; family reunion; naturalization; and antidiscrimination (16-17). A normative framework, including the above policy areas
implemented by European democracies, “describes the best direction that policy could
take to create favorable conditions for immigrant inclusion. For each indicator the
normative framework is translated into…favorable, less favorable, and least favorable”
(17). Every indicator is assigned a value of 1,2, or 3 to reflect how favorable a give policy
is to minority inclusion. A score of 3 for a given indicator means that the specific policy
is favorable for minority inclusion.
According to the index, “the score values compare countries to the normative
framework and describe how favorable (from favorable to least favorable) are their civic
citizenship and inclusion policies” (19). The 1-3 scoring system is standardized to a base
of 100 in the index with a score of a hundred or above suggesting that policies, pursued
by a EU member state, exceeds the EU average for a given strand of labor market
inclusion, long term residence, family reunion, nationality, and anti discrimination.
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Index Scoring Standardization of 100 with
Over 100 being above the EU Average
And under 100 being below the EU Average
France

Labor
Market
Inclusion:
96.4

Britain

Labor
Market
Inclusion:
102.04

Long Term
Residence:

Family
Reunion:

Nationality:

Antidiscrimination:

106.28

113.59

100.82

Family
Reunion:

Nationality:

Antidiscrimination:

99.03

107.77

99.46

111.41

Long Term
Residence:
99.47

This research concentrates on the quantitative measures calculated to determine labor
market inclusion and eligibility to assume a European nationality, partly comprising the
policy areas culminating to formulate the civic, citizenship, and inclusion index.
Elements emphasized in the policy indicator of labor market inclusion, encompassing
part of the index, include: market access and eligibility; security of employment status;
labor market integration measures; and rights associated with labor market participation.
Eligibility, conditions for acquisitions of status, and rights associated with status are
assessed in the determination of the extent to which a member state provides favorable
access to nationality for immigrant minorities (40).
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Labor Market Inclusion
Britain: 2.22

France: 2.11

Security of Employment Status
Britain: 2.5 France: 2.11
Labor Market Integration Measures
Britain: 2.5

France: 2.5

Rights Associated with Labor Market Participation
Britain: 2.0 France: 2.5
Eligibility
Britain: 1.82

France: 1.33

Nationality
Britain: 2.18

France: 2.29

Dual Nationality
Britain: 2.5

France: 3.0

Security of Status
Britain: 2.33

France: 1.67

Conditions for Acquisition of Status
Britain: 2.13

France: 2.25

Eligibility for Status
Britain: 2.00

France: 2.5
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MIPEX- Migrant Integration Policy Index: Methodology and Measures
The Migrant Integration Policy Index evaluates 7 policy areas including: labor
market mobility; family reunion; education; political participation; long term residence;
access to nationality; and anti discrimination to establish quantitative measures for the
extent to which immigrant minorities are integrated into their respective residence.
Within each of the 7-policy area, indicator scores of 0-3 are averaged to give one of four
dimension scores, which reflect immigrant integration policies. The scores, when
averaged, comprise the overall scores for each country. The initial scale is converted into
a 0,50, 100 index accounting for dimensions and policy areas for minority integration. A
measure of 100 indicates an adequate degree of immigrant minority inclusion in
economic and societal processes of their democratic residences.
Integration of Minorities in France
according to MIPEX

51

Integration of Minorities in Britain
according to MIPEX

57

MIPEX concludes that, “ few countries follow France in imposing job, language,
and integration requirements for family reunion”. The index also expresses that, “new
targeted labor market measures still overlook major problems of access” (MIPEX: France
Key Findings). The report also finds that while most countries facilitating naturalization
processes grant local voting rights for foreigners, France has yet to adopt a similar
practice.
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Britain practices, according to MIPEX, “some of the strongest anti discrimination
laws and equality policies”. The UK also exhibits the, “strongest commitment to
implement intercultural education” (MIPEX: Britain Key Findings). Advancement of anti
discrimination laws and equality policies assist newcomers and ethnic minorities to
achieve equal opportunities. Moreover, as assessed by MIPEX, labor market mobility for
non- EU migrants’ is favorable in the UK and they are generally treated the same as
British workers. Specifically, “the UK does not close off sectors of the economy to
immigrants, nor deny access to job services” (MIPEX: Britain Key Findings).
Status of Civil Liberties Methodology and Measures
Freedom House indicators demonstrate democracies’ vulnerabilities to
experience violence associated with individuals’ civil and political liberties. Terrorism
research that surveys state behavior often connects the likelihood for political violence
with expansive political liberties. Freedom House provides quantitative indicators for the
status of civil liberties in Britain and France. These measures allow comparison between
individual freedoms and prevalence of violence in democratic societies.
Freedom In The world survey “ provides an annual evaluation of the state of
global freedom as experienced by individuals” (Freedom In The World). The survey
accounts for freedom or the, “ opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields
outside the control of government and other centers of potential domination according to
two broad categories political rights and civil liberties”. The ratings process conducted by
Freedom House is based, “ on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil
liberties questions” (Freedom In the World). This research focuses on the measures
categories related civil liberties including: freedom of expression and belief, associational
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and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
Scores are assigned to each of the areas related to freedom and civil liberties on a scale of
0 to 4, where 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest. A score of 60 (or a total
score of 4 for each of the 15 questions) signifies the highest degree of civil liberties in a
democratic setting. Each rating of 1 through 7 corresponds to a range to total scores.
Freedom in the world survey also accounts for political or societal trends affecting
the status of civil liberties. A trend arrow indicates an alarming political development
impacting civil liberties and is based on emerging conditions that link with a scoring
change in the equivalent checklist of questions. Trend arrows are assigned only in cases
where score increases or decreases are not sufficient to warrant a ratings change
(Freedom In the World Methodology).

Status of Civil Liberties in France and Britain as Prescribed by Freedom
House
Britain’s Score from 2002 to 2011: 1

France’s Score from 2002 to 2011: 1
Trend Arrow: France received a downward trend arrow due to a continued pattern of
political and societal discrimination against ethnic minorities. These inclinations were
manifested in several policy actions advanced in France including: a government
sponsored debate about national identity, the passage of a bon on facial coverings in
public spaces, and aggressive deportation of 8,000 Roma (Freedom in the World).
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National Attachments Methodology and Measures
The national priorities Muslims’ of Western free states adopt, possibly suggests a
degree to which they will also contest their resident states foreign policy objectives
involving majority Islamic states in the Middle East. Pew global attitudes project,
gauging the opinions of European Muslims, assess feelings of national commitments
Islamic adherents of Britain and France harbor. Results of the survey are based on
telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of local research
organizations. According to the methodology of the survey, with the findings based on
the full sample size, “one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to
sampling and other effects is plus or minus the margin of error” (Pew Global Attitudes
Project 39). The sampling size of Brits interviewed is 902 with 412 over sample of the
Muslim population. Similarly, the interview sampling size in France consists of 905
interviews with a 400 Muslim oversample (39). Margin of error for the opinion data
referenced in this study is 6% for the British Muslim oversample and 5% for the French
Muslim oversample.
The Pew Survey, focusing on the concerns of Muslims in Britain over religious
extremism, determines that, “ British Muslims have a stronger Islamic identity than do
Muslims elsewhere in Europe” (In Great Britain, Muslims Worry About Islamic
Extremism). Fully 8 in 10 (over 80%) of Muslims in Britain think of themselves as being
primarily Muslim rather than British. Contrarily, in France 46% consider themselves as
Muslim first. These sentiments reflect a difference in the national priorities Muslims of
multicultural and assimilation democracies espouse.
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Synthesizing the Data: Quantitative Measures attributing Islamic political
Violence to State behaviors rooted in Multiculturalism or Assimilation
Previous scholarship discussing the relationship between state behavior and
Islamic terrorism credits muddled integration, economic disparity, discrimination, foreign
occupation of majority Islamic states, and expansive civil liberties with an increased
likelihood for democratic societies to experience Islamic political violence. This study,
rather, explores these variables in the context of assimilation and multicultural societies.
It evaluates how state behavior, shaped by multicultural or assimilationist conduct,
impact violent outcomes.
Assimilation and multicultural democracies have varying policy objectives that
either involves adequate Islamic minority integration or social cohesion and maintenance
of state sovereignty. The opinions of Muslims regarding their residence’s foreign
entanglements (perhaps reflected in their self professes national attachments) also diverge
between the Islamic populations of assimilation and multicultural societies. Additionally
inclusiveness of Islamic minorities in the labor market and societal processes fluctuate
with assimilation or multicultural practices. Maintenance of civil liberties remains a
constant across assimilation and multicultural democracies yet discrepancies in violent
experiences persist.
These variations possibly allude to the fact that behaviors of majorities influenced
by assimilation and multicultural conduct connect with violent consequences in
unexpected ways. Multiculturalism and assimilationist tendencies affect propensities for
violence. These integration and social cohesion efforts facilitate the political and societal
conditions under which these specific causal mechanisms contribute to an increased
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possibility to experience Islamic political violence. Islamist violent activity, therefore,
relates to these variables because they are shaped by the behaviors of multicultural or
assimilationist democracies.
Multicultural Britain, according to the diverse and scientific data sets referenced
in this research, promotes greater Islamic minority inclusion in the labor market and
integration than assimilationist France. Unpredictably, despite these political and societal
successes, Britain has experienced more incidence of Islamic political violence. Jihadist
violence is less prevalent in France, where environments exist previously thought to
cultivate violent trends among Islamic adherents and predispose a democracy to deadly
jihadist movements. Including Islamic minority discrimination, alienation, and poverty.
This unlikely result perhaps indicates that state policies, rooted in multicultural or
assimilation practices, directed toward resident Islamic populations affect prospects of
Islamic political violence more than democratic attributes, external state behaviors,
minority status, and minority perceptions. State behaviors, therefore, impact several
causal mechanisms of violence pursed by Islamic minorities for political ends.
Synthesizing the Data: Qualitative measures of Islamic Political in
Britain and France- anecdotal evidence of Islamic inspired violence and
upheaval
Media headlines provide robust and detailed accounts of less infamous religiously
or politically motivated violence. Many of these occurrences, though less notorious,
relate with the themes and intents tied to the more notable 7/7 bombing of London’s
transient system and disruptive youthful rioting in France’s Parisian suburbs. A survey of
media headlines details the confrontations of Britain and France with Islamic political
violence. Particular headlines, meant to depict the experiences of violence in Britain and
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France reveals that different aggressive trends associate with Jihadist vehemence in
assimilation and multicultural democracies. Islamic political violence, therefore,
prospectively associates with state policies and behaviors.
Le Monde, a French publication highlighted in the blog Euro-Islam analysis,
when assessing the Parisian riots of 2013 discusses, “Like many other suburbs in the
vicinity of Paris, the tension between youths and the police has been well established, but
what made this summer’s riots however distinct from others was the religious identity
and solidarity which mobilized people and remained absent in previous episodes of urban
violence” (Le Monde via Euro Islam Analysis). The article continues to explain that
protest of discrimination and alienation resulting from state policies and societal
conditions, shaped by assimilationist behaviors, drive outrage, rioting, and violent
protest. Conversely, according to a post on Euro-Islam analysis, “ terrorism plots the size
of 7/7 (in Britain) foiled every year” (Euro Islam Analysis March 26, 2013). The most
recent experiences of violent activity across Britain and France vary between looming
catastrophic threats in the UK and urban rioting in France.
Analysis included in the World Almanac of Islamism, authored by the American
Foreign Policy Council, confirms that, “ The United Kingdom is a European hub for
numerous forms of Islamist activity….(including that sustained by) non violent Islamists
who hold significant power and influence” (World Almanac of Islamism). This
observation corroborates the concerns held by the UK’s senior national coordinator for
counter terrorism that law enforcement officers are, “ foiling terrorism plots the size of
the 7/7 attacks every year” (Euro Islam Analysis).
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According to the World Almanac of Islamism, Islamist activity in France
involves, “ Muslim immigrant populations (who) are frequently concentrated in
ethnic ghettos of the Banilues, the working class suburbs surrounding French
urban centers, where they are marginalized, face discrimination, and weather high
unemployment rates. The World Almanac of Islamism asserts that, “ This
concentration of social problems has led repeatedly to outbreaks of mass
violence” (World Almanac of Islamism). This reflection verifies the scenarios
surveyed by LeMonde also crediting similar societal ills with fueling the most
recent 2013 summer rioting.
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Findings
Organized yet disruptive violence in assimilationist France characterizes the
chaos and annoyances designed to contest the societal marginalization of minority
residents who largely identify with Islamic doctrine. Catastrophic and deadly terrorist
pursuits in multicultural Britain rather associate with religiously motivated violence
intended to advance Jihadist causes, dominate politically, and at the very least terminate
western military presence in Islamic territories aboard. Multicultural tendencies to seek
the integration of Islamic minorities without the compromise of their religious or cultural
practices permits stronger identifications with religious causes over the security and
political success of their resident democracy. Assimilationist tendencies to promote social
cohesion through policies requiring abandonment of public displays of religious
commitments and not considering the economic and social status of minorities as a
component of their immigration policies potentially incites Islamic minority outrage often
channeled through rioting and societal disturbance.
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Discussion of the Data
Devastation in Britain
Britain remains one of only a few Western European democracies that recently
sustained several causalities in attacks perpetrated by native affiliates of global jihadist
movements. According to the global terrorism database at the University of Maryland,
Britain has lost slightly less than 60 innocents in attacks executed by jihadist
conglomerates on mass transient systems in populated areas since 9/11. Britain’s security
service MI 5 elaborates on the nature of the terrorism threat against national targets and
details that, “The UK has long-standing commercial, political and military links with
many countries in the Muslim world. Our involvement in the region is strongly opposed
by Al Qaida and other extremist groups. This has resulted in British interests and
citizens… repeatedly being targeted by international terrorists” (MI 5). Because of the
influence the British government exerts militarily over Islamic states abroad and the
perception of Britain as an occupying force among domestic Islamic communities tied to
this intervention, British interests and territory remain a considerable target of a violent
political agenda protesting their unwelcomed foreign influence.
MI 5 demonstrates overwhelming security concerns of the ever-evolving threat of
domestic Islamic terrorism and prospects of radicalization of resident Islamic adherents.
Because Islamic terrorist networks enlist media outlets and social media in their
strategies, a very diverse threat of terrorism in the U.K. emerged including not only the
affiliates and allies of well-organized global Jihadist networks, but more unpredictable
freelance terrorists privy to radical rhetoric and inspired to react. Consistent with MI 5
intelligence assessments, “ a significant number of British nationals and foreign citizens
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resident in the UK are known to be linked to or sympathetic with Al Quada” (MI 5).
Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the Security Service, in an address
concerning Britain’s’ growing terrorist threat warns that, “More and more people are
moving from passive sympathy towards active terrorism through being radicalized or
indoctrinated by friends, families, in organized training events here and overseas, by
images on television, through chat rooms and websites on the Internet” (Speech By The
Director General Of The Security Service: MI 5). Prospects for catastrophic terrorism in
Britain are expansive and resident Islamic populations remain very susceptible to
radicalization.
British nationals participating in Islamic political movements, founded in
aggression, support the violent causes of global terrorism networks through meaningful
and substantive activities. Intelligence analysis by MI 5 concludes that, “significant
number of British nationals and foreign citizens resident in the UK are known to be
linked to or (are) sympathetic with Al Quaeda” (MI 5). British conglomerates of global
Islamic terrorism reinforce global jihadists initiatives, as determined by UK’s security
service, though domestic and international terrorist operations, facilitating training for
Islamic British minorities in extremist ideology and terrorist techniques, raising funds for
international and domestic operations, and acquiring and disseminating necessary
documents for use by global jihadist operatives. Extremist British-Muslims execute far
more devastating and tangible jihadist violence by directly planning or attempting
domestic terrorist attacks. As analyzed by MI 5, “ a number of British residents have
travelled to Iraq and Afghanistan to join the insurgencies against those countries'
governments and international forces. Some have returned to the UK and are believed to
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be involved in supporting and planning terrorist activities here” (MI 5). British nationals
or residents participating in Islamic political violence enlist terrorism as a primary
method to contest foreign policies directed toward Islamic populations aboard or
political/ societal conduct considered unfavorable to global jihadists’ agenda.
Upheaval in France
Islamic political violence in France remains exclusive to the suburbs of Paris and
is mainly characterized by mass chaos and severe societal disturbance unleashed around
the “city of lights” as the devices of youthful rioters. An underclass of second generation
French-Muslims, primarily of North African descent, initiated the crisis of the Parisian
suburbs in late 2005. This reign of violence resulted in massive amounts of property
destruction including but not limited to incinerated cars and extensively vandalized police
stations, shopping malls, daycare centers, schools, as well as public sports facilities (De
Wenden). The collapse of France’s urban areas beginning in 2005,according to a Dutch
official, culminated in the destruction of, “10,000 cars and more than 300 buildings
including churches and synagogues” (Wilders, 147). Other reports indicate that around
70,000 violent episodes are attributable to the 2005 violent movements originating in the
immigrant communities of Parisian suburbs (De Wenden).
While the dynamics of these urban disturbances, in practice, actually entail some
complex interaction of the participating youths’ confusion over their religious identity in
a secularized society and their “undesirable” economic circumstances, theoretically
attributing the violent outbreaks to either Islam or poverty poses significant challenges.
As cited above many scholarly assessments and media reports associate the riots with
economic desperation and lack of opportunity to overcome such, experienced by the
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violently charged French natives perpetrating the riots. As observed in the extensive
survey of this unfortunate phenomenon, research and analysis rarely note the religious
affiliations of the rioters and to a large extent dismiss the role of Islam in this form of
organized violence.
Not to reference the religious elements of the violence, however, potentially
obscures accurate reasons for the advance of this organized violence. Although the
violent movements mainly involve disenfranchised Muslim youth reportedly mobilizing
to forge secure economic opportunities through violence, targets of their “outrage”
consist of symbols of religious significance including churches, women not adhering to
Islam’s standard of modesty, synagogues, symbols of secularism and modernization, and
non-Muslim residents (or dhimmis). Depicting the line where rioting, either because of
economic destitution or out of religious obligation, begins and ends in France’s current
political climate, and remains problematic. Dismissing either of these elements, however,
in analysis of this disruptive trend imperils a genuine understanding of France’s chaotic
and disturbing riots.
The rioting experienced in France remains unique and destructive in nature and
represents not, therefore, the most infamous and recognizable forms of Islamic political
violence including the slaughter of many innocents in random yet spectacular events. Not
meeting this renowned criterion of terrorism, however, neither automatically or entirely
invalidates the presence jihadist elements in France’s experience with rioting. These
disturbing and violent outbreaks, rather, indicate yet another form and reason for
organized Islamic aggression in democratic societies.
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It is often assumed that when radical Islam is a force for violent change, its
ideology is in its self a cause (violent pursuit of political change) to bring about a certain
political effect, or the political capability to enforce sharia law and exact policy
modifications consistent with a global jihadist agenda. When radical Islam influences
quests of violent ambitions, the participating actors often engage in the most extreme
forms violence yielding the most innocent causalities. Only when radical Islam is a
primary cause of violence can the most catastrophic forms of Islamic political violence be
understood and explained? Is Islamic political violence, however, always expressed in its
most catastrophic and destructive forms? Does it consistently involve the most radical
elements of Islam?
France’s experience with rioting by Muslim youths signifies a very different and
unfamiliar variation of Islamic aggression. Because Islam is not considered the primary
motivator of revolt among these conflicted youths it can therefore neither be the entire
cause of the Parisian chaos nor solely define the desired political outcomes sought
through violence. This does not mean, however, that Islam exerts no influence over the
calculations for the Muslim rioters to exact chaos and disturbance.
The riots in France, unlike the Islamic political aggression experienced by other
democracies, demonstrate the emergence of organized Islamic violence that is entirely
reactionary to state policies and societal behavior disconcerted with the role of Islam in
the function of the state. As analyzed by Cesari in reference to the 2005 riots, “ the real
issue is not the loyalty or disloyalty of French Muslims. Rather it is the dramatic
upheavals in both the organization of society and the construction of identity currently
taking place in France. These changes have caused the French to forcefully reaffirm

177

many of their longstanding cultural values, including secularism and the rejection of
minority cultural and ethnic communities” (Cesari, Ethnicity, Islam). DeWenden further
claims that, “ It is not in the name of Allah that they (the youthful rioters) have set fire to
cars. They have done so, rather, to collectively express their resentment and frustration
regarding social inequalities” (DeWenden). The riots then comprise Islamic participants
acting violently not out of religious obligation but as disgruntled citizens that happen to
adhere, in a large majority, to a similar religious doctrine. Their subscription to a
particular religious ideology, as a minority class, subjects them to perceived mistreatment
and inequality, conditions to which the “discriminated” and “alienated” young Muslims
violently respond. Disturbing behaviors among the Muslim youth ensue not because they
are Muslim but because they remain apart “underprivileged” class facing tumultuous
economic circumstances and consider themselves apart of such unfortunate
circumstances together as Muslims. According to their determinations, such conditions
warrant violent political change not out of religious conviction but as marginalized
citizens who happen to possess the same religious convictions.
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V

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
FINDINGS

State behaviors affect violent outcomes initiated for political change. Change
pursued in liberalized societies through terrorism contrasts significantly from that
pursued in illiberal societies but motivations for change result from behaviors of the state.
Democracies with significant Islamic minorities experience political violence because
majority behaviors, designed to address the presence of Islamic minorities, influence
choices among Islamic populations to sustain jihadist movements. Greatest potential for
violence in free states emerge from political or societal processes that unintentionally
coerce Islamic minorities’ participation in violence. Minorities perceiving an inferior
status or occupation of lands considered exclusive of Islamic citizenship, especially when
Islamic minorities possess few attachments to their resident state (as permitted by the
tenets of multiculturalism) engage in violence for political change.
Majority practices dealing with a considerable population of Islamic adherents
primarily affect aspects of violent outcomes because such practices oblige or fail to
oblige minority national attachment, determine types of political change pursued through
force, impact nature of violence utilized for political change, and influence what
justifications minorities perceive for aggression. Although propensities for violence and
reasons for its use fluctuate with different societal/political approaches directed toward
Muslims, political violence associates with majority conduct in democracies concerning
their Islamic populations.
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Rejecting the Null
Multicultural and assimilationists’ preferences to integrate minorities or promote
social cohesion affect prospects of violence more than the variables previously identified
to predispose a democracy to political violence. Multicultural and assimilation
tendencies connect with state policies that affect violent consequences exacted by radical
Muslims. Multicultural and assimilationist conduct relate with democracies’ violent
experiences more than democratic attributes, minority status, minority feelings, and
external state behaviors.
Multicultural polities aspire to integrate immigrant minorities and maintain
overtly accommodative postures that promote extreme political and cultural sensitivity.
Multicultural democracies have integrated their Islamic minorities to an extent greater
than assimilationist systems. Islamic populations of multicultural democracies also enjoy
a superior economic position. Unexpectedly, despite these realities, multicultural
democracies’ experience with violence is more frequent and deadly.
Assimilation governments require immigrant minorities to adopt national
identities consistent with prevailing values and traditions. Pursuit of this objective
involves the implementation of perceivably alienating and discriminatory political
mandates on immigrant minorities to abandon religious and cultural leanings that may
distinguish them as separate from the mainstream. Islamic political violence is, however,
less prevalent and destructive in assimilation democracies where Islamic minorities’
status and economic position is unfavorable compared to the plight of Islamic minorities
in multicultural democracies. Islamic populations of assimilation democracies, however,
possess more positive views and identify with their residence to a greater extent.
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Assimilation and multicultural democracies’ encounter Islamic violence to
different extremes despite their similar military endeavors in majority Islamic states.
Islamic minorities’ self reported attachments to their democratic residence indicates their
likelihood to violently react to foreign policy objectives involving states exclusive to
Islamic citizenship.
Discrepancies in violent outcomes suggest that conditions specific to
democracies, previously theorized to cause violence, relate with multicultural or
assimilationist behaviors. Variables and processes known to cause Islamic terrorism in
democracies are linked to multicultural and assimilation frameworks designed to
integrate immigrant minorities or advance social cohesion.
Assimilation vs. Multiculturalism and discrepancies concerning the extent
of National Attachment among Islamic Minorities
As concluded by this study, multiculturalism and assimilation affect the degree to
which Islamic minorities possess national attachments to the democracy of which they
are welcomed to be apart. Various political regulations of religious practice or behavior
and societal treatment of Islamic minorities correlate with the national loyalties Islamic
adherents adopt. Political and societal mindsets, unique to either multiculturalist or
assimilation democracies, connect with the feelings of devotion or commitment Islamic
citizens direct toward their democratic residence or religious subscriptions.
Conflicting policies, endorsed by France and Britain, that concern dress code
requirements imposed on patrons of swimming facilities perfectly demonstrate the
different approaches advanced in multicultural and assimilationist democracies impacting
Islamic immigrant minorities. As discussed in the Telegraph, “swimmers are told to wear
burkinis”. The article further discusses that, “….swimmers including non- Muslims are
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barred from entering the pool in normal swimming attire. Instead that are told that they
must comply with the “modest” code of dress required by Islamic custom (Patrick,
Telegraph Aug 15 2009). Contrarily in August of 2009 the blog Euro Islam Analysis
posted that, “ French pool bans burkini wearing swimmer” (Euro Islam Analysis August
12 2009).
These excerpts demonstrate a significant contrast between societal and legal
consequences endured by Islamic minorities in Britain and France. The contradictory
approaches of multiculturalist or assimilation democracies, as is illustrated by it being
illegal to either not wear a “burkini” in Britain or sport a similar dress in France,
epitomize the societal and political ramifications of integration and social cohesion
policies.
Link between State Behavior and level of national commitment possessed
by Islamic minorities
Assimilationist models attending to a significant Islamic presence theoretically
forge national attachments among immigrant Muslims native to democracies or aspire for
the integration of Islamic minorities. Policy implications of majority concerns to uphold
republican values and practices, largely considered compromised by mass Islamic
migration within societies adopting assimilationist mindsets, include legal obligations for
Islamic citizens to mold their beliefs and cultural tendencies with those of their resident
state. Minority inclusion is not the primary objective of assimilationist frameworks and,
therefore, overwhelming senses of patriotism and strong national sentiments are not
necessarily the primary elements of national identities assumed by the minorities for
whom such frameworks are intended. National attachments, determined by
assimilationist objectives and pursued by majorities , account for the conformity of
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religious and cultural traditions to governing societal and political procedures among
immigrant minorities.

Muslim National Attachments:
Muslim Then British;
French Then Muslim
Extent of national attachment held by Islamic minorities links with paradigms in
democracies meant to integrate or promote social cohesion among immigrant
populations. This research concludes that the social cohesion objectives associated with
the assimilation policies adopted in France result in French Muslims choosing to identify
as French Muslims. Contrarily Muslims in Britain prioritize their religious affiliations
when developing a national identity as Islamic immigrants. Integration or social cohesion
efforts pursued by democracies and the resulting treatment to which affected immigrant
populations are in turn subject relate to the commitment Muslims divert to either their
religion or new residence.
Public opinion data issued by Pew Research Center discusses that, “ British
Muslims have a stronger Islamic identity than do Muslims elsewhere in Europe. Fully
eight in ten (81%) British Muslims think of themselves as Muslims first rather than as
British. In France just 46% consider themselves as Muslim first” (In Great Britain
Muslims Worry about Extremism). Further data from Pew Research Center also reveals
that 78% of French Muslim’s surveyed want to, “adopt national customs”. Alternatively,
only 35% of British Muslims want, “to be distinct from society” (Muslims in Europe:
Economic Worries Top Concern About Religious and Cultural Identity). According to a
Gallup poll, 78% of Muslims in Paris favor living in a neighborhood with a mix of people
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compared to Muslims in Britain only 63% of who share this preference (Muslims in
Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding already exists). Pew Global research on global
attitudes also finds that, 47% of British Muslims feel that there is a conflict between
being a devout Muslim and living in modern society contrasting to 28% of French
Muslims who fell there is such a conflict (The Great Divide: How Westerners and
Muslims View Each Other).
French then Muslim; Assimilation practice and priorities of
Nationalism assumed by Islamic Immigrants
The public opinion data above reflects the success of assimilation approaches to
facilitate priorities among Islamic minorities to assume a French national identity over
that of strict allegiance to Islam. In fact, consistent with the pew survey above, French
Muslims are far more likely to consider themselves French first and Muslim second than
are Muslims in Britain. France’s political determinations forge strong national
preferences over that of strong religious commitments among Islamic immigrant
populations, and permits uncompromised practice of democratic and republican ideals.
These political calculations protect state sovereignty, despite a significant Islamic
presence attributable to increased immigration from Islamic states. This trend
notoriously poses grave complications to democracies that experiencing vast Islamic
immigration.
Assimilationist models, also, successfully minimize minority aggression founded
in religious prerogatives. Political processes and societal conditions, facilitated by such
models, prohibit and object to religious tendencies that conflict with successful
adaptation to free societies. Conforming religious convictions to national interests much
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prior to the emergence of organized violence from global jihadist movements, determined
to vehemently advance Islam, is permissible under assimilation approaches.
This phenomenon is illustrated in French officials ejecting proponents of radical
Islam and banning the face veil in public spaces. Jihad Watch, a daily blog positing
Jihadist activity discuses that, “France ejects 12 Islamic preachers of Hate (Jihad Watch
July 30 2005). Euro Islam Analysis also emphasizes that, “Imam accused of preaching
radicalism in Toulon expulsed to Morocco” (Euro Islam Analysis May 3,2009). The most
infamous demonstration of France’s assimilationist tendencies is the government’s
decision to ban the burqa and face veils in public places. Euro Islam Analysis posts that,
“French Senate votes overwhelmingly to ban face veils in public spaces” (Euro Islam
Analysis September 21 2010).
Along with the political ability to heighten patriotic sentiments possessed by
French-Muslims, France also successfully mitigates radical and violent movements
because of assimilation practices. Consistent with assimilation applications, France
maintains “no tolerance” posture for behavior or rhetoric with the potential to erode
republican values or that predicate the emergence of organized political aggression. The
expulsion of proponents of radical Islam validates France’s concern to: preserve French
republicanism potentially compromised by the embrace of cultural differences practiced
by Islamic immigrants; and undermine extremist movements known to deteriorate free
societies.
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Muslim then British;
The Advancement of Islamic Nationalism in Western Europe
Multiculturalist models, theoretically more capable of facilitating Islamic
integration, allow for the maintenance of religious and cultural traditions although they
are sometimes incongruous with dominant societal/political inclinations. Themes of
acceptance, tolerance, and understanding define majority attitudes toward ethno religious
citizens. Multiculturalist systems not only respect cultural and religious differences but
strengthen the fabric of diversity through their embrace of such. Minorities’ different
ethnic and religious observations, therefore, are considered appropriate and encouraged in
national identity formulation.
Islamic minority inhabitants of multiculturalist societies conceive of few
contradictions between their mores and those of the civilizations of which they were
welcomed to be a part. This remains consistent with the findings of a unique study
surveying the attitudes of Muslims in Britain. Of all the British Arabs in London
interviewed all agreed that, “ there is no incompatibility between being British and being
Muslim” (El-Wafi, Layla).
Although feelings of inclusion and acceptance resonate with Islamic minorities
native to multiculturalist societies, religious commitments trump any attraction to sustain
and advance a multiculturalist model, not only permitting but encouraging esteem of
religious doctrine to which they remain very devoted. Multiculturalism deters national
attachment among resident ethno religious minorities. As discussed in the following
article, there are Islamic political movements in Britain aspiring to, “ establish an Islamic
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super-state under sharia law like Afghanistan under the Taliban” and ultimately succeed
portions of British territory (Jihad Watch April 26 2004).
Immigrants’ incompatible religious and cultural traditions minimally factor into
the citizenship status of minorities in multiculturalist societies. The consequential lack of
devotion, therefore, to governing societal and political trends potentially contributes to
forceful change pursued by Islamic minorities. Regard for religious convictions over
national values, permitted by the multiculturalist constructs, invigorates aggression
intended for political change. This is especially prevalent when minorities’ religious
beliefs petition extensive influence or dominance over political processes. Majorities
obligating minority affections for national values may fail to facilitate genuine and strong
immigrant ties to national interests. Not obligating, however, a rejection of beliefs that
conflict with democratic principles prospectively allows for segregation of likeminded
individuals into initially “harmless” but politically charged movements. These
movements potentially evolve into violent jihad. Several articles highlight circumstances
under which Islamic extremists of British national origin organize to obtain political
control over areas in the UK they currently inhabit and conspire to override entrenched
democratic ideals. Daily Mail Online, a British news publication, reports that, “
Dewsbury, Bradford, and Tower Hamlet (are) where Islamic extremists want to establish
independent states with Sharia Law”. The publication further comments that, “ the
notorious Muslims Against the Crusades group have named Yorkshire towns…in East
London as test beds for blanket Sharia rule” (Daily Mail Online July 6 2007).
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Inclusion vs. Political Change;
Divergent political objectives pursued through Violence
Assimilation and Multicultural models affect the objectives pursued in organized
violent movements initiated by Islamic minorities. Assimilation approaches, focusing
primarily on development of national loyalties by immigrant minorities, expect minority
integration into labor markets to occur as a by-product of their determinations to make
minorities indistinguishable from majorities. Assimilationist societies do not facilitate a
process by which the equality of immigrants is achieved. This neglect potentially leads to
populations of immigrants (perhaps strongly identifying with cultural and civic attributes)
economically inferior to that of majorities. These unfortunate societal trends influences
prospects of organized rebellion among Islamic minorities, isolated from majorities on
economic fronts, to achieve opportunities for greater participation in economic activities.

Real Justifications for Violent Reactions in France
A Democracy that Discriminates
Economic inclusion remains the primary aspiration of the rioters whom
perpetrated France’s most notorious encounter with political violence during the mass
upheaval of the 2005 riots in urban settings. Apathy among majorities in France
concerning the deteriorating economic conditions endured by immigrant populations,
concentrated in ghettos, prompted organized violent protest by disenfranchised citizens of
Arab or Asian descent. Systemic poverty in Parisian neighborhoods created feelings
among affected populations that violent responses remained the only course of action
through which to demand economic accessibility.
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Studies of Labor market reports conclude that, “evidence of discrimination due
purely to religion, not national origin, meet the highest standards of statistical
significance,” commented Dr. Laitin in a report issued by the French American
Foundation (Laitin). The findings of the study also conclude “There is no doubt that antiMuslim discrimination is holding back Muslim economic success in at least one sector of
the French labor market….(Laitin)” A senior official at the UN also warns that, “France’s
ethnic minorities are trapped in social and economic “ghettos” because of an “insidious
racism” tolerated by French politicians”. Classified cables released on Wiki leaks also
point to concerns of the United State Embassy over minority treatment in France
exacerbating urban tensions. Economic stagnation experienced by minorities in France
sustains societal conditions under which rioting and upheaval are the only considerably
effective measures through which minorities publicize feelings of alienation and
discrimination.
Societal Inclusion Pursued through Rioting and Rebellion in France
Poverty and racial divisions surround the social upheaval enacted by discontent
minority populations. The BBC notes that, “rioting by youths in a Paris suburb has
highlighted the discontentment among sections of France’s immigrant population”
(Ghettos Shackle French Muslims Oct 31 2005). An AFP reporter agrees and writes that
the riots in France lay bare “ what observers said was the country's failure to address deep
problems of poverty and immigration” (Jihad Watch November 2, 2005). Economic
factors compel disgruntled immigrant populations to engage in social upheaval for
increased labor market inclusion.
Yet British Muslims sympathize with the Youthful Rioters more
than the Islamic inhabitants of France….
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Polling data reflects an alarming trend that Muslims in Britain direct more
sympathy to the youthful rioters than do Muslims in France. A survey conducted by the
Pew Global Attitudes Project finds that 75% of British Muslims are sympathetic with
youth who rioted in France contrasting to only 63% of French Muslims who share in the
sympathy with the rioting youth (Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries top Concerns
About Religious and Cultural Identity). This perhaps speaks to the loyalty and national
attachment French Muslims devote toward their resident democracy. This viewpoint
among a majority of French Muslims also suggests that rioters in France, perhaps
organized along socio economics rather than religious lines, see to achieve political
change and petition a more favorable economic standing.

Political Change Pursued though Violence in Britain:
Termination of Foreign Occupation of Lands Considered Exclusive of
Islamic Citizenship

Multicultural approaches focusing primarily on integration of minorities in terms
of economic and social equality often through policy accommodation and preferential
treatment permit Islamic adherents to live separate lives apart from the mainstream. This
conduct, with an obvious policy and societal neglect to forge the even minimal ties ethno
religious minorities direct toward their national residence, results in the overwhelming
commitment Islamic immigrants maintain toward their beliefs even if radical. These
priorities concerning ethnic or religious traditions potentially cause the violent contest of
state policies that affect immigrants’ international religious or ethnic equivalents.
Objectives pursued through use of violence in multicultural societies are then defined by
desires of immigrant minorities to achieve policy responses that do not influence or
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involve their religious or ethnic counterparts abroad. An Ipsos MORI poll assessing the
attitudes of British Muslims finds that British foreign entanglements account for the
domestic political violence prevalent in the UK. Specifically the poll references that, “a
majority of British Muslims believe that the war in Iraq is the main reason why London
was bombed (53%). In contrast, just 14% say that the war in Iraq had nothing to do with
why London was bombed” (Ipsos MORI Attitudes of British Muslims July 22 2005). A
British Muslim Cleric warns that, “unless British and American troops were withdrawn
from Muslim lands they would be to blame for the (deadly) consequences (Daily Mail
Online September 13 2008).
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Rebellion vs. Jihad
Integration or social cohesion methods also affect the nature of violence in
Multicultural or Assimilation societies. Assimilationist democracies mandate minorities
to conform cultural and religious traditions to prevailing values. Alienated minorities,
however, react to their inferior status through rioting. Assimilation practices dictate
preservation of state sovereignty over any desires for satisfactory minority economic or
social status. Assimilation prerequisites upheld by majorities, therefore, ineptly measure
inclusion and equality. National identities fostered by majority requirements to
assimilate, forces minority commitment to national interests, but not necessarily,
successful integration. Minorities rebel, therefore, in states necessitating assimilation, and
respond to feelings of exclusion and inferiority when majority efforts dismiss the ill
sentiments possessed by their Islamic minority populations. An article on the Drudge
Report notes that, the rioting in France involved premeditation and strategy but remained
limited to organized chaos rather than severe violence. The article mentions that, “
French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy said that Thursday that the riots in several Paris
suburbs…..were not spontaneous but rather well organized” (Jihad Watch November
2005).
Radicalization and incidence of political violence occur less in societies requiring
minority assimilation despite perceptions of inferiority and exclusion because majorities
prohibit conduct potentially corrosive of state sovereignty. Majorities induce national
attachments through promises of legal consequence and societal intolerance of behaviors
that undermine state interests. Strict interdiction of minority behaviors and attitudes that
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conflict with state values and interests, considered to potentially lead to radicalized
Islamic populations and political violence, weakens Islamic movements aggressive in
nature before organized violence ensues.
Several documented incidences of the French remaining intolerant of radical
Islam emphasize the relationship between assimilation tendencies and minimal Jihadist
activity in France compared to that of Britain. Such incidences include France expelling
Imams who advocate wife beating and terrorism as reported by the BBC and Associated
Press (Jihad Watch April 21 2004 and May 21 2004). As is highlighted by articles in the
International Herald Tribune and BBC, discussing Britain’s insidious rise of Jihadist
movements, minimal political violence in France contrasts dramatically with that endured
by the UK. While France detains comparatively only 80 of proponents of radical Islam,
Britain’s security services claims to be monitoring the same type of violent activists by
the thousands.
Multiculturalism’s Nature Nurturing Violence:
The Rise of British jihadists
Minimal attachments possessed by Islamic minorities toward their resident state,
perpetuated by majorities imposing few requirements to adopt identities consistent with
prevailing values, correlates with violence, radicalization, and catastrophic terrorism.
Decline in the frequency of violence, reduced tendencies for Islamic populations to
become radicalized, and no further incidence of catastrophic terrorism correlates with
shifts in majority behaviors that compel Islamic minorities to more strongly identify with
political/societal attributes of their resident state.
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Weak national identities fuel Jihadist ambitions among radicalized Islamic
populations native to states that encourage societal tolerance and respect for cultural and
religious differences although contradictory to central values. Indifference toward the
animosity of Jihadists, as is directed by well-intentioned policies and societal mindsets of
multicultural democracies, permits tensions among radicalized Islamic populations to
become organized violent movements for political influence and control. Majority
models that allow minorities to embrace their differences, even if extreme and dangerous,
rather than call for their abandonment, position violent actors in opportune conditions for
successful execution of well organized Jihadist pursuits. This is regrettably evident in the
headline of the Economic Times highlighting Britain as the epicenter of Jihadist activity
in Europe.
Variable Justifications for Participation in Violence
Real and perceived justification for Islamic minority participation in violence
varies with majority behaviors directed toward resident Islamic populations. Majorities
obligating customization of religious and ethnic practices so they complement central
values remain less concerned with minority integration/assimilation than extensively
influencing if not controlling behaviors of religiously diverse populations. Priorities to
preserve state sovereignty, considered threatened upon heavy immigration, consumes the
political will of majorities aspiring to require minorities to invent a hybrid identity
reflecting both old and new mores. Adequate integration of immigrants and their
decedents, consequently, receives minimal attention. Minority discrimination/alienation,
resulting from majority assimilation practices dedicated to only preserving state
sovereignty rather than including immigrant minorities in economic and societal
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processes to an extent equal to that of majorities, potentially fuels minority participation
in political violence. France encounters risk to experience violence when minorities
perceive themselves as inferior and excluded.

Perceived Justification for Violence in France
Public opinion data suggests feelings of dissatisfaction possessed by French
Muslims. According to the findings of the pew research surveys, French Muslims are
more worried about unemployment and report having had a bad personal experience
more frequently than Muslims in Britain. Muslims in Britain, however, report in an
MORI poll conducted for the Sun that, “ they belong to Britain, feel apart of British
society, and believe they make valuable contributions to British society”. Justifications
for outbreaks of rioting in France revolve around needs for young immigrant
communities to achieve economic prosperity and social equality.
Perceived Justification for Violence in Britain:
“Mistreatment and Control” of Global Islamic Populations
Multicultural societies that permit ethno religious minorities to influence political
and societal processes not only accommodate but also meaningfully attempt integration
of ethnically distinct minorities. Despite grave disparities between minorities’ religious
compulsions and mainstream values. Minorities perceive, therefore, few justifications to
join in societal rebellion to achieve a more favorable status. Minority contributions to
violent movements in these societies, rather, emerge from their outrage over majority
occupation of lands considered exclusive of Islamic citizenship and Islamic minority
perceptions of occupation. Islamic minorities native to multiculturalist societies
sympathizing with the plight of their religious counterparts in distant lands before
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concerning themselves with the stability and security of their native state reflects weak
patriotic sentiments. Minimal national commitments possessed by Islamic minorities of
multiculturalist states result from the noble intentions of majorities to create
environments sensitive to and indicative of minorities prized religious and cultural
traditions.
British Muslims consider the “War on Terror” as a war against Islam (Travis).
Moreover, British Muslims maintain unfavorable views of Westerners compared to
Muslims of other European countries and believe that Western citizens are, “ selfish,
arrogant, greedy, and immoral” (Borger). Muslim attitudes in Britain more closely align
with opinions of Muslims in the predominantly Islamic States of Africa and Asia. Public
opinion data also reveals that Muslims in Britain consider Europeans more hostile to
Muslims compared to that of Muslims in France. These feelings persist despite French
Muslims reporting more bad personal experiences than Muslims residing in Britain (The
Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other). This unexpected reality
perhaps indicates that British Muslims believe Europeans mistreat Islamic adherents
abroad. British Muslims possess unfavorable views concerning Westerner’s treatment of
Muslims and involvement in the “War on Terror” despite the Saudi King, presiding over
one of the most conservative Muslim populations in the world, noting apathy on behalf of
the UK in the struggle against international terrorism (BBC Oct 29 2007).
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French Muslims also perceive Western and Israeli Occupation of dominant
Islamic Lands
Yet seem to reserve violence/societal disruption for political causes not
affiliated with this military advance despite French Involvement
French Muslims also extensively oppose Western occupation of Israel and
dominant Islamic lands but fail to engage in catastrophic domestic violence and pursue
radical agendas. France continues to experience a lack of institutionalized violence and
extremism despite French support of and contributions to the “War on Terror”.
According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, French Muslims oppose the “U.S.
War on Terrorism” and possess sympathies with the Palestinians to nearly the exact same
extent as British Muslims (Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about
Religious and Cultural Identity). Yet France has contributed extensively to “Operation
Enduring Freedom”. A report published by the Brookings institute establishes that, “
France responded to early U.S requests for help and deployed nearly 5,000 military
personnel to Central Asia, approximately the same number as the United Kingdom”
(Shapiro).
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Outbreaks of Severe Islamic Political Violence despite extensive French
contribution to the “War on Terror” remain to be experienced….
According to Pew Global Attitudes project Muslims in France largely oppose the
“War on Terror” and are overwhelmingly sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians
confronting Israeli “occupation”. Reports published by the Brookings institute, however,
discuss French involvement in the US led “War on Terror” and concludes that, “ French
forces have been present at nearly all phases of the operation…contributing almost a
quarter of the French Navy ” (Shapiro). Despite these sentiments and similar foreign
policies affecting international Islamic populations, France has yet to experience
domestic Islamic political violence comparable to Britain.
Minimal violence experienced in France suggests that catastrophic political
movements compelling policy change related to a state’s foreign agendas are not
advanced in democracies adopting assimilationist policies. Additionally, more severe
violence is specific to political movements demanding modifications of foreign policy
rather than those soliciting heightened prospects for economic inclusion.
Demands for control and Territorial Succession through Violence
Permitting maintenance of religious and cultural practices (even if contradictory
to prevailing democratic principles) facilitates enclaves of Islamic populations whose
revered traditions remain not only incompatible with existing societal and political trends
but continue to define their national identities. For instance, Islamic elitists in Britain
exhibit fierce determination to eventually fly the “flag of sharia” over Downing Street by
2020 (Daily Mail Online September 13 2008). Moreover, extremists groups active in
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Britain are relentless in their demands to create an Islamic state in Britain (Jihad Watch
July 20 2010).
Islam’s Place in Domestic Political Violence against Democratic
targets
Less severe and extreme forms of domestic Islamic violence occur in France,
rather than in Britain, despite the prevalence of societal and political conditions
theoretically considered to predispose political systems to political violence. These
conditions include: heightened ethno-religious inequality; alienation; discrimination; and
poverty. This reality reveals the unexpected vulnerabilities of Britain to experience
Jihadist violence associated with Islam’s unintended yet esteemed status and power in
British society and politics, perhaps as “accidently” realized by well-intentioned
multicultural models. The catastrophic forms of organized violence executed by BritishIslamic nationals in the July 2005 mass transient bombings and participation of BritishIslamic nationals in attacks against British military targets in majority Islamic states
mimic the overarching violent objectives of global Jihadist movements. Such movements
seek the termination of western military presence from Islamic homelands and political
dominance through random vehement acts.
Unrestricted practice of political Islamism in British society and politics, as an
inadvertent consequence of multicultural mindsets universal to British methods of
minority integration, creates conditions favorable to Islamic minority radicalization,
outrage, and domination. Couple minority indoctrination by political yet peaceful
Islamists advancing radical agendas with ethno-religious minorities’ intense desires for a
political landscape more indicative of very highly regarded religious prerogatives and
political change through organized religious violence remains inevitable.
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This is evident in the demands of radical Islamic leadership in Britain for
Muslims in the UK to be fruitful and multiply. Daily Mail Online reports that a hate
fanatic compels British Muslims to, “have more babies (so that) Muslims can take over
the UK. He further exclaims that, “it may be pure conversion that Britain will become an
Islamic State. We may never need to conquer it from the outside” (Daily Mail Online
September 13 2008). The same article also notes, promises on behalf of radical Islamists,
for a 9/11 styled attack in the UK. This hateful rhetoric reveals that extremist Muslim
forces remain steadfast in their objective to control Britain through violence.
Multicultural tendencies to respect the legitimate yet corrosive political
aspirations of minority groups, though certainties of deterioration to democratic values
prevail with their political success, determine the extent to which radical adherents of
Islam (though seeking change through legitimate and peaceful means) relate with
possibilities for devastation. Extremist rhetoric and ample opportunity to radicalize
otherwise peaceful Islamic populations relates to the vulnerabilities of Britain to
experience Islamic terrorism. Majorities consider the political expressions of Islamists
and their radical ambitions to undermine democracy, as acceptable and permissible under
the pretenses of tolerance and acceptance. Minority esteem and accommodation,
however, define the success of integration within multicultural democracies. These
majority attitudes, however, risk freedom and security because devastation and
catastrophic terrorism possibly associate with the sensitive state behaviors advanced in
multicultural societies.
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Catastrophic Violence Exclusive to more inclusive Democracies:
Discrepancies in Extremism between Democratic integration models
Emergence of a radicalized Islamic front in Britain remains a microcosm of the
tolerance and esteem of ethnic and religious differences considered integral to the success
of minority integration. A culture of acceptance, ultimately permitting advance of radical
Islam, possibly promotes successful integration but also facilitates opportunities to
practice religious extremism. Consequently, Iraq Prime minister observes that the,
“mosques in Britain are more extreme that the ones back home” (Blackburn Citizen Jan
2008). Non radical Muslims in Britain remain very concerned about the rise of extremism
in the UK. Islamic adherents residing in Britain are almost twice as concerned about
religious extremism in Britain than are their counterparts in France as determined by
polling data issued by Pew Research Center (In Great Britain, Muslims Worry About
Islamic Extremism).
Minority contest of discrimination, exclusion, and oppression correspond with a
potential for rebellion organized along social lines in democracies that ascribe to
assimilationist practices. Not more, however, than powerful religious radicals (as
permitted by the steadfast multicultural positions of democratic actors) manipulate
“favorable” political outcomes through cataclysmic violence. Islamic radicalization and
aggression is more likely in Britain where those subscribing to Islam enjoy preferential
treatment for the sake of their successful integration. Rather than is there the potential for
rioting, perpetrated by poor immigrants, in France, because of economic exclusion.
Britain’s multiculturalism practices repeatedly compromise the rights of the vast
majority of their non-Islamic citizens so to ensure that Islamic traditions remain
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uncompromised. Islamic political violence persists in Britain despite this preferential and
favorable treatment at a cost that is significant and burdensome to majorities. In
democracies’ where majorities’ rights matter less than the successful integration of
immigrant minorities (possessing deep commitments to Islam) experience systemic
political violence.
Preferential Treatment of Islamic Minorities
As indicated in the data, adequate integration of minorities, as aspired by
Multiculturalist democracies, sometimes compromises the rights of majorities though
considered “secure” via constitutional guarantees. An article in Muslim Weekly posits
that, “ Police stopped two Christian preachers handing out Bible extract in a Muslim area
of the West Midlands and accused them of a “hate crime” by allegedly trying to convert
Muslims” (Euro Islam Analysis June 12 2008). A Daily Express article conveys that,
“British banks are banning piggy banks because they may offend some Muslim’s” (Jihad
Watch October 25 2005). These examples highlight the curtailing of free speech in
Britain so to undermine behaviors exhibited by majorities considered offensive to
Britain’s Muslim populations. Societies promoting minority integration at the expense of
constitutional rights guaranteed to majorities remain vulnerable to experience Islamic
terrorism targeted at foreign policy manipulation and domestic political control.
Britain as the Target of Jihadist Violence rooted in Islamic Doctrine:
British nationals remain susceptible to jihadist violence. Terrorism rooted in
Islamic extremism threatens political stability in Britain. Violent measures in Britain
pursued by Jihadists advance political agendas designed to fight perceived injustice and
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achieve policy change conducive to religious prerogatives. Islamic political violence in
Britain promotes radical religious ideals that mandate populations, over whom Islamic
elites preside or extensively influence, to submit and abide by sharia law.
Britain encounters heightened Islamic terrorism despite equal guarantees of civil
liberties, means of economic mobilization, and preferential treatment granted to Islamic
minorities. Islamists’ aims for policy change and justice, in Britain, contradict freedom.
Jihadist movements, most regrettably even if unintentionally, advance at freedom’s
expense.
Islamic radicals seek to undermine British interests abroad through terrorist
strikes. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of Britain’s security service
MI 5, explains that, “ the UK has longstanding commercial, political and military links
with many countries in the Muslim world. Our involvement in the region is strongly
opposed by Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. This has resulted in British interests
and citizens abroad repeatedly being targeted by international terrorists” (MI-5 Security
Service). British military installments, consulates, educators, and nationals have been
targets in the violent political pursuits of global Jihadists in Islamic states.
Islamic terrorism also compromises domestic security. Dame Eliza ManninghamBuller also discusses that, “ international terrorism is a nationwide problem. Those
involved in international terrorism are not associated with any single area of the UK, and
individuals convicted of terrorist offences have lived in many different parts of the (UK).
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Terrorists have sought to target a variety of locations” (MI-5 Security Service). Several
incidences of domestic political violence including: the 7/7 bombings, attempted
bombings against mass transient systems, airport bombings, nightclub bombings, and
urban violence illustrate Britain’s expansive vulnerabilities to experience Jihadist
aggression perpetuated by British citizens.
Prospects for future incidence of Islamic political violence in the UK remains
significant. Dame Eliza Manningham- Buller exclaims that, “ between September 11
2001 and March 31 2010 : 237 individuals have been convicted of terrorism-related
offences including murder as well as illegal possession of firearms and explosives; 1,834
people have been arrested under the terrorism act; and 102 prisoners were classified as
terrorists 73 per cent of whom were UK nationals” ( MI-5 Security Service). UK’s law
enforcement community and security service agents thwarted many plots. The resolve of
UK’s jihadists, however, is only weakened when the determination of Britain to preserve
freedoms and democratic traditions match their overwhelming commitment to realize the
destruction of such.
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Rioting Youth in France Vs. Jihadist Operatives in Britain
If assimilationist models combatted the inequality accompanying policies
determined to only facilitate national interests among immigrant communities rather than
empower minorities’ economic and social mobilization, the young and rebellious Islamic
communities of France would have minimal justification or motivation to engage in
violence as a religious community. Islam minimally factors into the decisions of the
youth in France to participate in violence. Rationalizations for violence among Muslim
youths, rather, emerge from their strong sentiments to identify with France in both social
and economic aspects while maintaining their religious affiliations with Islamic doctrine.
Islam factors greatly in the rationalization of jihadist participants to act violently
against democratic residents that tolerate or accommodate the peaceful yet political
demands of influential Islamic elites. Choudray, a powerful Islamic leader in Britain,
promises that, “ You will know when the Muslims have ignited an insurrection when
there is blood on the streets of London and New York like there is blood on the streets of
Fallujah and Mumbai” (Daily Star).
Not that political tolerance or policy accommodation of legitimate yet
controversial religious demands cause violence, rather, such state behavior demonstrates
ambivalence toward a national identity conscious of democratic liberties. When state
actions undermine national interests, political expectations for ethno religious minorities
to then empathize with the same values (abandoned by official accommodating policies)
and assimilate remains politically impossible. Islamic minorities either politically or
violently motivated not assimilating, however, permits if not encourages sympathy and
political confidence in Jihadists determined to expel foreign influences from Islamic
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lands and establish a tyrannical global Islamic order through violence or political
victories.
More than alienation, discrimination and inequality as a product of assimilation
contribute to minorities’ calculations to pursue calamitous political violence,
“satisfactory” treatment of politically motivated Islamic radicals because of
multiculturalist conduct, fail to limit Muslim extremists’ participation in significant and
purposeful destruction for political interests. In societies overtly accommodating to
political Islam, organized violence is more severe, systemic, and extensively involves
religiously motivated actors. This trend suggests an association between the esteem of
political Islam and political violence of the most devastating and destructive kind
perpetrated by Jihadist activists.
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CONCLUSIONS
Democracies instinctively open their boarders to a myriad of ethnicities and
religious adherents who seek its benefits of a prosperous and free life. Consistent with
their beliefs that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are rights to which every
human is entitled, welcoming those deprived of such, and emigrating from totalitarian
homelands remains a moral obligation. Intense desires of liberalized states to extend
these rights to oppressed people through citizenship, however, accompanies challenges to
the very principles and values obligating them to maintain accessible boarders.
Assumptions held by democracies that those fleeing very desperate circumstances
will inevitably adopt senses of peace and patriotism out of gratitude for new found
freedom risks state sovereignty and security. Efforts of democratic societies to establish
national loyalties among immigrant minorities often negate constitutional guarantees.
Reservations of free states, however, not to mandate development of national identities
among immigrant minorities that ultimately conform ethnic and religious interests to the
values and principles necessary to sustain democratic practice results in native minority
populations feeling void of a homeland. Coupling apathy and disaffection among ethno
religious minorities with opportunities for change via healthy democratic function,
achievement of a political landscape more indicative of minorities’ highly regarded
religious and ethnic traditions remains likely.
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Integrating, assimilating, and ultimately fostering national attachments among
immigrant Islamic minorities and their sequential generations, whose cultural practices
conflict with status quo societal conduct and religious convictions dictate all aspects of
life, considerably challenge democracies considered equipped to manage such
complexities. Regardless of the dedications of liberalized host states to promote national
sentiments among generations of immigrants, dethatching communities from strict and
radical religious doctrine around which they revolve their entire lives remains exhaustive
if not impossible. When violent behaviors intend the advancement of religious interests,
convincing its organizers and participants to abandon their epistemological beliefs and
therefore violent activities, involves changing hearts and minds. Shifting ones priorities
from pursuing ingrained religious obligations requiring violence that undermines freedom
to loving and desiring freedom for all, is a task challenging to even the most “utopian”
societies.
When approaching life from religious perspectives, individuals’ mindsets focus
on eternal rather than momentary circumstances and they acknowledge their actions to
have forever consequences. If daily conduct determines eternal security, according to the
religious principles by which one abides, then no amount of debate, political discourse,
political proceedings, or compromise will likely convince adaptation of behaviors
contrary to a belief system promising “absolute perfection” beyond this God given life.
Majority behaviors directed toward Islamic minorities then reduce rather than eliminate
prospects of violent political change.
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Jihadist Strategy: accessing Freedom to Undermine and Eradicate
Freedom
One person’s terrorist is not always another’s freedom fighter. Never is this a
reality, when in fact, a terrorists’ ambitions involve the advancement of the global
Jihadist cause. Islamists have left the world with no illusions that their political ends,
achieved through violence, include a population’s full subscription to Sharia Law and
complete submission to the dictates of “Allah”. Jihadists’ desires to rule by force and
violently solicit one’s commitment to Islam. This is evident both in the fact that: in lands
where Islamists currently reign supreme personal freedom is completely restricted and
violence is the hallmark of their aspirations to control lands absent their authoritative
leadership.
Free states are, therefore, neither obstructing freedom nor providing legitimate
justifications for Jihadists’ participation in violence when their measures, however
perceivably insensitive or inconsistent with democratic conduct, intend the survival of
liberty against assaults targeted at its demise on behalf of Jihadist actors. The radical
Islamic operatives, who strategically enlist democratic qualities in their violent efforts,
promise extinction of democratic ideals. Combatting Jihadists’ advances, therefore,
involves a Free State’s fierce commitment to the longevity of democratic principles and
republican traditions without regard for the offense they potentially cause to those who
ultimately seek liberties’ demise.
Ensuring the survival of freedom requires a commitment to uphold principles that
guarantee liberty among capable and willing democracies to an extent that trumps the
desires of Jihadists to unravel institutionalized democratic processes. They strategically
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procure, the freedoms to which they are privy, in their destructive endeavors. Ironically
guarantees of liberty are means through which Jihadists violently endeavor to achieve its
eradication. The very freedoms that have facilitated prosperity and individual agency to
levels that remains unprecedented in human history.
Policies and societal models, advanced to effectively assimilate/integrate Islamic
minorities, must account for minority attachment to national interests. This is of a
particular challenge to consolidated democracies that inherently seek the accommodation
of very diverse populations. Ethnic and religious affections, however, corrupting desires
for a strong national identity among Islamic populations native to democracies certainly
compromises state security and erodes sovereignty because of their strong sentiments and
convictions to advance Islam rather than preserve freedom. Disallowing religious
practices contradicting democratic ideals, dissolving barriers that hinder
assimilation/integration, and societal conduct reflecting an overwhelming dedication to
the maintenance of republican principles, however, considerably lessens
demands/motives for violence because of blatant majority actions to foster national
commitments among Islamic minorities.
Democratic states whose native Islamic populations possess few national loyalties
combined with those populations perceiving justification to exact change through
violence remain likely to experience Islamic political movements founded in aggression.
The national identities assumed by Islamic minorities residing in democracies factor
greatly into prospects for violence in liberalized states.
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The Unintended Consequences of well-intentioned democratic policies
Nationalist movements aiming to alter political functions occur in liberalized
states other than for the most obvious preconditions of violent movements: an absence of
freedom. Outcomes of such movements in free societies, as in illiberal societies, depend
upon behaviors of the state. In democracies, however, one person’s terrorist is another’s
meaningful channel to accomplish favorable political change despite legitimate
alternatives provided by constitutional guarantees and at the disposal of such.
Violence is less severe and less prevalent in democratic societies where
justifications for violence are predominantly considered more significant. More than
inequality, discrimination, alienation, and poverty democracies determine possibilities of
violence, majority behaviors that esteem immigrant minorities and welcome
their political and societal influence (even if vastly different from the
mainstream), however noble, greatly affect opportunities for Islamic radicalization and
political violence.
From this perspective western societies endorsing multiculturalism incentivize
violence. Violent ambitions of participants in Jihad very possibly achieve political
influence or domination in the contexts of societies who are receptive of their prized
religious principles that obligate political change consistent with religious laws. In this
respect, multicultural societies may experience the most violent, spectacular, and
devastating forms of Islamic terrorism, diverse versions of Islamic radicalization across
their populations, and remain very vulnerable to future incidents of Islamic political
aggression. Multiculturalism’s societal and political conduct, concerning domestic and
international Islamic adherents, facilitates circumstances optimal and appropriate for the
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advance of political Islam. Such threats remain especially considerable if participants in
Islamic political violence regard the preferential treatment of Islamic citizens, extended
by multiculturalist democracies, as a form of highly sought influence or domination.
Western societies ascribing to assimilation models for national identity
construction also compels Islamic violent contest, as determined by this study, but less
extensively. Assimilationist models prioritize the development of strong national ties of
minorities over that of Islamic residents’ integration. Struggles for national identity
formulation compatible with democratic ideals complicate ethno-religious minorities’
role in political and societal landscapes. Assimilationist perspectives advanced in free
states disallow change favoring minorities’ religious or ethnic attachments. Minority
feelings of alienation and discrimination ensue and create environments favorable to
outbreaks of minority rebellion, which indicate a lack of minority integration despite
unwavering national loyalties.
Numbers of willing participants in violent or rebellious movements perhaps
remain an unfortunate manifestation of the opportune capitalization on the misfortune or
feelings of misfortune of Islamic populations by radical Islamic leadership. Absent
incentives or motivations for Islamic political violence perpetrated by majority behaviors
in democracies, a need to exploit the circumstances facing global Islamic communities so
to oblige aggression remains less vital to causes of political Islam. Without demands for
violence to promote political Islam, supplies of willing actors to engage in such dissipate.
Without supplies of participants feeling warranted to use violence and motivated by
majority behaviors, the democratic conditions that rationalize violent behavior becomes a
political challenge of much less significance. Majorities potentially reduce rational
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choices to engage in violence by requiring domestic ethno religious minorities to adapt to
the culture, society, and political makeup of the democracy receiving them rather than
conforming the recipient democracy to highly regarded religious and ethnic compulsions
of immigrant communities.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Jihadist Movements Protesting Freedom
Proponents of democracy assume that political violence occurs because every one
wants to be free and perceive oppressed individuals to aggressively pursue change for
independence. Welcoming subjugated populations into free societies from this
perspective significantly minimizes need for violent expression. What if, however, people
thought to be fleeing oppression in reality do not want to be free? Perhaps migration from
oppressive homelands dictated by strict Islamic principles is less about being free from
obligatory religious conduct and more about being privy to economic incentives
accompanying liberty. Maybe prospects of successfully combining the benefits of living
in wealthy free market societies and political functions complimentary of Islam fail to
deter if not compels migration from desperate circumstances although consistent with
strict adherence to Islamic doctrine.
Inquiry into disparities of economic status of generations of immigrants from
Islamic states residing in free societies and their counterparts native to homelands of
ancestral emigration potentially credits economic opportunity rather than desires to be
free with past changes of residence. Countless research correlates mass economic
desperation with overwhelming absence of freedom. Because both fail to largely exist in
recent Islamic residences, determination of whether better economic circumstances drive
migration over requirements for freedom potentially explains the violent objectives of
Islamic immigrant minorities and successive generations to make their liberalized
residence less free and more consistent with Islamic law.
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Compatibility of Islam and Democracy
Additional exploration of the compatibility of Islam and democracy further
identifies motivations for violence among immigrant Islamic residents of free societies.
This relationship illuminates whether strict Islamic adherents can peacefully inhabit free
societies. This research demonstrates challenges among free states determined foster
national identities because of potential desires of radical Islamic populations to violently
undermine freedom regardless of successful integration.
Theological assessment of Islamic doctrine demonstrates Islamic minorities’
violent reactions despite political avenues for peaceful alternatives. Integrating minority
religious perspectives into models explaining Islamic political violence as a consequence
of majority behavior reveals whether religious considerations compel violent responses to
majority behavior irrespective of accomplished integration/assimilation of Islamic
minorities.
Majority Approaches toward Islamic Minority Populations and
Counterterrorism Measures
Do policies and societal behaviors seeking the integration or assimilation of
Islamic minorities relate with counterterrorism procedures adopted by democratic
societies to combat terrorism? Determining the relationship between majority efforts to
integrate or assimilate Islamic minorities and counterterrorism policies assists in isolating
majority behaviors as a causal mechanism of Islamic political violence in democratic
societies. If counterterrorism measures in multiculturalist societies are more
comprehensive and rigorous than those adopted by assimilationist democracies yet
Islamic terrorism occurs in its most destructive and severe forms, then multiculturalist
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tendencies not only significantly factor into the likelihood of a democratic society to
experience catastrophic forms of terrorism but also may cause such phenomena.
Others opt out of Violence
Why do ethnic minorities, other than those adhering to Islamic doctrine,
native to Western European democracies and therefore subject to the same majority
treatment as their Islamic minority counterparts opt out of violence? Exploration of this
discrepancy potentially determines to what extent the violent reactions of Islamic
minorities to majority behaviors are perpetuated by religious commitments. Ascertaining
reasons for divergences in minority reactions clarifies whether religious mandates initiate
and sustain violent movements.
Scholarly Debate over the Relationship between
State Behavior and Islamic Political Violence
Differing scholarly views regarding the likelihood of free states to experience
terrorism raises questions about which aspects of democratic function promote or reduce
prospects for violent behavior among native non-state actors in democracies.
Approaching such an inquiry from a comprehensive theoretical assessment promises to
develop a composite model capable of identifying the determinants of political violence
in free societies. Accounting for various theoretical mechanisms explaining the risks of
liberalized states to encounter political violence endorsed by their own citizens, therefore,
requires empirical attention to the scholarly advancements attempting to understand the
prevalence of violence among non-state actors extended political liberties.
Most studies relating regime type with occurrences of political violence, as
concluded by Fox and Sandler, focus minorities’ responses to state behavior and any
examination of the influence and characteristics of the majorities receives secondary
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attention. Fox and Sandler promote that many, “ analyses do not examine how
democracies treat minorities” (Fox/Sandler 471). Future terrorism/state behavior
inquiries necessitates, as Piazza suggests, a re evaluation of regime type indicators as
predictors of terrorism as opposed to just accounting for the status of political rights or
levels of political participation enjoyed by minorities (347). Crenshaw realizes that
prospective scientific research attending to political violence should necessarily
demonstrate to what extent patterns of terrorism result from government decision-making
processes (406). The following research evaluates not the responses of violent actors
representing often-marginal subnational constituencies to the conditions and processes of
democratic states to which they are subject but rather behaviors of democratic societies
and government elites directed toward minority groups forging the political and societal
paradigms out of which violent actors emerge.
Measuring Genuine National Attachment
Gaps between policy preference, their practice, and success, prescribed by
assimilation or multicultural frameworks, perhaps demonstrates a lack of genuine
attachment to the state possessed by Islamic minorities or their restricted access to
societal, economic, and political processes. Policy successes as defined by Islamic
minorities being undifferentiated from majorities, directing sincere affections toward the
state, or being privy to equal opportunities in the social, economic, or political spheres
can be determined through a quantitative analysis merging measures provided by
Queen’s University Multicultural Index, European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index,
and the European Social Survey. These data sets and indices, through quantitative
analysis, not only produce statistical results capable of determining the extent to which a
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democracy practices Assimilation over Multiculturalism but also proves statistical
significance (or lack there of) concerning political success of objectives pursued through
policies to either forge strong national interests possessed by ethno religious minorities or
completely integrate them into social, political, and economic domains.
Opportunities for Manipulating and Capitalizing on Emotions
While this evaluation of societal conditions and political processes highlight
justifications minorities derive for participation in violence it vaguely ruminates over the
discrepancies’ between real and perceived reasons legitimizing violence. Further analysis
promises a deeper understanding of the extent that religious elites capitalize on the mis
perceptions of ethno-religious minorities to advance violent movements. Additional
research could detail to what degree radical religious leaders exploit the circumstances of
Islamic minorities to establish justification for participation in violence. Insight into this
potential also demonstrates the likelihood of ethnically fragmented minorities to still
engage in violence absent of a fierce commitment to Islam.
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APPENDIX I METHODOLOGIES FOR DATA SETS
Data set measuring Independent Variable
Section I: Queens University Multicultural Index
Data Set Measuring Dependent Variable
Section II: START Global Terrorism Data Base
Data Sets measuring Causal Mechanisms
Section III: Islamic Radicalization Index
Section IV: Minorities at Risk- Causal Mechanism: Status of Minorities
Section V: French National Identity and Integration, Who belongs to the national
community? - Causal Mechanism; perceptions of discrimination/alienation held by
Minorities’
Section VI: Living Apart Together, Policy Exchange Report chapter 6- Causal
Mechanism; perceptions of discrimination/alienation held by minorities’
Section VII: European Citizenship and Inclusion index- Causal Mechanism; varying
political objectives pursued through Violence
Section VIII: Freedom in the World- Causal Mechanism; Status of Civil liberties and
opportunities for violence
Section IX: Pew Global Attitudes Project- Causal Mechanisms; National Priorities
assumed by Islamic Minorities
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Data Sets Demonstrating Proportion of Multiculturalism, Inclusion,
Integration, Civil liberties, National priorities among Islamic Minorities,
and Islamic Political Violence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Queens University Multicultural Index
START Global Terrorism Data Base
European Citizenship and Inclusion Index
Migrant Integration Policy Index
Pew Global Attitudes Project- Muslims’ perceptions of nationality

Section X: Migrant Integration Policy Index
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Section I:
Measures of Multiculturalism:
Queens University Multicultural Index
Queen’s University MCP Index for Immigrant Minorities is intended to track the extent
of this multicultural shift over the past three decades, by examining the adoption of the
following eight policies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism;
Adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum;
Inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or
media licensing;
Exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc;
Allowing dual citizenship;
Funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities;
Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;
Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups

"Multiculturalism Policy Index, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/ 23 June 2012.
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Section II
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was developed to be a comprehensive,
methodologically robust set of longitudinal data on incidents of domestic and
international terrorism. Its primary purpose is to enable researchers and analysts to
increase understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. The GTD is specifically
designed to be amenable to the latest quantitative analytic techniques used in the social
and computational sciences.
Scope of Data
The GTD was designed to gather a wide variety of etiological and situational variables
pertaining to each terrorist incident. Depending on availability of information, the
database records up to 120 separate attributes of each incident, including approximately
75 coded variables that can be used for statistical analysis. These are collected under
eight broad categories, as identified in the GTD Codebook, and include, whenever
possible:
Incident date
Region
Country
State/province
City
Latitude and longitude (beta)
Perpetrator group name
Tactic used in attack
Nature of the target (type and sub-type, up to three targets)
Identity, corporation, and nationality of the target (up to three nationalities)
Type of weapons used (type and sub-type, up to three weapons types)
Whether the incident was considered a success
If and how a claim(s) of responsibility was made
Amount of damage, and more narrowly, the amount of United States damage
Total number of fatalities (persons, United States nationals, terrorists)
Total number of injured (persons, United States nationals, terrorists)
Indication of whether the attack is international or domestic
Other variables provide information unique to specific types of cases, including
kidnappings, hostage incidents, and hijackings.
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Sources
Information in the GTD is drawn entirely from publicly available, open-source materials.
These include electronic news archives, existing data sets, secondary source materials
such as books and journals, and legal documents. All information contained in the GTD
reflects what is reported in those sources. While the database developers attempt, to the
best of their abilities, to corroborate each piece of information among multiple
independent open sources, they make no further claims as to the veracity of this
information. Users should not infer any additional actions or results beyond what is
presented in a GTD entry and specifically, users should not infer an individual associated
with a particular incident was tried and convicted of terrorism or any other criminal
offense. If new documentation about an event becomes available, an entry may be
modified, as necessary and appropriate.
As discussed in more detail below, the first phase of data for the GTD (GTD1: 19701997) was collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS)—a private
security agency. Cases that occurred between 1998 and March 2008 were identified and
coded by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), in partnership with
START. A third data collection phase was instituted for cases that occurred between
April 2008 and October 2011, with efforts led by the Institute for the Study of Violent
Groups (ISVG) at the University of New Haven. Beginning with cases that occurred in
November 2011, GTD data collection is done by START staff at the University of
Maryland. In addition, GTD researchers have worked to supplement information on
additional cases throughout the full duration of the GTD.
In addition to data originally collected by PGIS, CETIS, and ISVG, cases identified in
other archives of terrorism incidents have also been incorporated, including:
Global terrorism incident data provided by Alex P. Schmid, Director of the Terrorism
Research Initiative (TRI). We thank Prof. Schmid for allowing us to draw from
databases he developed in the course of his career in academia and in the United
Nations.
Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda and other
Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa, by Yonah Alexander
Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America, by Christopher Hewitt
the Conflict Archive on the Internet
the Australian Turkish Media Group and, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, Present, the
Prospects, by Francis Hyland
Further Submissions and Responses by the ANC to Questions Raised by
the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 12 May 1997
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Section III

Indicators for the
Prospects of Minority
Radicalization

•

Britain: Islamic Radicalization in the UK

•

France: Islamic Radicalization in France

Islamic Radicalization Index (IRI)
International Institute for Counter Terrorism
http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/IslamicRadicalizationIndexIRI/tabid/379/Default.aspx

•

Media Headlines demonstrating Minority Radicalization

Islamic Radicalization Index Methodology
The IRI includes articles, essays, opinion pieces and briefing notes, written by ICT Staff, Fellows and
Interns dealing both with theory and empiricism of Islamic radicalization. These reports seek to
demonstrate, within the confines of national borders, how, why and by whom Islamic radicalization is
proliferating in each nation-state. Ultimately, it is the purpose of the ICT to offer the international
community a new outlet that seeks to discuss and educate the growing issue of Islamic radicalization in the
West.
Bigot, Adèle. "Islamic Radicalization in France." International Institue for Counter Terrorism. International
Institute for Counter Terrorism. Web. 12 Aug 2013.
Wojtowicz, Anna. "Islamic Radicalization in theUK: Islamic Radicalization Index ." International Institute for
Counter Terrorism. International Institue for Counter Terrorism, n.d. Web. 12 Aug 2013.
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Section IV
Minorities At Risk: Methodology
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project is a university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the
status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at
least 500,000

MAR tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present -identifying where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses specifically on
ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary
world because of their status and political actions. Political significance is determined by the following two
criteria:
A: The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment via-vis other
groups in a society
B: The group is the basis for political mobilizationand collective action in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests
The centerpiece of the project is a dataset that tracks groups on political, economic, and cultural
dimensions. The project also maintains analytic summaries of group histories, risk assessments, and group
chronologies for each group in the dataset
The minority group assessments consist of two parts: a risk assessment and an analytic summary. The risk
assessment summarizes whether the group is at risk of rebellion, protest, or repression, based on levels of a
number of other variables. The analytic summary gives a brief history of the group and its relations with the
state. The group's values on key variables from the dataset are embedded within both components.
Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
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Section V
French National Identity and Integration, Who belongs to the National Community?
Section III pgs. 9-12
French Identity and Integration Methodology:
This report analyzes a unique data set from the largest survey ever conducted in France on ethnic
minorities. One that asks questions about dual nationality, feelings of national belonging,
French”), and “feeling at home” in France. TeO was conducted in metropolitan France between
September 2008 and February 2009 using a sample of 22,000 people. Respondents were divided
into five subsamples, representing:
•

Immigrants14 (8,500)

•

Descendants of immigrants (8,200)

•

French migrants from overseas departments (DOMs)15 (650)

•

The descendants of DOM migrants, born in mainland France (750)

•

Persons born in mainland France without an immigrant background, from two
generations (3,600)

The census records citizenship in three categories that are mutually exclusive: French citizen at
birth, French citizen by acquisition (including second generations born in France), and foreigners.
Because data on multiple nationalities simply do not exist in official records, the TeO survey is
the main source of information on dual nationality.
This report analyzes the identity patterns of immigrants and their descendants, focusing on how
these relate to French national identity. We rely here on self-declaration by respondents.
Simon, P. French national identity and integration: Who belongs to the national community? Migration Policy Institute N.p.. Web. 12
Aug2013.<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FrenchIdentity.pdf>
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Section VI
Living Apart Together, Policy Exchange report
Chapter 6
Methodology
This report explores the attitudes of Muslims in Britain today and the reasons why there
has been a significant rise in Islamic fundamentalism amongst the younger generation. It
argues that the growth of Islamism in the UK is not solely a foreign problem, but
something that must be understood in relation to political and social trends that have
emerged in British society over the past two decades. It also examines the impact of
public policy on the Muslim population and suggests that the way Government is
responding to Islamism is making things worse not better.
Mirza, Munira, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja'far. "Living Apart Together." . Polciy Exchange, n.d. Web. 12 Aug 2013.
<www.policyexchange.org.uk>.
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Section VII
European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index: Methodology
Method: The Member States’ policies were compared to a common normative framework. The normative
framework sets out a formulation of the basis for immigrant inclusion, which argues that immigrant
inclusion requires:1.Labour Market Inclusion 2.Family Reunion 3. Long Term Residence 4.Naturalization
and 5.Anti-Discrimination. In each of these ﬁve areas, a number of speciﬁc policy indicators were
developed, and each Member State scored against each policy indicator. The indicators were based on the
existing commitments of Member States to give immigrants rights and obligations comparable to EU
citizens. There are almost 100 policy indicators. The data to score the EU-15 against the policy indicators
was collected from migration experts in the EU-15.
Index Structure: The Index sets out a formulation of inclusion based on labor market inclusion and civic
citizenship. It sets out a comprehensive set of policies that Member States can use to facilitate immigrant
inclusion. Inclusion requires more than just access to the labor market. Work is not enough – for
immigrants to be included successfully into society, they need to feel secure, and to feel that their
contribution over time is valued. The policies that can create these favorable conditions over the long term
are in the areas of labor market inclusion, long term residence; family reunion; naturalization and antidiscrimination. Together, long-term residence, family reunion, naturalization and anti-discrimination
contribute to what is often called ‘civic citizenship.’
Scoring System: To summarize - the Index is built up from almost 100 indicators.
Each country is given a score of 1, 2 or 3 for each indicator depending on which option - least favorable,
less favorable or favorable – is selected. The indicators are grouped into ﬁve strands (Labour Market
Inclusion, Long-Term Residence, Family Reunion, Naturalization, Anti-Discrimination).Within each of the
ﬁve strands, the indicators are divided into four dimensions. The four dimensions are consistent across the
ﬁve strands as far as possible.
To allow us to analyze the results usefully, we have calculated averages and indices from the numerous,
complicated indicator results collected. The strand average per country is calculated as the average of all
the indicators in the strand. So, for each country, there are ﬁve strand averages.
The dimension average per country per strand is calculated as the mean of all the indicators in the
dimension, in the strand. So, for each country, there are four dimension averages per strand. Note– The
strand average is NOT the mean of the four
Geddes, Andrew, Jan Niessen, Richard Gowan, and Laura Citron. European Civic Citizenship and
Inclusion Index. Brussels: British Council Brussels, 2005. Print.
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VIII
Freedom in the World Methodology
The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the state of global
freedom as experienced by individuals. The survey measures freedom-the opportunity to
act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other
centers of potential domination-according to two broad categories: political rights and
civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process,
including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete
for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who
have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate Civil
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.

The methodology of the survey is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil
liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. These standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of
geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic
development. The survey operates from the assumption that freedom for all peoples is
best achieved in liberal democratic societies.

Scores – The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and
15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three
subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4),
and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four
subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and
Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual
Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a
score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties
present. The political rights section also contains two additional discretionary questions:
question A (For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the
system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public
discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is
the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a
country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of
another group?). For additional discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may be added,
as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be subtracted (the
worse the situation, the more that may be subtracted). The highest score that can be
awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10
questions). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a
total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions).
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The scores from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the current year
under review. In general, a score is changed only if there has been a real world
development during the year that warrants a change (e.g., a crackdown on the media, the
country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in the narrative.
In answering both the political rights and civil liberties questions, Freedom House does
not equate constitutional or other legal guarantees of rights with the on-the-ground
fulfillment of these rights. While both laws and actual practices are factored into the
ratings decisions, greater emphasis is placed on the latter.
For states and territories with small populations, the absence of pluralism in the political
system or civil society is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the
government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking its operation. For
example, a small country without diverse political parties or media outlets or significant
trade unions is not penalized if these limitations are determined to be a function of size
and not overt restrictions.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings – The total score awarded to the
political rights and civil liberties checklist determines the political rights and civil
liberties rating. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the
lowest level of freedom, corresponds to a range of total scores (see tables 1 and 2).
“Freedom in the World.” Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 June 2012. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedomworld>.
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Section IX
The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project conducts public opinion surveys
around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people’s assessments of their
own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the
day. Nearly 400,000 interviews in 63 countries have been conducted as part of the
project’s work.

Methodological Appendix: Results for the survey are based on telephone and faceto-face interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research
Associates International, which manages the fieldwork conducted by local research
organizations in each country. All surveys are based on national samples except in China,
India, and Pakistan, where the sample was disproportionately or exclusively urban.

For results based on the full sample in a given country, one can say with 95% confidence
that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus the
margin of error. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question
wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into
the findings of opinion polls.

Great Britain Sample design: Probability Mode: Telephone adults 18
plus Languages: English, Urdu, and Arabic Fieldwork dates: April 4-26, 2006 Sample
size: 902 including a 412 Muslim oversample; general public sample is weighted to be
representative of the overall population Margin of Error: 6% for general public; 6% for
Muslim oversample Representative: Telephone households
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France Sample design: Quota Mode: Telephone adults 18 plus Languages:
French Fieldwork dates: April 5-19, 2006 Sample size: 905 including a 400 Muslim
oversample; general public sample is weighted to be representative of the overall
population Margin of Error: 4% for general public; 5% for Muslim
oversample Representative: Telephone households

242

Section X
Migrant Integration Policy Index
 MIPEX is a fully interactive tool and reference guide to assess, compare and
improve integration policy.
 MIPEX measures integration policies in all European Union Member States up to
31 May 2010.
Methodology:
•

There are 148 policy indicators on migrant integration in the MIPEX. These have
been designed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest
standards through consultations with top scholars and institutions using and
conducting comparative research in their area of expertise.

•

A policy indicator is a question relating to a specific policy component of one of
the 7 policy areas. For each answer, there are 3 options. The maximum of 3 points
is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment.

•

Within each of the 7 policy areas, the indicator scores are averaged together to
give one of 4 dimension scores which examine the same aspect of policy. The 4
dimension scores are then averaged together to give the policy area score for each
of the 7 policy areas per country which, averaged together one more time, lead to
the overall scores for each country. In order to make rankings and comparisons,
the initial 1, 2, 3 scale is converted into a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and
policy areas, where 100% is the top score.

"Migrant Integration Policy Index | MIPEX." Migrant Integration Policy Index | MIPEX.
Outcomes for Policy Change, n.d. Web. 23 June 2012. <http://www.mipex.eu/>.
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APPENDIX II: MEASURES OF MULTICULTURALISM IN BRITAIN AND
FRANCE
Multiculturalism in Britain: according to Queen’s University
Multicultural Index
1.

Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary
affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and / or
regional and municipal levels and the existence of a
government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to
implement this policy in consultation with ethnic
communities

No

Evidence:
• Although multiculturalism in Britain is typically recognized as a demographic fact, it has not been formally affirmed
in any constitutional, legislative or parliamentary sense. Indeed, discourse tends to shy away from the use of the term
“multiculturalism” and leans instead toward that of cohesion and integration.
• Nonetheless, there has been much activity within this area. For example, in 2001, a series of racialized incidents in
Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford led to the creation of a review team on community cohesion (Home Office 2001).
This, coupled with the London terrorist attacks of 7 July 2005, has contributed to a discourse that focuses primarily on
communities. In 2005, the British government launched Improving Opportunity/ Strengthening Society, a strategy to
“increase race equality and build community cohesion by helping people from different backgrounds to get along well
together in their local area” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009a), which concluded in 2009. At
that time, the government announced a new strategy, Tackling Race Inequalities, which engaged in a number of
consultations. The consultations will inform the government’s continuing race equality strategy, and a report was
expected in
2010 (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009b).
• Although several government agencies have mandates related to multiculturalism, the Department for Communities
and Local Government is probably most directly involved, as it is responsible for “building cohesion” and “tackling
anti-social behaviour and extremism” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2010). In addition, the
Equality and Human Rights Commission, a statutory body created in 2007 has responsibility for issues related to
equity, discrimination and human rights. It replaced the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial
Equality, and the(Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009).
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2.

The adoption of multiculturalism in school
curriculum

Partially

Evidence:
• Rhetoric related to multiculturalism education has been present since the 1970s, but national policy has been less
evident, given that education is a delegated responsibility. The National Curriculum Council, which was created as a
result of the 1988 Education Reform Act, recommended multicultural and citizenship education be developed as part of
the wider curriculum. This was never adopted (Figueroa 2007). Nonetheless, a 1985 report, Education For All, did
recommend increased attention toward Britain’s “shared values” within school curriculum, as well as “an appreciation
of the diversity of lifestyles and cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds which make up this society and the wider
world” (Swann 1985). By the early 1990s, most local boards had integrated multiculturalism into their curriculum
(Bleich 1998).

• Although responsibility for the delivery of education and curriculum continues to be delegated to local authorities, the
Department for Children, Schools and Families, which was created in 2007, does set broader policy. It is guided by The
Children’s Plan: Building Brighter Futures which, among other things, places on schools a duty to promote community
cohesion, in addition to diversity, human rights and equity. Consistent with broader discourse in the UK,
“multiculturalism” is generally not used in policy documents. Nonetheless, The Children’s Plan highlights citizenship
education as a central part of the strategy. The curriculum is to include “a new strand of work examining the key
concepts of identity and diversity and encouraging exploration of what it means to be a citizen in the UK today”
(Department for Children, Schools and Families 2007, 73-74).

• In addition, the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) “requires [local authorities] to eliminate discrimination and
promote equal opportunities, as well as develop race equality policies in a proactive rather than a reactive way, as had
previously been the case” (Fry et al. 2008, 7; see also Tomlinson 2005).
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3.

The inclusion of ethnic representation / sensitivity
in the mandate of public media

Yes

Evidence:
• Prior to the 1980s, there was little attention paid to ethnic representation in the media, and it was partly in response to
criticism that several initiatives were undertaken. These focused mainly on the training of white journalists and
producers, as well as increasing the employment of minorities in the media sector (Alibhai-Brown 1998). A 1983
report by the Commission for Racial Equality, entitled Ethnic Minority Broadcasting, encouraged networks to look
more seriously at media content so that it may “help to reflect our multi-racial society” (Zolf 1989).
• At present, the Communications Act 2003 mandates the Office of Communications (OFCOM) to regulate electronic
communications networks, including broadcasting, radio and television. In carrying out these duties, section 3(3)(l) of
the act requires that OFCOM consider “the different interests of persons in the different parts of the United Kingdom,
of the different ethnic communities within the United Kingdom and of persons living in rural and in urban areas.”
OFCOM has produced research that examines media literacy and consumption by ethnic minorities.
• In addition, the BBC, which is the country’s public service broadcaster and is funded through a license fee paid by all
households in the United Kingdom, includes among its objectives the representation and reflection of various
communities, including ethnic and religious communities. The corporation notes that “programming will reflect the
diversity of the UK and explore ethnic, cultural, religious and non-religious groups, enabling the wider community to
understand their customs, convictions and concerns” (BBC 2010a). This may include “using voices and faces from a
range of regional and ethnic backgrounds and communities of interest, and [featuring] religion and ethics as part of its
genre mix” (ibid.). Further, “minority religions in the UK (and including the major belief systems of Judaism,
Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam and Buddhism) as well as secular beliefs will receive mainstream coverage” (ibid.).

4.

Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or
court cases)

Yes although there is variation

Evidence:
• There is a fairly long history of granting exemptions to dress codes in the UK. This dates back at least to the Race
Relations Act 1976, which prohibited indirect discrimination. As a result, even seemingly neutral laws may be deemed
to be discriminatory if their application results in differential outcomes. Some of the exemptions that have been granted
include those permitting Sikhs to wear a turban in lieu of a safety helmet while on a construction site (Employment Act
1989), in addition to those that exempt Sikhs from the requirement to wear a helmet while on a motorcycle (Motor
Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption)
Act 1976). Similarly, exemptions to the uniforms for bus drivers have been granted to permit the wearing of a turban
and a long beard (BBC 2010b), and the uniform of the Metropolitan Police Service was adapted in 2001 to include the
hijab as an option (Hopkins 2001).

• There are also cases where exemptions have not been granted. These include the case of a Muslim woman who was
employed as a bilingual support worker in a West Yorkshire school but was prevented from wearing her veil while
teaching. She filed a grievance, and while a tribunal awarded her damages for pain and suffering, it upheld the policy.
For its part, the school noted that the woman’s job as a bilingual support worker requires face-to-face interaction and
the wearing of a veil that conceals the mouthinterferes with learning (McLaren 2006).
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5.

Allows dual citizenship

Yes

Evidence:
• The UK has long allowed citizens to possess dual or multiple citizenships. Those who acquire British nationality are
not normally required by the UK to renounce any other citizenships they may hold, and British nationals who acquire
the citizenship of another country British citizenship (Home Office 2010; see also Howard 2005).

6.

The funding of ethnic group organizations or
activities

Yes

Evidence:
• Funding for ethnic group organizations and activities was first initiated in the mid-1980s when
the Arts Council of Britain began to target ethnic communities as beneficiaries of its resources.
Although these opportunities gradually decreased in the 1990s (Fisher et al. 1994), the Home
Office’s Ethnic Minority Grant Program came into effect in 1992, offering funding to ethnic
groups to support voluntary sector projects in England and Wales; a similar program was also set
up in Scotland (Karim 1996).
• The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) also at one time provided funding to ethnocultural
groups, but this does not appear to have continued after the CRE was reorganized into the
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in 2007. Rather, the EHRC’s focus appears to
be much more closely related to legislative compliance and the promotion of equality than to the
funding and support of ethnocultural groups.
Now, the UK’s Big Lottery Fund, which was created by Parliament in 2006, disburses money
raised through the sale of lottery tickets in the country. Through the Big Lottery Fund and a
smaller program, Awards For All, various charities, community groups and schools can apply for
grants to support local projects. The criteria are very broad and identify eligible projects as those
that will improve life chances, build stronger communities and more active citizens, improve
rural and urban environments and contribute to healthier communities (Big Lottery Fund 2010).
A number of ethnic groups have received funding through this program.
Other granting programs require organizations to meet specific criteria, which are typically
related to the delivery of programs that meet established government criteria. For example, in
2009, the government created a two-year program, called the Tackling Race Inequalities Fund,
which provides grants to eligible organizations whose programming relates to the promotion of
race equality and redress of disadvantage
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2009c). In order to qualify for funding,
groups must meet specific criteria and deliver programs that meet the objectives set by the
government. There is also an Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant, which is not specifically
designed for ethnocultural groups, but rather for schools and local authorities engaged in
strategies to address disparities between minority and non-minority pupils (Qualifications and
Curriculum Development Agency 2010).
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7.

The funding of bilingual education or mothertongue instruction

NO

Evidence:
• The school system in the UK has been characterized as “predominantly monolingual and unicultural” (Wei 2006,
82). Although complementary schools do exist, these receive minimal—if any—government support (Creese et al.
2006). Indeed, as Wei (2006, 78) points out, most complementary schools—whether based on language, culture, or
religion—“were set up in response to the failure of the mainstream education system to meet the needs of the ethnic
minority children and their communities—a fact that is often deliberately ignored by various UK governments.” She
notes further that the Conservative government, under Margaret
Thatcher, “used the success of the Chinese community schools to argue that ethnic minorities were better off with ‘selfreliance’ and cut back already limited funding in the local education authorities’ budgets for bilingual classroom
assistants. Complementary schools and classes were further marginalised as a result” (Wei 2006, 78).
• Local authorities continue to make some provision for bilingual classroom assistants, but these are viewed as a tool
for enhancing pupils’ English language ability, rather than for an important part of mother tongue maintenance. In
other words, policy measures are directed more at improving minority students’ outcomes within the existing school
system, rather than through complementary or alternative programs (see, for example, Department for Children,
Schools and Families 2007). As Wei (2006, 78) points out, complementary schools and the maintenance of mother
tongue language and culture are “seenminority concern and were left with ethnic minority communities to deal with
themselves.”

8.

Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant
groups

Yes

Evidence:
• The UK’s first Race Relations Act was passed in 1965, but it was not until 1976 that it was expanded to include both
direct and indirect discrimination, as well as remedies for infringement. Although the 1976 act permitted positive
action measures, such as the provision of services to meet the needs of particular groups (e.g., refugees), this was
strengthened in the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. The amended act applies to public authorities, including
governments, schools and the police and gives them a “general duty to promote race equality” (Department for
Children, Schools and Families 2010). Public bodies must, as a result, give “due regard” to the need to “eliminate
unlawful racial discrimination; and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different
racial groups” (ibid.). Thus, the act goes beyond anti-discrimination initiatives to include more proactive or positive
measures. Moreover, while anti- discrimination measures existed prior to the passage of the amended act, it was only
after 2000 that the government itself became subject to affirmative action measures.
http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/evidence/UnitedKingdom.html
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Multiculturalism in France: According to Queen’s university
multicultural index
1.

Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary
affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and / or
regional and municipal levels and the existence of a
government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to
implement this policy in consultation with ethnic
communities

No

Evidence:
• Article 1 of the French constitution (1958) says that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social
republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall
respect all beliefs.”
• Delvainquière (2007, 20) interprets this as an affirmation that “France does not recognise minorities, whether they be
ethnic, religious, linguistic or other. Under French law, all citizens have equal rights, and the law is not intended to
accord specific rights to given ‘groups’ defined by their community of origin, culture, beliefs, language or ethnicity.”
• To be sure, France is a culturally diverse country, and this dimension is not ignored entirely. De Wenden (2005, 73)
has argued that a distinctly French approach to multiculturalism is evolving, particularly with respect to the country’s
Maghrebian population, which in their negotiations with French officials, has tended to follow a republican model,
asking for a delegation of responsibility in particular areas, while respecting France’s laws and values and assuming a
French cultural identity. This, in de Wenden’s view, is the “French compromise.”
• In 2007, a Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development was created by President
Sarkozy. It is mandated to control migration flows (and illegal migration, in particular), encourage cooperation
between migrants and their countries of origin, promote the French identity and facilitate integration. Integration is
recognized as a two-way process that involves migrants as well as the host society. Nonetheless, it is clear that
immigrants are expected to integrate into existing French culture and society; it is the responsibility of the state and
society to help facilitate this (Ministère de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement
solidaire 2010).
• Until recently, there were several other organizations undertaking work related to immigration and integration. These
include the Fonds d’Action Social pour les Travailleurs Immigrés et leurs Familles (FAS), the Service Social d’Aide
aux Emigrants (SSAE), the Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI), the Direction de la Population et des
Migration (DPM), and the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI). Most of these have now been centralized into the
National Agency for the Welcoming of Foreigners and Migrants (ANAEM —Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des
Etrangers et des Migrations) (Schiff et al. 2008b).
• At the local level, Schiff et al. (2008b) note that policies related to integration and inclusion are rarely ever unified
and certainly never targeted directly at immigrants and minorities; they exist instead under the auspices of various other
administrative departments and programs. Local migrant councils have been introduced, but their consultative role is
limited to issues that fall under municipal jurisdiction (Schuerken2005).

2.

The adoption of multiculturalism in school
curriculum

No
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3.

The inclusion of ethnic representation / sensitivity
in the mandate of public media

Only weakly and not explicitly

Evidence:
• Radio and television broadcasting is overseen by the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA), which was established
in 1989; it was the third broadcasting regulator to have been created in France.
• The 1986 Law on Freedom of Communication gives the Conseil its authority. Its responsibilities include ensuring
broadcasters adhere to the principles of pluralism and objectivity, ensuring respect for human dignity, protecting the
interests of children, and protecting and promoting French language and culture on television and radio. The Conseil
must also ensure television is accessible (particularly to those who are deaf or hearing-impaired) and that the
“audiovisual media reflect the diversity of French society.” In the Conseil’s mandate, it is noted that “the media have a
responsibility to present an image reflecting the reality of today’s France and to combat discrimination. The
Observatoire de la diversité has been established by the Conseil as a dedicated tool to assess policies implemented by
television channels in this respect” (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel 2010; see also Delvainquière 2007).
• Neither the legislation nor the mandate of the Conseil specifically mentions ethnic or racial minorities, although
“diversity” “pluralism” and the absence of “discrimination” are referenced. This is consistent with France’s definition
of equality which does not permit the differentiation of groups on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion.
• Some observers have pointed to the absence of minorities on mainstream television and radio and suggest that this
has spurred the development of an ethnic press and various ethno-specific channels (Schuerkens 2005).

4.

Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or
court cases)

No

Evidence:
• Latraverse (2008, 3) notes that France employs a formal, universalistic definition of equality. That is, “rules are
judged to meet the requirement of equality if they are the same for all. In theory, exceptions to the generality of the law
are by their very nature illegal, and the principle of equality is exhaustively expressed by equality before the law.” Of
course, there are instances when differential treatment occurs, but the categorization of groups for this purpose is only
permitted if the criteria employed are based on purely objective indicators (e.g., socioeconomic status). Categorization
on the basis of identity is not permitted and, “specifically, no circumstances are considered to justify differential
treatment on grounds of ‘race’ or ‘origin’” (Latraverse 2008, 3). This has been affirmed in French case law, which does
not recognize such groups as legal categories (Latraverse 2008).
• No examples of exemptions for military personnel or police officers could be found and, given the reticence to
recognize racial, ethnic or religious “groups,” it is doubtful that group-based exemptions would be granted. Such
policies could only be enacted if they were based on other “neutral” grounds (e.g., social disadvantage, age, sex).
• Although schools do provide special menus to children who do not eat pork, the wearing of religious symbols is
highly restricted. As Schiff et al. (2008a, 11) point out “after a long and much publicized debate, regulations regarding
the respect of the secular principle (laïcité) in schools were made more stringent and a law was instituted on March 15,
2004 which explicitly bans the public wearing ‘of signs or clothing through which students ostentatiously manifest
their religious faith’ (Law n° 2004-228).”
• In 2008, India put pressure on the French government to reconsider its ban on the turban, but President
Sarkozy reiterated the principles of neutrality and secularism and noted that these apply to everyone, including Sikhs
(PTI 2008).
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5.

Allows dual citizenship

Yes

Evidence:
• Nothing in French law prevents or prohibits the holding of more than one citizenship (see Howard 2005; United
States Office for Personnel Management 2001).

6.

The funding of ethnic group organizations or
activities

Yes

Evidence:
• In 1981, the provisions of France’s Law on Association, which was originally passed in 1901, were extended to
immigrants and the foreign-born. This gave them the right to establish associations under certain conditions, as long as
they respect the constitution and, in particular, the principles of secularism, equality and freedom of conscience
(Delvainquière 2007).

7.

The funding of bilingual education or mothertongue instruction

No

Evidence:
• Schiff et al. (2008a) argue that the French school system makes very few provisions for ethnic or cultural minorities.
Since 1975, there have been some courses offered in “languages and cultures of origin” (Enseignement en Langues et
Cultures d’Origine—ELCO), but these are a result of bilateral agreements with various countries of origin and are not
an initiative of the French government. They have also come under criticism; they are often viewed as an impediment
to full integration and in contravention of the principle of equal treatment.
• This is influenced strongly by France’s policy of not differentiating citizens on the basis of ethnic or racial origin; this
makes it difficult to target programs specifically to minority children. As a result, programs that assist immigrant or
minority children tend to be promoted as initiatives for “disadvantaged” children (Schiff et al. 2008a).
• Some specialized organizations provide training in the languages most commonly spoken by immigrants (including
Arabic, Portuguese, and various languages from Asia and Central and Eastern Europe). Delvainquière (2007, 22) notes
that “from a general standpoint, France has been committed, for the last several years, to the development of
multilingualism, in particular by increasing the number of language teaching establishments.” There are various
programs available to assist in the development of multilingualism; these include self-teaching modules available at
Paris’s Public Information Library, as well as language courses offered on Radio France Internationale (Delvainquière
2007).

• Where there are bilingual classes, these tend to be focused on the instruction of one of France’s regional languages
(Eurybase 2008a). Moreover, while the curriculum encourages the learning of foreign languages, this tends to be
geared toward students destined for higher education, those who attend private schools, and those in the most affluent
neighbourhoods; as a result, minority children tend not to be the primary beneficiaries (Schiff et al. 2008a).
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8.

Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant
groups

No

Evidence:
• Schiff et al. (2008b, 2) note that “state-initiated and state-sponsored programs, designed to help disadvantaged groups
in education, employment and public services, are not explicitly aimed at particular ethnic groups. Although antidiscrimination law is quite developed and condemns all forms or differentiation according to ethnic origin in a variety
of domains, there exists no French version of affirmative action based on racial or ethnic characteristics” (emphasis
added). Further, even where there are policies that could be considered positive action measures targeting immigrants
or minorities (including, for example, the designation of several spots at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques for students
from particularly disadvantaged school districts), the initiatives are framed in terms of “merit” not on the basis of any
socially relevant group characteristic.
• French law also prohibits the collection of data on race or ethnic origin (Schiff et al. 2008b); this would render it
difficult to implement or effectively monitor an affirmative action policy.
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APPENDIX III: MEASURES OF CAUSAL MECHANISMS
Section I:
Minorities At Risk
Measure for Real Justifications to
Participate in Violence

Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) "Minorities at Risk
Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
Methodology: Reference Appendix VIII

Minorities At Risk: Methodology
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project is a university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the
status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at
least 500,000

MAR tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present -identifying where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses specifically on
ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary
world because of their status and political actions. Political significance is determined by the following two
criteria:
A: The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment via-vis other
groups in a society
B: The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests
The centerpiece of the project is a dataset that tracks groups on political, economic, and cultural
dimensions. The project also maintains analytic summaries of group histories, risk assessments, and group
chronologies for each group in the dataset
The minority group assessments consist of two parts: a risk assessment and an analytic summary. The risk
assessment summarizes whether the group is at risk of rebellion, protest, or repression, based on levels of a
number of other variables. The analytic summary gives a brief history of the group and its relations with the
state. The group's values on key variables from the dataset are embedded within both components.
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Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

Criteria
MAR focuses specifically on ethno-political groups, non-state communal groups that have
"political significance" in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions.
Political significance is determined by the following two criteria:

The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis
other groups in a society

The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of
its self-defined interests

Many group traits can contribute to the sentiments and interests that lead to collective action by
ethno-political groups. The possible bases of communal identity include shared language,
religion, national or racial origin, common cultural practices, and attachment to a particular
territory. Most communal identity groups also share a common history, or myths of shared
experience, that often include their victimization by others. No one of these is essential to group
identity. Fundamentally what matters is the belief--by people who share some such traits and by
those with whom they interact--that the traits Set them apart from others in ways that justify their
separate treatment and status.

"Data." MAR. University of Maryland, 18 May 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp>.
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Assessment for Muslim (Noncitizens) in France
Risk Assessment:
There is some risk of the non-citizen Muslims in France employing militant strategies in their dealings with
the government. Specific factors, which may contribute to the likelihood of rebellion amongst the French
Muslims, include repression and recent rioting.
However, the French Muslims do lack other factors, which encourage rebellion such as regime instability,
territorial concentration and group cohesion. Furthermore, they have come to France to try to build a better
life and would not want to jeopardize this life by such activities. As non-citizens they could simply be
deported. The group already faces the stereotype in France that assumes all Muslims are involved with
Algerian terrorist groups, and any militant activity would only reinforce this belief.
The group does have many of the risk factors that point to a high probability of protests, (repression,
cultural and political restrictions), and these in combination with their history of protest, such as the 1983
“Marche des Beurs”, in which about 100,000 immigrants marched to Paris, makes this strategy likely to be
used again in the future. Certainly their violent riots, which lasted approximately three weeks in 2005 is an
indication that Muslims in France are at risk for future protests. Additionally, the war in Iraq and the 2004
passage of the French law banning conspicuous religious symbols, including headscarves, from schools has
created tension in the recent years with the Muslim population. While this was largely in practice already
due to a ministerial decree in 1994, it did manage to spark some protests in 2004.
While not as bad as in other countries in Western Europe, the ultra right wing is still a threat to the group;
racism is rampant; and as more cases of police racism are reported, there will be more demands to protect
the group. However, the French government has attempted to help ameliorate problems of integration,
including a 2004 move by Sarkozy in which he nominated a Muslim to the post of Préfet in Nantes, France.
The Muslims are also very poor compared to the rest of France. The lack of cohesion in the group has been
and will continue to be a severe limitation in the group’s attempts to improve their situation.

"Data." MAR. University of Maryland, 18 May 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp>.
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Assessment for Asians in the United Kingdom
Risk Assessment
The risk of rebellion by Asians in the United Kingdom is low, although not nonexistent. However, violence
that does erupt is more likely in reaction to the central government’s foreign policies, as was seen in the
2005 subway bombings in London. It is unlikely that more than sporadic violence can be sustained, as the
majority of Asians and Asian advocacy groups pursue nonviolent means.
Although they do not have the usual risk factors associated with protest -- such as repression, political
restrictions, support by organized kindred groups, etc. -- their situation is deteriorating, and it is likely that
they will attempt to bring attention to this.
Several Asians serve in Parliament and many more have been elected to municipal councils, so
conventional political opportunities are present. Nonetheless there is substantial potential for future protest,
especially in response to deterioration in the group’s security and the glacial pace of anti-discrimination
efforts. Protest is not likely to be large-scale or sustained, however, because the group remains culturally
and politically fragmented.
There is also some risk for communal clashes arising from increasing tension between the Black and Asian
communities, and between Muslim and non-Muslim community. In 2005 the communal conflict reached its
peak in Birmingham. The alleged rape of a 14-year-old of Jamaican descent led to nights of protests and
rioting between the British Asian and Afro-Caribbean groups.
"Data." MAR. University of Maryland, 18 May 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp>.
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Section II

European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion
Index
Varying Political Objectives pursued
through Violence as demonstrated by
extent of minority inclusion in Britain and
France
OR
Perceptions of Foreign Occupation of
Majority Islamic States

Geddes, Andrew, Jan Niessen, Richard Gowan, and Laura
Citron. European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index.
Brussels: British Council Brussels, 2005. Print.
Methodology: Reference Appendix VIII

Report of the official Account of the
Bombings in London on 7th of July 2005
9 Feb 2014. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/7-july-report.pdf>.

European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index
Method: The Member States’ policies were compared to a common normative framework. The
normative framework sets out a formulation of the basis for immigrant inclusion, which argues
that immigrant inclusion requires:1.Labour Market Inclusion 2.Family Reunion 3. Long Term
Residence 4.Naturalization and 5.Anti-Discrimination. In each of these ﬁve areas, a number of
speciﬁc policy indicators were developed, and each Member State scored against each policy
indicator. The indicators were based on the existing commitments of Member States to give
immigrants rights and obligations comparable to EU citizens. There are almost 100 policy
indicators. The data to score the EU-15 against the policy indicators was collected from migration
experts in the EU-15.

Index Structure: The Index sets out a formulation of inclusion based on labor market
inclusion and civic citizenship. It sets out a comprehensive set of policies that Member States can
use to facilitate immigrant inclusion. Inclusion requires more than just access to the labor market.
Work is not enough – for immigrants to be included successfully into society, they need to feel
secure, and to feel that their contribution over time is valued. The policies that can create these
favorable conditions over the long term are in the areas of labor market inclusion, long term
residence; family reunion; naturalization and anti-discrimination. Together, long-term residence,
family reunion, naturalization and anti-discrimination contribute to what is often called ‘civic
citizenship.’

Scoring System: To summarize - the Index is built up from almost 100 indicators.
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Each country is given a score of 1, 2 or 3 for each indicator depending on which option - least
favorable, less favorable or favorable – is selected. The indicators are grouped into ﬁve strands
(Labour Market Inclusion, Long-Term Residence, Family Reunion, Naturalization, AntiDiscrimination).Within each of the ﬁve strands, the indicators are divided into four dimensions.
The four dimensions are consistent across the ﬁve strands as far as possible.
To allow us to analyze the results usefully, we have calculated averages and indices from the
numerous, complicated indicator results collected. The strand average per country is calculated as
the average of all the indicators in the strand. So, for each country, there are ﬁve strand averages.
The dimension average per country per strand is calculated as the mean of all the indicators in the
dimension, in the strand. So, for each country, there are four dimension averages per strand.
Note– The strand average is NOT the mean of the four
Geddes, Andrew, Jan Niessen, Richard Gowan, and Laura Citron. European Civic Citizenship and
Inclusion Index. Brussels: British Council Brussels, 2005. Print.
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Political Objectives pursued through Violence in Britain and France among Islamic
Minorities according to the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index
France’s Overall performance for Ethno-Religious Minority Citizenship
and Inclusion
France’s performance in four of ﬁve strands of indicators is above the
European average – in labor market inclusion it is below average. In all cases, the
variation is not great, with the biggest discrepancy being in the area of long-term
residence

Labor market inclusion

In labor market inclusion, France is ahead of the
European average on labor market integration issues
and rights associated with labor status. It is most
obviously below the European average in terms of
access and eligibility (where it has a moderately
unfavorable score), and slightly below it on labor
market inclusion and security of employment status.

Eligibility for long-term residence and
security of status

In terms of eligibility for long-term residence, as
well as security of status, France is well above the
European average – it has a favourable3.00 on the
former. However, in terms of conditions for longterm residence, it is marginally below the average

Rights associated with family reunion

France is well above the European average in terms
of rights associated with family reunion (a 3.00),
and less clearly ahead in terms of security of status.
It is just below the European average for conditions
for acquisition of status.

Nationality

Anti-discrimination

France performs strongly in all areas for nationality,
especially rights to dual nationality – a very strong
favorable score. In terms of security of status, it
comes in just under the European average, with a
moderately unfavorable score
France is above the European average in half of the
measures for anti-discrimination, notably in
remedies and sanctions. In these areas, its scores are
clustered around the division between less favorable
and moderately favorable categories. But it is below
the European average in respect of equality
agencies, with an unfavourable1.00.

Geddes, Andrew, Jan Niessen, Richard Gowan, and Laura Citron. European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index. Brussels:
BritishCouncil Brussels, 2005. Print
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Britain’s Overall performance for Ethno-Religious Minority Citizenship
and Inclusion
Britain is very close to the European average in each indicator. It is slightly higher than average
in labor market inclusion, longer-term residence and nationality and slightly below in antidiscrimination. All its strand scores are within the less favorable category.

Access, eligibility and labor market
integration measures

Though Britain performs above the European
average in access and eligibility and labor market
integration measures, it is below average in security
and rights associated with labor market
participation.

Rights associated with long-term residence

Family reunion

Eligibility for nationality

Anti-discrimination

Britain is below the European average with regard
to rights associated with long-term residence and, to
a much larger degree, to eligibility. However, it
performs comparably better in conditions for
acquisition and security

Again, this time for family reunion, Britain is above
the European average for two of the indicators and
below for the other half. However, there is not too
much difference between the ﬁgures, with the
exception of security of reunion, where it performs
poorly

Though it is slightly below the European average
for eligibility for nationality, Britain performs well
in the other three indicators, especially security

In terms of anti-discrimination, there are again no
signiﬁcant differences between Britain’s
performance and the European averages; it is
slightly below in remedies and sanctions but
marginally higher in the other three indicators

Geddes, Andrew, Jan Niessen, Richard Gowan, and Laura Citron. European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index. Brussels: British
Council Brussels, 2005. Print.
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Political Objectives pursued through Violence in Britain among Islamic Minorities
according to the Report of the official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th of July
2005
Motivation
The best indications of the group’s motivation are set out in Khan’s video
statement, first aired on the Arabic television channel, Al Jazeera on 1
September and in his last Will and Testament, discovered by the police after
the bombings.
The focus of the video is on perceived injustices carried out by the West
against Muslims justifying violence through his own twisted interpretation of
Islam. The key passages are:
“Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities
that this world has to offer.
Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and
following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger
Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated.
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of
them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and
sisters.
Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop
the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will
not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a solider. Now you too will
taste the reality of this situation....
I myself, I make du’a 4 to Allah....to raise me amongst those whom
I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s
heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman alZawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and
sisters that are fighting in the...of this cause.”

9 Feb 2014. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/7-july-report.pdf>.
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Section III: Civil liberties and opportunities for Violence

Indicators of Democratic Vitality
Independent Variable I
A. Demonstration of Democracies’ vulnerability to experience violence because of Civil
Liberties and Political Liberties

Freedom House Measures for Civil liberties and Political Liberties

“Freedom in the World.” Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 June 2012. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedomworld>.

Status of civil liberties in France and Britain as prescribed by Freedom
House:
Opportunities for violence associated with democratic practice
Britain’s Score from 2002 to 2011: 1
Frances Score 2002-2011: 1
TREND ARROW:
France received a downward trend arrow due to a continued pattern of political and societal discrimination
against ethnic minorities, manifested in policies including a government-sponsored debate about national
identity, the passage of a ban on facial coverings in public places, and the systematic deportation of some
8,000 Roma.
“Freedom in the World.” Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 June 2012. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reporttypes/freedom-world>.
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Behaviors of Britain and France, negatively affecting status of civil liberties, but determined to
reduce prospects of political Violence:
Freedom House’s qualitative indicators of compromise to civil liberties in relation to threats of
political violence
Behaviors in Britain form 2002 to 2011 related to minimizing prospects of political violence
but that undermine civil liberties as detailed by Freedom House
Attacks on British refugee asylum policy continued in 2001. Britain has been unable to handle an
increasing influx of refugees; currently more than 40,000 people await decisions on asylum applications.
The Immigration and Asylum Act, enacted in April 2000, seeks to deter asylum seekers by offering them
vouchers redeemable for goods instead of cash welfare benefits. In addition, asylum seekers are to be
dispersed among 13 designated sites around Britain instead of being allowed to settle where they choose,
and refugees whose applications for asylum are turned down will be allowed only one appeal. Rights
activists charged that the new law, which does not allow vendors to give change in cash for vouchers that
exceed the value of goods purchased, would both demean and reinforce prejudice against refugees
The Terrorism Act 2000, permanent legislation to replace emergency laws concerning political violence,
became effective on February 19, 2001. Amnesty International released a briefing on the bill, outlining
concerns about provisions such as arrest, entry, and search and seizure without warrant; denial of a
detainee's access to counsel upon arrest and during interrogation; detention without trial for up to 12 days;
and the shifting of the burden of proof from prosecution to defense. Shafiq Ur Rehman, a Muslim cleric
accused of supporting terrorism, was ordered to be deported in October after 17 months of deliberations by
the Law Lords. In December, the government passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act after just
a month of parliamentary and public scrutiny, which allows for indefinite detention of terrorism suspects
without charge
In December 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted by "written procedure" antiterrorist
legislation that requires member states to prevent "the public" from offering "any form of support, active or
passive" to terrorists and to check all refugees and asylum seekers for terrorist connections. Human rights
groups criticized the legislation because it does not distinguish between conscious or unconscious
assistance, treats would-be immigrants as criminals, and was not debated in parliament before being
adopted
The terrorist attacks led to government proposals to toughen antiterrorism laws, which in turn sparked
concerns about civil liberties. The proposals, first introduced in August 2005, were wide ranging. However,
in one of the first bills to be voted on by the House of Commons, Blair was defeated. Instead of extending
the time terrorism suspects could be held without detention from 14 to 90 days, the Commons extended the
period to 28 days. In another government setback, the Law Lords, the highest court in Britain, ruled in
December that evidence obtained through torture could not be used at trial
Concerns about terrorism extended into 2006. In February, a radical and outspoken Muslim cleric, Abu
Hamza al-Masri, was convicted of soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred. (British National Party
leader Nick Griffin was cleared of incitement charges in November after calling Islam a “vicious, wicked
faith,” prompting claims by some observers that the justice system was biased against Muslims.) In August,
authorities reported that they had disrupted a plot to blow up transatlantic airliners departing London
Brown’s efforts to double the amount of time that police could hold suspects without charge to 56 days
continued in 2008. The period was shortened to 42 days in a bill submitted in 2008. Although the bill
passed the House of Commons in June, despite individual Labour members’ opposition, the House of Lords
soundly defeated it. Brown, rather than trying to force it past the Lords, decided to hold the bill in reserve
in case of emergency
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In 2009, a government report found that many people arrested under the antiterrorism laws had been
subsequently charged with different crimes, indicating that the laws may have been misused. It also showed
that people of Asian descent have been arrested on flimsier grounds than others. In June the Law Lords
ruled that the evidence used against a defendant may not be kept secret under so-called control orders—
restrictive conditions placed on terrorism suspects—as was previously the case
The new government (in 2010) promised to review the Labour governments’ tightening of security at the
perceived expense of civil liberties

“Freedom in the World.” Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 June 2012. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedomworld>.

264

Behaviors in France from 2002 to 2011 related to minimizing prospects of political violence
but that undermine civil liberties as detailed by Freedom House
A 1999 law sets maximum limits on detention of suspects during a criminal investigation. Also included in
the bill was the formation of "detention judges" to rule on the justification of incarceration. Additionally,
those being held for interrogation must have immediate access to an attorney. However, public security
laws allow police far-reaching powers to tap telephones, carry out searches, and jail terror suspects without
trial for up to four years

In October, following the terrorist attacks on the United States, French police arrested nine people with
reported links to the Al-Qaeda terror network on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks in France. In
November, Parliament adopted new anti-terror legislation. Police are now able to search cars with the
authorization of a prosecutor, a right previously prohibited. Police can also search private property without
warrants. They also have greater access to private telephone conversations and e-mail. Judges can now
demand that phone and Internet companies save messages for up to one year
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, new security laws, granting police sweeping new
search-and-seizure powers, came into effect
December 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted by "written procedure" antiterrorism
legislation that requires member states to prevent "the public" from offering "any form of support, active or
passive" to terrorists and to check all refugees and asylum seekers for terrorist connections. Human rights
groups criticized the legislation because it does not distinguish between conscious or unconscious
assistance, treats would-be immigrants as criminals, and was not debated in parliament before being
adopted
In November 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the United States, parliament adopted new
antiterrorism legislation. Police may search cars with a prosecutor's authorization and other private property
without warrants. They have greater access to private telephone conversations and e-mail. Judges can
demand that phone and Internet companies save telecommunications data for one to two years
The Internal Security Guidance and Planning Law was passed in July 2002. The law gives police, with a
judge's permission, the power to make remote online searches of Internet service providers and their
records of customers' Internet activities and private and professional e-mail traffic. Critics are concerned
about Internet-based freedom of expression and individual rights to confidentiality
France's stiff antiterrorism campaign has included surveillance of mosques, and raids for unrelated reasons
(such as tax inspections) sometimes target places where Muslims in particular are found (such as halal
butchers). Terrorist suspects can be detained for up to four days without being charged. France is more
willing than other European countries to deport radical Muslim clerics for speech considered incitement to
extremism or terrorism. The police are frequently criticized for aggressiveness in random personal checks,
which often target youths of North African and African descent. Such police checks have deepened
resentment between minorities and the authoritie
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APPENDIX IV: INDICIES AND POLLING DATA
Section I:
Integration of Minorities in Britain according to MIPEX
Score: 57
Key findings:
•

Some of strongest anti-discrimination laws and equality policies.

•

Strongest commitment to implement intercultural education.

Anti-discrimination
UK has some of the strongest anti-discrimination laws and equality policies, which help
newcomers and ethnic minorities achieve equal opportunities in practice. Discrimination
is illegal on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion or nationality in all areas of life. During
the last MIPEX, the 2006 Equality Act created a single equality body, the EHRC. The
2010 Equality Act makes the law more coherent and easy to use (see box). The UK has
committed to promote equality through the EHRC’s powers, state equality duties and
public information policies. Still, its rather average enforcement mechanisms would
improve if equality NGOs could play a role in court, as in 24 countries, and use class
actions, as in 14.
Labor Market Mobility
Non-EU migrants’ labor market mobility in the UK is favorable, as in most countries of
labor migration. Once they pass the points system, they are generally treated the same as
British workers. The UK does not close off sectors of the economy to immigrants, nor
deny access to job services.
Education
Migrant pupils receive better support in schools across Britain than they do on the
continent, while all pupils receive the best education on how to live together in a diverse
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society. Generally across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, newcomers
benefit from slightly favorable targeted measures.
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Integration of Minorities in France According to MIPEX
Score: 51
Key findings:
• Few countries follow France in imposing job, language and integration
requirements for family reunion
• Most countries that facilitate naturalization grant local voting rights for foreigners
– not yet France
• New targeted labor market measures still overlook major problems of access
Anti- discrimination
The independent and slightly strong equality body, la HALDE, has been effective in
advising government and the increasing numbers of victims. However, FR alone slightly
weakened national protections when transposing EU law (see box). This is prohibited in
14 other countries. Following the 2009 Sabeg report, government could focus on its own
modest equality policies.
Labor Market Mobility
Despite governmental promises to promote ‘selective’ work migration, France denies all
non-EU residents selected to live there with equal opportunities in more areas of its labor
market than most European countries. While unemployed non-EU residents can use
better implemented targeted measures to find work, they have limited opportunities to
enter a career that matches their skills. They are denied legal access to more jobs than in
all MIPEX countries.
Education
As in established immigration countries, all pupils can access schools and what general
support exists for disadvantaged students. If they (immigrants) later have different needs
than peers with similar social backgrounds (e.g. newcomers, limited French), few are
entitled to targeted support
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Section II
AUGUST 17, 2006

The French-Muslim Connection Is France Doing a Better Job of Integration than Its Critics?

by Jodie T. Allen
When Muslim youth rioted in the suburbs of France late last year, commentators were quick to fault the
French “color-blind” assimilation model. “The unrest in France’s cities shows that social and policing
policy has failed, as well as integration,” read the headline on an article in the Economist magazine on
November 12, 2005.
But findings from the latest Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which included over-samples of Muslims in four
European countries,1 suggest that the French model can claim some success, however mixed. Some aspects
of that relative success are especially striking when compared with the attitudes and experiences of
Muslims in Great Britain, where police last week foiled a home-grown plot by Islamic terrorists to blow up
U.S.-bound airliners.
France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, an estimated 5 million persons primarily of
Algerian and Moroccan extraction (since religion is not tabulated in France’s census, no official estimate is
available). Similarly, Muslims in Spain are largely of Moroccan extraction. By contrast, Pakistanis
predominate among Britain’s Muslims along with other ethnicities, while Germany’s Muslims are primarily
Turkish in origin.
Where European Muslims Mostly Agree
When you see your Muslim friends on a daily basis you don’t think that relations with Muslims are bad. But
if all you do is watch television, most of what you see are extreme examples of Islam. Islam is not the
religion of terror. But people are afraid of terrorism and too often religion is mixed up in the debate.
– Pierre-Etienne Issoulie, 22, architect, Paris2
It’s true that relations are bad, but to go from there to saying who’s wrong? I think everyone bears some
responsibility. On the Muslim side, it’s too much religion, religion, religion, and they don’t want to open up
to others.
– Jeannine Pilé, 33, housewife and mother
[All interviews cited in this analysis were conducted in France by reporters for the International Herald
Tribune.]
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French Muslims do share many opinions with their co-religionists in neighboring countries. Primary among
them is concern about joblessness. More than half of French Muslims (52%) say they are very worried
about unemployment among Muslims — the primary complaint of last fall’s rioters — and an additional
32% say they are somewhat concerned. These levels are comparable to those expressed by Spanish,
German and, to a slightly lesser degree, by British Muslims. (Curiously, among French Muslims, only 48%
of those under age 35 say they are very worried about unemployment compared with 59% of their elders.)

Like Muslims elsewhere in Europe, the French also worry more generally about the future of Muslims in
their country — though, in this case, Muslims in France are significantly less worried than those in Great
Britain. A majority (57%) is also at least somewhat concerned about the declining importance of religion
among their co-religionists in France, though again, British Muslims are more troubled on this score with
73% sharing the worry. (In this, as in other questions in the survey, no significant difference is seen among
the responses of French Muslims of Algerian, Moroccan or other ethnicity.)
Not surprisingly, a majority of French Muslims (63%) sympathize with their youthful rioters — but not
much more so than do Muslims in Spain and Germany. Interestingly, British Muslims are significantly
more tolerant of the French car-burners, with fully 75% offering their sympathy.
Common Attitudes toward Non-Muslims
Relations between Muslims and westerners may be bad between governments; I don’t actually think they
are bad between people. But the people don’t really get a chance to get to know each other… I think the
mass media has played a big role in this. It’s not objective on either side, and that leads to false
stereotypes.
– M’hand Chabbi, 29, of Moroccan origin, works selling Moroccan specialties in a central Paris market
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French Muslims share the view that relations between Muslims and Westerners are bad, a view prevalent
elsewhere in Europe — and in predominantly Muslim countries — with the exception of Spain, where
nearly half of the Muslim population rates relations as good compared with fewer than a quarter who call
them bad. But while 58% of French Muslims view relations with Westerners as bad, far more (41%) view
these relations as good than do British or German Muslims.
Additional points of similarity between French and other European Muslims include generally unfavorable
opinions of the United States, of its war on terrorism and, to a lesser degree, of its citizens
Also, like the great majority of Muslims in Great Britain and Spain (though less so in Germany) French
Muslim sympathies in the Middle East lie with the Palestinians rather than with Israel. However, nearly
two-in-three French Muslims (65%) worry about extremism among Muslims — as do even more (70%) of
British Muslims. And, like Muslims elsewhere in Europe only a tiny minority of French Muslims (16%)
say that suicide bombings and other violence against civilian targets in defense of Islam can often or
sometimes be justified.
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Voici La Différence

However, even on the hot button issues of the Middle East, French Muslims depart company with others of
their faith both in Europe and in the Muslim world. For example, French Muslims are evenly split on the
question of the effect of the victory by the radical group Hamas in this year’s Palestinian election, with
44% saying it was good for Palestinians and 46% judging it bad. By comparison, British Muslims weighed
in lopsidedly on the positive side (56% ‘good’ vs. 18% ‘bad’) as did Spanish Muslims (57% vs. 22%).
Moreover, joined only by German Muslims in Europe, the French are heavily opposed (71%) to the
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. British Muslims, in contrast, are evenly split on the subject.
And while the majority of Muslims in all four European countries surveyed say they have little or no
confidence in Osama bin Laden, French Muslims are virtually unanimous (93%) in their disdain. (By
comparison, 68% of British Muslims submit a vote of no confidence in the Al Qaeda leader.)

Most striking, however, is the difference between the views that French Muslims hold about people of
other faiths and the views held by Muslims elsewhere in Europe and in predominantly Muslim countries.
French Muslims even top the general publics in the United States and France in favorable ratings of
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Christians (91% of French Muslims vs. 88% of Americans and 87% of the French take that view).
But what most distinguishes French Muslims from their co-religionists not only in the Muslim world but in
Europe, is their attitude toward Jews. Fully 71% of French Muslims express a positive view of people of
the Jewish faith, compared with only 38% of German Muslims, 32% of British Muslims, 28% of Spanish
Muslims and still lower numbers in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed. In this, Muslims reflect
the view of the larger French public among whom fully 86% express a favorable opinion of Jews, a higher
proportion than even than among the American public.
At Home in France?
There are a lot of Muslims who are much more open, who don’t pray regularly — that’s what I see in
France. What happens in other countries I don’t know. From what I see it’s half and half in France. There
are some who are super-cool, who are not practicing, who are very open to France, and others who are
less.
– Wahid Chekhar, 34, actor
Most Muslims in France feel very French — but they feel that the French don’t see them that way, because
they may look Arab or black…. Surveys suggest that Muslims are generally more conservative for example
on issues such as sexuality and marriage… [But] the fraction of Muslims actively practicing their religion
in France is only 10 percent, which is very similar to that of practicing Catholics.
– Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, immigration specialist and research director, Center for International
Studies and Research, Paris

By and large, Muslims in France do not seem to see themselves as surrounded by hostile natives. Just 39%
say they think many or most Europeans are hostile toward Muslims — considerably lower percentage than
the 56% among the general French population who take that view. In Germany, where most Muslims are of
Turkish descent, roughly half (51%) see Europeans as unwelcoming — a view shared by 63% of the larger
German public.
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This perception of welcome persists despite the fact that French Muslims are somewhat more likely than
those in other European countries to report that they have had a bad experience attributable to their race,
ethnicity or religion. Nearly four-in-ten Muslims (37%) in France report such incidents, compared with
28% in Britain, 25% in Spain and 19% in Germany. Younger French Muslims are more likely to report a
bad experience — 40% of those under age 35 compared with 31% of those age 35 or older.

But what most distinguishes French Muslims among others in Europe are their self-perceptions. Few
Muslims living in France see a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern
society. Seven-in-ten French Muslims (72%) perceive no such conflict, a view shared by a virtually
identical 74%-share of the French general public. In Great Britain, however, Muslims split evenly (47% see
a conflict, 49% do not) while only 35% of the British general public see no inherent conflict between
devotion to Islam and adaptation to a modern society.
Moreover, when asked whether they consider themselves as a national citizen first or as a Muslim first,
French Muslims split relatively evenly (42% vs. 46%) on the issue. Not only is this remarkably different
from Muslims elsewhere in Europe (fully 81% of British Muslims self-identify with their religion rather
than their nationality, for example) but it is remarkably close to the responses given by Americans when
asked whether they identify first as national citizens or as Christians (48% vs. 42%). Perhaps in this, as in
other things, Muslims living in France are indeed absorbing the secular ways of their countrymen, among
whom fully 83% self-identify with their nationality, rather than their religion.
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On this one question, however, some evidence of a growing Islamic identity among younger French
Muslims appears. Among those under age 35, many of them French by birth, only 40% self-identify
primarily as French while 51% self-identify first as Muslim, while 7% say both equally. Among those 35
and older, 45% self-identify with their nationality, 36% as Muslims and 16% as both equally.
However, no such age differential appears on the question of whether Muslims in France want either to be
distinct from the larger culture or to adopt its customs. Nearly eight-in-ten French Muslims (78%) say they
want to adopt French customs. Those under age 35 are equally as likely to say this as are their elders. This
high preference for assimilation compares with that expressed by 53% of Muslims in Spain, 41% in Britain
and 30% in Germany.
All in all, one might conclude that, despite their problems — prime among them joblessness among youth
generally, not just Muslim youth — the French need take no integrationist lessons from their European
neighbors.

Notes
1Special samples among Muslim populations were surveyed in France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain
in the Spring of 2006. For the complete report, including a summary of the methodology. economic and
demographic data on the countries surveyed, and complete topline results see The Great Divide: How
Westerners and Muslims View Each Other
2All interviews cited in this analysis were conducted in France by reporters for the International Herald
Tribune.
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